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California Supreme Court Survey
January 1991-June 1991
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent deci-
sions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader
of the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve
as a starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are
analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the ex-
tent to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline
and judicial misconduct cases have been omitted from the survey.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Fair Employment and Housing Commission lacks
the authority to award compensatory damages in
employer harassment actions: Peralta Community College
District v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959, the California Legislature introduced the Fair Employ-
ment Practice Act' and in 1980 combined it with the Rumford Fair
Housing Act2 to produce the Fair Employment and Housing Acts
(hereinafter FEHA). The FEHA states that harassment of an em-
ployee is unlawful.4 An employee who is harassed by an employer
has three options. First, the employee may file an action in state
court under a common law cause of action.5 Second, the employee
may file an action in state court under the FEHA.6 Third, the em-
ployee may file a complaint with the Fair Employment and Housing
Department (hereinafter Department) 7 pursuant to the FEHA.
Where an employee files a complaint, the Department must inves-
tigate the claims and determine whether the complaint should be
heard by the Fair Employment and Housing Commission (hereinaf-
ter Commission). 9 When hearing a claim, the Commission has the
authority to assess fault and order any corrective measures includ-
ing, but not limited to those remedies expressly authorized by section
1. 1959 Cal. Stat. 1999-2005 (repealed 1980).
2. 1963 Cal. Stat. 3823-24 (repealed 1980).
3. 1980 Cal. Stat. 3140 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1991)). See Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment
Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 1055 (1983) (discussing the history and application of the FEHA). See generally 8
B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 756-58, 763, 766-67
(9th ed. 1988); 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1363-64 (9th ed.
1988); 41 CAL. JuR. 3D Labor § 405 (1978 & Supp. 1991); 50 AM. JUn. PROOF OF FAcTs
3 127, Sex Discrimination: Sexual Harassment Creating a Hostile Work Environ-
ment §§ 4 & 9 (1988); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, On-The-Job Sexual Harassment as
Violation of State Civil Rights Law, 18 A.L.R. 4TH 328 (1982).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h) (West Supp. 1991).
5. Rojo v. Klinger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 82, 801 P.2d 373, 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 140
(1990) (common law actions not precluded by FEHA).
6. See, e.g., Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 214, 649
P.2d 912, 914, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 272 (1982) (after obtaining "right to sue" letters, em-
ployees filed state court action pursuant to FEHA).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12960 (West Supp. 1991).
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12963 (West 1980).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12965(a), 12969 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
12970 of the California Government Code.1O
In Peralta Community College District v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission," a district employee filed a complaint with
the Department against her employer alleging sexual harassment.
Following a Department investigation, the Commission heard the
complaint and held in the employee's favor. In addition to other
remedies, the Commission awarded her $20,000 in compensatory
damages for her emotional distress.12 The Commission's decision was
reviewed by the trial court pursuant to an administrative writ of
mandamus.' 3 The trial court held that the Commission did not have
the authority to award compensatory damages and ordered that the
award of $20,000 be stricken.14 The court of appeal reversed.'5
The issue before the California Supreme Court in Peraltai 6 was
whether section 1297017 empowered the Commission to impose com-
pensatory damages's in a complaint alleging employer harassment.19
The supreme court held that section 12970 does not authorize the
Commission to impose compensatory damages in an action for harass-
ment against an employer. 20
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
In its decision, the supreme court analyzed the pertinent statutory
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970 (West Supp. 1991). See infra note 17.
11. 52 Cal. 3d 40, 801 P.2d 357, 276 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1990).
12. Id. at 44, 801 P.2d at 359, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 116. The Commission also ordered
Peralta to stop discriminating, to enact a written policy pertaining to sexual harass-
ment, to inform all employees of the policy against sexual harassment, and report to
the Commission on its compliance. Id. at 53 n.10, 801 P.2d at 365 n.10, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
122 n.10.
13. Id. at 44, 801 P.2d at 359, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Justice Panelli wrote the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Mosk, Eagleson, and Arabian concurring. Justice Broussard dissented in a sepa-
rate opinion in which Justice Kennard joined.
17. Section 12970(a) states, in pertinent part:
If the commission finds that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful prac-
tice under this part, it shall ... requir[e] such respondent to cease and desist
from such unlawful practice and to take such action, including, but not lim-
ited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, with or without back
pay, and restoration of membership in any respondent labor organization, as,
in the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this part,
and including a requirement for report of the manner of compliance.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
18. See generally 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts §§ 1319-26
(9th ed. 1988); 23 CAL. JUR. 3D Damages §§ 12-16 (1975); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 23-
35 (1988).
19. Peralta, 52 Cal. 3d at 48, 801 P.2d at 362, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 119. The court
clearly stated that compensatory damages might be available under a tort action. Id.
20. Id. at 60, 801 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
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language of the FEHA.21 The court noted that the purpose of the
FEHA is "to provide effective remedies which will eliminate... dis-
criminatory practices." 22 This purpose is to be accomplished by rem-
edies "included, but not limited to" those in section 12970.23 The
court stated that the remedies expressly authorized in section 12970
are "corrective measures," and are to be implemented in the work-
place.24 Further, the court determined that compensatory damages
were not designed to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, but
rather serve to make the victim of the discrimination whole.2 5 Fol-
lowing the doctrine of ejusdem generis,26 therefore, the court held
that compensatory damages are not within the scope of section 12970
because they are not sufficiently similar to the "corrective measures"
expressly provided.27
The supreme court stated that the legislative intent behind the
FEHA was to provide an "efficient and expeditious" option to the
state court system.28 Moreover, the court noted that the complexities
associated with awarding compensatory damages 29 would force the
Commission to act more like a traditional court.30 Therefore, author-
izing the Commission to award compensatory damages would defeat
the legislative intent of the FEHA.3s
21. Id. at 48-51, 801 P.2d at 362-64, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 119-21.
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980). See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employ-
ment and Hous. Comn'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387, 743 P.2d 1323, 1326, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 70
(1987) (punitive damages allowed where it serves FEHA purposes).
23. See supra note 17.
24. Peralta, 52 Cal. 3d at 49, 801 P.2d at 362, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
25. Id. (citation omitted). See supra note 19.
26. See generally 7 B. WmrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law
§§ 94, 96 (9th ed. 1988); 73 Am. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 155-60 (1974); Athena Mueller, An-
notation, Supreme Court's Views on Weight to be Accorded to Pronouncements of Leg-
islature, or Members of Legislature, Respecting Meaning or Intent of Preiously
Enacted Statute, 56 L. ED. 2D 918 (1979); Romualdo P. Eclaveva, Annotation, Supreme
Court's Application of the Rules of Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur A Sociis, 46 L. ED.
2D 879 (1977).
27. Peralta, 52 Cal. 3d at 49-50, 801 P.2d at 3362-63, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20.
28. Id. at 55, 801 P.2d at 366, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (citing Sterns v. Fair Employ-
ment Practice Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 490 P.2d 1115, 1120-21, 98 Cal. Rptr. 467, 472-
73 (1971)).
29. See W. PAGE KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54-55 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the complex nature
of awarding damages for emotional distress).
30. Peralta, 52 Cal. 3d at 55-56, 801 P.2d at 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
31. Id.
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard dissented for several reasons. Broussard argued
that the legislature's intent was to provide remedies that would make
the employee whole.32 One basis for this conclusion was that section
12970 provides for back pay damages, which directly serve to make
the employee whole.33 The focus of Justice Broussard's concern was
that the awarding of compensatory damages is often the only redress
that may serve to make the employee whole when harassment occurs
during employment.3 4
III. CONCLUSION
In Peralta, the court concluded that the legislative intent and the
language of section 12970 did not authorize the Commission to award
compensatory damages in an employer harassment action.3 5 The
court did not rule whether an agency's power to award unlimited
compensatory damages violates the judicial powers clause3 6 or the
right to a trial by jury.37 Therefore, should the legislature amend
section 12970 and empower the Commission to award compensatory
damages, an employer could still prevail on a state constitutional
challenge. The court's narrow construction of section 12970 decreases
the motivation for an employee to seek restoration from the Commis-
sion.3s Moreover, as a result of the ruling in the instant case and
other recent supreme court decisions,3 9 the number of harassment
actions filed in California courts should increase.40
RICHARD JOHN BERGSTROM III
32. Id. at 61, 801 P.2d at 371, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted).
33. Id. at 63, 801 P.2d at 372, 276 Cal. Rptr. 129 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 62, 801 P.2d at 371, 276 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Broussard, J., dissenting). The
majority noted that an employee may receive both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages where the action is filed in superior court. Id. at 45, 801 P.2d at 360, 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 117. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 60, 801 P.2d at 370, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
36. Id at 54-56, 801 P.2d at 365-67, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 122-24.
37. Id. at 57, 801 P.2d at 368, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 125. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 1.
38. James P. Hargarten & Daniel P. Westman, Employees Find New Friends in a
Surprising Place; State's High Court is Once Again Welcoming Wrongful Termina-
tion Suits, THE RECORDER, Sept. 5, 1991, at 4.
39. See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379,
1404, 743 P.2d 1323, 1338, 241 Cal, Rptr. 67, 82 (1987) (the Commission lacks authority
to award punitive damages in employer harassment action); Commodore Home Sys.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221, 649 P.2d 912, 918, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 276
(court may award punitive and compensatory damages under FEHA).
40. See Hargartem & Westman, suprpnote 38, at 4.
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I. CML PROCEDURE
A. Under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.10
and 425.11, a defendant must receive actual notice of
damages sought before a default judgment may be
entereck Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc.
In Schwab v. Rondel Homes, Inc.,' the California Supreme Court
held that under California statutory law, a plaintiff must give a de-
faulting defendant notice of damages sought.2 The court found that
in an action for personal injury or wrongful death, under Sections
425.103 and 425.114 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a de-
fendant must be notified of both general and specific damages sought
1. 53 Cal. 3d 428, 808 P.2d 226, 280 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1991) (en banc). Justice Brous-
sard delivered the opinion of the court with Justices Lucas, Panelli, Kennard, Arabian,
and Baxter concurring. Justice Mosk dissented in a separate opinion. In his dissent,
Justice Mosk stated that California Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.10 and 425.11
are "bad law and bad policy, they are an ineffective means of implementing the Legis-
lature's apparent intent." Id. at 440, 808 P.2d at 234, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
2. Id. at 435, 808 P.2d at 230, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 87. In Schwab, defendants refused
to rent an apartment unit to plaintiffs because of a signal dog. Plaintiffs' housing dis-
crimination action under CAL. Civ. CODE § 54.1(b)(5) sought damages under CAL. CIv.
CODE § 54.3. The complaint requested "damages for each plaintiff for mental and emo-
tional distress and for 'further monetary and pecuniary losses and damages' in
amounts according to proof, treble statutory damages in amounts according to proof
'but in a sum no less than $250,' attorney fees, and punitive damages of $500,000." Id.
at 430, 808 P.2d at 227, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
3. Section 425.10 provides:
A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain both of the following.
a) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and
concise language.
b) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims he is
entitled. If the recovery of money or damages be demanded, the amount
thereof shall be stated, unless the action is brought in the superior court to
recover actual or punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death, in
which case the amount thereof shall not be stated.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10 (West Supp. 1991). See generally 23 CAL. JUR. 3D Dam-
ages §§ 155-162 (1975); 4 B. WrrgiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading §§ 332, 423-425,
447-448, 463 (3d ed. 1985).
4. Section 425.11 provides:
When a complaint or cross-complaint is filed in an action in the superior
court to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death, the party
against whom the action is brought may at any time request a statement set-
ting forth the nature and amount of damages being sought. The request shall
be served upon the plaintiff or cross-complainant, who shall serve a respon-
sive statement as to the damages within 15 days thereafter. In the event that
a response is not served, the party, on notice to the plaintiff or cross-complain-
ant, may petition the court in which the action is pending to order the plain-
tiff or cross-complainant to serve a responsive statement.
If no request is made for such a statement setting forth the nature and
amount of damages being sought, the plaintiff shall give notice to the defend-
ant of the amount of special and general damages sought to be recovered (1)
before he or she may be subject to a default judgment.5
In its determination that notice of damages must be served on a de-
fendant, the court looked to its prior holding in Greenup v. Rodman 6
and to previous appellate decisions where default judgments were
before a default may be taken; or (2) in the event an answer is filed, at least
60 days prior to date set for trial.
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 425.11 (West 1991). See also 4 B. WrrKN, CALIFORNIA PROCE-
DURE, Pleading § 463 (3d ed. 1985); 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading
§ 1113 (3d ed. 1985); 23 CAL. JuR. 3D Damages § 155 (1975).
5. Schwab, 53 Cal. 3d at 435, 808 P.2d at 230, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 87. A court may
enter a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to answer the
complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 585. Section 585 provides:
Judgment may be had, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint, as fol-
lows:
a) Contract action; personal service. In an action arising upon contract or
judgment for the recovery of money or damages only, if the defendant has...
been served, other than by publication, and no answer... has been filed with
the clerk or judge of the court within the' time specified in the summons...
the clerk, or the judge.., shall enter the default of the defendant or defend-
ants, so served, and immediately thereafter enter judgment for the principal
amount demanded in the complaint or a lesser amount if credit has been ac-
knowledged, together with interest allowed by law ....
b) Other actions; personal service; hearing. In other actions, if the defend-
ant has been served, other than by publication, and no answer .. . has been
filed with the clerk or judge of the court within the time specified in the sum-
mons ... the clerk, or the judge if there is no clerk, upon written application
of the plaintiff, shall enter the default of the defendant. The plaintiff thereaf-
ter may apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint; the court
shall hear the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in
his or her favor for such sum (not exceeding the amount stated in the com-
plaint), as appears by such evidence to be just ....
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 585 (a)&(b) (West Supp. 1991).
In addition, section 580 of the Civil Code limits a plaintiff's default judgment (where
the defendant has failed to answer) to the amount stated in the complaint. Section 580
provides: "[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed
that which he shall have demanded in his complaint; but in any other case, the Court
may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and em-
braced within the issue." CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 580 (West 1976). See also 4 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading § 449 (3d ed. 1985); Craig H. Millet & Tina
I. Waine, Securities Law, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 617 (1981).
6. 42 Cal. 3d 822, 726 P.2d 1295, 231 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1986). In Greenup, involving a
minority shareholder's action against a majority shareholder, the minority share-
holder's complaint sought compensatory damages "in a sum that exceeds the jurisdic-
tional requirements of [the superior court]." Id. at 825, 726 P.2d at 1296, 231 Cal. Rptr.
at 221. The only specific amount sought in the complaint was $100,000 in exemplary
and punitive damages. Id. The trial court sanctioned the majority shareholder for in-
tentionally refusing to comply with discovery and awarded a default judgment of
$338,000 in compensatory and $338,000 in punitive damages. Id at 826, 726 P.2d at 1297,
231 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
The California Supreme Court reversed, reiterating the general rule that a default
judgment is limited to the amount demanded. Id. at 831, 726 P.2d at 1300, 231 Cal.
Rptr. at 225. The court further stated that although the trial court's judgment was
based in part on sanctions for discovery violations, the sanctions did not except the
judgment from the limit imposed by the damage amounts requested by the plaintiff.
Id. at 828, 726 P.2d at 1299, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 224. Thus, the plaintiff was limited to a
recovery of $15,000 in compensatory damages (the jurisdictional minimum of the supe-
rior court) and $100,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 829, 726 P.2d at 1300, 231 Cal. Rptr.
at 225.
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disallowed when they exceeded the damage amounts of which the de-
fendant had knowledge.7 The court rejected plaintiff's argument
that the defendant should be on notice that a default judgment at a
minimum involves an amount equal to the jurisdictional minimum of
the trial court.8 The court reasoned that such an assumption was in
conflict with other California appellate decisions, 9 as well as the stat-
utory language of section 425.11.10 The court also relied upon its
holding in Greenup, stating that the amount sought in the complaint
would provide "sufficient notice" if sections 425.11 and 425.10 were
not satisfied.l Further, the court refused to find that notice given to
a defendant of punitive and statutory damages would satisfy the spe-
cial and general damage notice requirements of section 425.11.12
By requiring that a plaintiff give notice of damages sought before a
default judgment may be entered, the court reaffirms two principles.
First, liability may not be imposed upon a defaulting defendant if the
statutory notice requirements have not been satisfied. Second, a de-
fendant is "entitled" to notice of his or her potential liability in deter-
7. The court reiterated that "a default judgment is ... limited to the damages of
which the defendants had notice." Schwab, 53 Cal. 3d at 433, 808 P.2d at 229, 280 Cal.
Rptr. at 86.
See Hamm v. Elkin, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1343, 242 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1987) (notice of dam-
ages is required before default will be allowed); Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison, 125
Cal. App. 3d 436, 178 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1981) (plaintiff who sought damages "in excess of
$5,000" was limited to default judgment of $5,000); Twine v. Compton Supermarket,
179 Cal. App. 3d 514, 224 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986) (interpreting § 425.11).
See generally, 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleading § 450 (3d ed. 1985);
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 580 (West 1976) (section 580 prohibits a default judgment in
excess of the complaint's prayer).
The amount of the complaint's prayer also generally determines the court's jurisdic-
tion. See generally, 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 19 (3d ed.
1985 & Supp. 1991).
8. Schwab, 53 Cal. 3d at 434, 808 P.2d at 229, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
9. These cases stand for the proposition that notice of the minimum jurisdictional
requirement of the court is not presumed as actual notice is required. See Petty v.
Manpower, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 794, 156 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1979); Hamm v. Elkin, 196 Cal.
App. 3d 1343, 242 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1987); Plotitsa v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 755,
189 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1983).
10. Schwab, 53 Cal. 3d at 435, 808 P.2d at 230, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
11. Id.
12. Id. California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11 provides in pertinent part: "the
plaintiff shall give notice to the defendant of the amount of special and general dam-
ages sought to be recovered (1) before a default may be taken .... CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 425.11 (West Supp. 1991).
See also Plotitsa v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 755, 189 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1983)
(special and general damages must be specified and such requirement mandates that a
specific accounting of the damages sought rather than a general total of damages).
mining whether to allow a default judgment to be entered.'3
AUGUSTINE GERARD YEE
B. The California superior courts have discretion to
reconsider amount-in-controversy jurisdiction even after
good faith pleadings initially establish such jurisdiction,
but in order to properly transfer a case to municipal
court, the superior court must establish that the matter
will 'necessarily" fail to result in a verdict exceeding
$25,000: Walker v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Walker v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court 2 re-
solved a conflict among the courts of appeal:3 whether section 396 of
the Code of Civil Procedure4 permits a superior court to transfer a
case for failure to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement when
13. Schwab, 53 Cal. 3d at 435, 808 P.2d at 230, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 87. See also Hamm
v. Elkin, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1343, 242 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1987) ("knowledge of the alleged
amount of damages may be crucial to a defendant's decision whether to permit a
clerk's default").
1. 53 Cal. 3d 257, 807 P.2d 418, 279 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1991).
2. Chief Justice Lucas authored the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Justice Broussard wrote a concurring and
dissenting opinion in which Justice Mosk joined.
3. Compare Davis v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. 3d 596, 599-601, 102 Cal. Rptr.
238, 240-41 (1972) (holding that where a prayer for relief does not appear fraudulent on
its face, section 396 precludes transfer) with Williams v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App.
3d 378, 387, 264 Cal. Rptr. 677, 682 (1989) [hereafter Williams (RD Instruments)]
(holding that trial courts may look beyond the face value of a case and transfer the
case if the true value fails to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement) and Wil-
liams v. Superior Court, 219 Cal. App. 3d 171, 178, 268 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Williams (Gemco)] (holding that a superior court has discretion to transfer a case
if the jurisdictional limit could not realistically be met) and Campbell v. Superior
Court, 213 Cal. App. 3d 147, 155, 261 Cal. Rptr. 509, 515 (1989) (same).
4. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 396 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Section 396 governs the
transfer of superior court cases. The court noted that the first, second, and fifth
paragraphs of section 396 are especially relevant in determining whether the transfer
of a case from a superior court is proper. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 264, 807 P.2d at 422, 279
Cal. Rptr. at 580. The first paragraph of section 396 directs that "[i]f an action or pro-
ceeding is commenced in a court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof,
as determined by the complaint or petition .... the action... shall ... be transferred
to a court having jurisdiction." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 396 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
The second paragraph of section 396 states that
[i]f an action ... is commenced in ... a court which has jurisdiction of the
subject matter thereof as determined by the complaint or petition, and it
thereafter appears from the verified pleadings, or at the trial, or hearing, that
the determination of the action... will necessarily involve the determination
of questions not within the jurisdiction of the court, in which the action or
proceeding is pending, the court, whenever such lack of jurisdiction appears,
must suspend all further proceedings therein and transfer the action ... to a
court having jurisdiction thereof.
Id. (emphasis added). The fifth paragraph of section 396 concludes that superior courts
are not required to transfer cases "because the judgment to be rendered, as deter-
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good faith pleadings pray for a proper jurisdictional value. The court
held that section 396 grants the superior courts discretion to recon-
sider the jurisdictional amount question and requires the courts to
transfer those cases which will "necessarily" result in a verdict below
the jurisdictional amount, even where good faith pleadings initially
satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement.5
In Walker, the petitioners argued that superior court orders
transferring their consolidated personal injury cases to municipal
court for failure to exceed the superior court's $25,000 jurisdictional
constraint 6 should be set aside because the petitioners' prayers had
requested relief in the proper jurisdictional amounts.7 The petition-
ers relied on a line of decisions holding that if a plaintiff prays for a
proper amount in the complaint, and the prayer is neither fraudulent
mined at the trial or hearing, is one which might have been rendered by a municipal
or justice court." Id.
5. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 267-68, 807 P.2d at 424-25, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. The
court focused on the word "necessarily" in section 396 as the statutory standard for
determining whether a plaintiff will be able to obtain a verdict within the jurisdic-
tional range. Id at 268-69, 807 P.2d at 425, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See supra note 4.
6. Section 86(a)(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure directs that jurisdic-
tion is conferred to municipal courts "[i]n all cases at law in which the demand ...
amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 86(a)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Read in conjunction with section 396, see supra
note 4, this section directs that superior court actions failing to exceed the $25,000
amount-in-controversy requirement should be transferred to municipal court.
7. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 807 P.2d at 420-21, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79. The
appellate court in Walker consolidated the actions of two plaintiffs injured in automo-
bile accidents, both of whom petitioned the appellate court for writs of mandate di-
recting the superior courts to set aside transfer orders requiring their cases to be
removed to municipal court. See Walker v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1154,1156,
266 Cal. Rptr. 569, 569 (1990). The supreme court reviewed the facts and settlement
negotiations in both matters. The first petitioner, Walker, was struck by a car while
riding a motorcycle. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 262, 807 P.2d at 420, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
Walker sued the driver's employer, claiming total damages of over $1 million. Id at
262, 807 P.2d at 421, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Subsequently, the court referred the matter
to arbitration where Walker revised his claim for general damages to $250,000 and was
eventually awarded a $15,000 settlement. Id After both parties requested a trial de
novo, the superior court judge ordered a "voluntary" settlement conference, at which a
$25,000 settlement was recommended. Id. at 263, 807 P.2d at 421, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
Finally, at a later status conference, the judge expressed skepticism that the value of
the claim exceeded the $25,000 superior court jurisdictional requirement, and without
holding a hearing or allowing the parties to argue the issue, transferred the matter to
municipal court. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 263, 807 P.2d at 421, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 579. Simi-
larly, the second petitioner, who was struck by a car while crossing a street, claimed
damages in excess of $25,000. Id. The second petitioner received a $25,000 arbitration
award, but upon request for trial de novo, the superior court judge ordered the case
transferred to municipal court for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount-in-contro-
versy requirement, without setting a separate hearing to argue the issue. Id
nor fictitious on its face, section 396 precludes transfer.8 The
supreme court agreed to set aside the transfer orders,9 but disagreed
with the petitioners' assertion that section 396 precludes transfer
whenever good faith pleadings pray for a proper jurisdictional
amount.'0 Instead, the court found that the superior court had
abused its discretion" by ordering transfer, because the underlying
facts did not support the conclusion that the ultimate relief granted
would "necessarily" be less than the jurisdictional amount.12
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The California Supreme Court rejected as too narrow the view that
pleadings are the sole determinant of jurisdictional value.' s However,
the court dismissed as too broad the idea that superior courts have
latitude to transfer cases any time a proper damage award appears
8. Id. at 261, 807 P.2d at 420, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 578. See, e.g., Davis v. Superor
Court, 25 Cal. App. 3d 596, 600, 102 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (1972) (quoting Rodley v. Curry,
120 Cal. 541, 543, 52 P. 999, 1000 (1898) (" '[ilt is so well settled that the amount for
which judgment is demanded in the complaint determines the jurisdiction that no au-
thorities need be cited')); Depretto v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 36, 39, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 810, 812 (1981). The Walker court labeled the rule delineated in Davis as the
"traditional" rule. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 266, 807 P.2d at 423, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 581. See
also 2 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 19 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990)
(prayer for relief in complaint is determinative of jurisdiction where not fictitious or
fraudulent); 20 AM. JuR. 2D Courts § 154 (1965 & Supp. 1991); 76 C.J.S Removal qf
Causes § 29 (1952 & Supp. 1991).
9. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 273-74, 807 P.2d at 428, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
10. Id. at 270, 807 P.2d at 426, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (stating that section 396 permits
transfer during the course of litigation). See also 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts § 92 (1983 &
Supp. 1991) (noting that Campbell, Williams (RD Instruments), and Williams
(Gemco) permit the trial court to evaluate the facts of a case in determing jurisdic-
tional amount); 20 AM. JuR. 2D Courts § 154 (1965 & Supp. 1991) (stating the tradi-
tional rule that the complaint is determinative of amount-in-controversy jursidiction,
but also acknowledging recent California interpretations of section 396).
11. The abuse of discretion standard of review hinges upon whether the trial
court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason in an area where but one inference may
be drawn from the relevant facts. Shamblin v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 478-79, 749 P.2d
339, 342, 243 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905 (1988). See generally 5 CAL. JuR. 3D Appellate Review
§ 522 (1973 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the abuse of discretion doctrine).
12. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 273, 807 P.2d at 428, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 586. The court
noted that the facts and negotiations in the two underlying personal injury suits, see
supra note 7, gave the superior court no reasonable grounds for determining in its dis-
cretion that the ultimate damages would necessarily fail to meet jurisdictional require-
ments. Instead the court emphasized that "[i]n Walker, court-ordered settlement
negotiations resulted in a $25,000 settlement recommendation, and in White, court-or-
dered arbitration resulted in a $25,000 award-both figures but one cent below the
minimum jurisdictional amount for the superior court." Id. at 273, 807 P.2d at 428, 279
Cal. Rptr. at 586. See 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Courts § 124 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (stating that
"[wihere a court has jurisdiction over an action, it has no authority to transfer the case
to a lesser court"). Cf E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Jurisdictional Amount for Appel-
late Review as Affected by Payment or Tender, or by Settlement, 58 A.L.R. 2D 166
(1958) (discussing effect of settlement negotiations on amount-in-controversy
evaluation).
13. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 262, 807 P.2d at 420, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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"unlikely" or "not reasonably probable."14 The court explained that
the older line of decisions cited in support of a narrow interpretation
were largely uninstructive because they either focused solely on the
first paragraph of section 396, they predated enactment of the sec-
tion, or they failed to cite section 396.15 However, while the court ac-
knowledged that three recent court of appeal decisions that
interpreted section 396 more broadly were essentially correct,16 the
supreme court admonished the superior courts to not abuse their dis-
cretion.' 7 Interpreting the first, second, and fifth paragraphs of sec-
tion 396, the court ruled that superior courts may transfer a case
based on pretrial hearings and other information only if "'the action
... will necessarily involve the determination of questions not within
the jurisdiction of the court.' "18 Finally, the supreme court enumer-
ated four prerequisites which superior courts should satisfy before
transferring a case, cautioning that: (1) parties must be afforded
proper notice and an opportunity to resist transfer; (2) information
from settlement negotiations must not be divulged; (3) transfer must
not be used for the "unfettered" purpose of clearing crowded court
calendars; and (4) records must be made of any transfer hearing.19
14. The Walker.court noted that the appellate court in Williams (RD Instru-
ments) had not itself adopted the broad standards used by the trial court in that case.
It was the trial court that stated it was "not reasonably probable" or it was "unlikely"
that the claim at issue would result in a proper jurisdictional award. Walker, 53 Cal.
3d at 262, 269, 807 P.2d at 420, 425, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 578, 583 (citing Williams (RD In-
struments), 216 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 386, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 680, 681). The Williams (RD
Instruments) appellate court had relied on a higher standard which comported with
the section 396 standard: whether the requisite award "could be proven" or "could not
be obtained." Id. Thus, the Williams (RD Instruments) court did not embrace the in-
correctly broad standards, as the respondent tried to convince the supreme court. Id
15. I at 265-66, 807 P.2d at 422-23, 279 Cal. Rptr. 580-81. See, e.g., Davis v. Supe-
rior Court, 25 Cal. App. 3d 596, 599, 102 Cal. Rptr. 238, 240 (focusing solely on the first
paragraph of section 396); Becker v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 313, 90 P. 689 (1907) (pre-
dating section 396); Depretto v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 36, 39, 171 Cal. Rptr.
810, 812 (1981) (failing to cite section 396); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 76-
77, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1970) (not involving, nor citing section 396).
16. Walker, 53 Cal. App. 3d at 268-69, 807 P.2d at 425, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (hold-
ing that properly construed, the articulations of Campbell, Williams (RD Instru-
ments), and Williams (Gemco) comport with section 396 requirements).
17. Id at 270-71, 807 P.2d at 426, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 584. The court noted that the
Williams (RD Instruments), Campbell, and Williams (Gemco) courts had proceeded
with caution in analyzing the propriety of transfer, and indicated that it endorsed the
courts' circumspection. Id
18. I& at 269, 807 P.2d at 425, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 583 (emphasis added) (quoting CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 396 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991)). See supra notes 11 and 12. See gen-
erally 16 CAL. JuR. 3D Courts §§ 124, 125 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (discussing the transfer
of causes brought in the wrong court).
19. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 807 P.2d at 426-27, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 584-85.
Justice Broussard concurred in the result, but dissented from the
majority's reasoning on the grounds that the majority departed from
fifty years of precedent in holding that pleadings made in good faith
alone determine amount-in-controversy jurisdiction.20 He criticized
as unprecedented the recent line of cases allowing transfers based
upon pretrial hearing information.21 Furthermore, he questioned
whether superior courts should transfer cases in which they have al-
ready invested time and resources.22 Finally, Justice Broussard
maintained that a mechanism sufficient to discourage plaintiffs from
inflating claims exists in California Code of Civil Procedure section
1033(a) 23 which forces plaintiffs who fail to recover the jurisdictional
amount to carry costs.24
III. CONCLUSION
Walker clarifies the transfer mechanism so that superior court
judges will be more likely to hold pretrial hearings to investigate
cases where attaining the jurisdictional amount is not expected. This
result raises fears that judges may decide "the value" of a matter
20. Id. at 274-76, 807 P.2d at 428-30, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 586-88 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
21. Id. at 276, 807 P.2d at 430, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 588 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Broussard came to his conclusion by attacking the Campbell deci-
sion as misinterpreting section 396 and asserting that it was the only case cited by the
majority as precedent. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brous-
sard also argued that the majority's misreading of section 396 enlarged a court's ability
to transfer cases and, thus, infringed upon the legislature's ability to make policy deci-
sions regarding where cases should be heard. Id. at 280, 807 P.2d at 433, 279 Cal. Rptr.
at 591 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Accord 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Courts § 135 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (noting that legislature has broad
powers to prescribe the procedure under which courts exercise jurisdiction).
22. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 278, 807 P.2d at 432, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 590 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Broussard predicted an additional drain on re-
sources would accompany the majority's rule, warning that "[p]olicing unwarranted
transfers will simply add to the appellate courts' burden." Id. at 280, 807 P.2d at 433,
279 Cal. Rptr. at 591 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1033(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). Section 1033(a)
reads: "In the superior court, costs or any portion of claimed costs shall be as deter-
mined by the court in its discretion in accordance with [the applicable procedure]
where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a
court of lesser jurisdiction." Id.
24. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 275, 807 P.2d at 429-30, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Broussard quoted Greenbaum v. Martinez,
86 Cal. 459, 25 P. 12 (1890), that even though the rule of determining jurisdiction by
the face of the pleadings may encourage inflation of claims, the "inevitable conse-
quence of not being able to recover the jurisdictional sum [is that the plaintiff must]
carry costs" and this will "be sufficient to prevent such a practice from becoming com-
mon." Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 275, 807 P.2d at 429, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 587 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Greenbaum, 86 Cal. at 459, 25 P. at 13 (1890)). Jus-
tice Broussard asserted that the Greenbaum rationale maintains its vitality modernly.
Id. (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra note 23.
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before a litigant has the opportunity to fully argue his case. 25 Realis-
tically, however, courts must have the power to direct cases to the
proper forum to promote judicial efficiency. 26
Furthermore, the Walker interpretation of section 396 strictly
prescribes the superior court's transfer powers.27 Indeed, in order to
avoid having an appellate court set aside transfer orders, not only
must a superior court determine that a verdict will "necessarily" fall
short of the jurisdictional amount, but also it must carefully docu-
ment the transfer hearings, give the parties notice and opportunity to
oppose the transfer, and resist the temptation to transfer solely for
the purpose of paring down a crowded docket.28 Under these con-
straints, it seems unlikely that superior court judges will perceive
that the Walker decision grants them any significant new license to
transfer cases which they previously would have retained.
KURT M. LANGKOW
C. In malpractice actions, section 364(d) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure tolls the one-year statute of
limitations for ninety days when notice of intent to sue is
served in the last ninety days of the one-year period-
Woods v. Young.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Woods v. Young,' a unanimous California Supreme Court2 held
25. The majority noted that this fear is legitimate. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 269-70,
807 P.2d at 425-26, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84. Furthermore, the court noted that the Cali-
fornia Constitution grants plaintiffs a right to a jury trial. Id See CAL. CoNST. art. I,
§ 16. However, the court argued that this concern is addressed first by an inherent
limitation in the application of section 396, which "does not permit a trial judge to de-
termine the merits of a claim," and second by a judicial safeguard, which places a high
standard on a trial court's determination that a matter fails to meet minimum amount-
in-controversy requirements. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 269-70, 807 P.2d at 426, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 584.
26. California's superior courts transfer over 3,000 matters to the municipal courts
each year after pretrial hearings. Walker, 53 Cal. 3d at 267, 807 P.2d at 424, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 582. Curtailing the superior courts' authority to distribute these cases based
upon anything but the face value of their prayers for relief would create significant
backlogs and impair the courts' ability to concentrate on the kind of issues meant to
fall within the superior courts' jurisdictional domain. But see supra note 21 and ac-
companying text.
27. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
28. Id,
1. 53 Cal. 3d 315, 807 P.2d 455, 279 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1991).
2. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennard with Chief Justice Lu-
cas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, Baxter and Kremer, Presiding Justice of the Court
that when a plaintiff files a notice of intent to sue for malpractice3
during the last ninety days of the one-year statutory limitation pe-
riod,4 section 364(d)5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure acts to
toll the statute for a period of ninety days from the date of the
notice.6
The court interpreted section 364(d)7 in this manner to resolve the
conflicting approaches that had resulted from appellate court opin-
ions in Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium8 and Braham v. Sorenson.9
The court's interpretation also attempted to harmonize the language
of the statute with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).10
of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, sitting by assignment of the
Chairperson of the Judicial Council, concurring. Justices Mosk and Baxter wrote sep-
arate concurring opinions.
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering Supp. 1991) states: "No action based
upon the health care provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the
defendant has been given at least 90 days prior notice of the intention to commence
the action." Id. See also 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions §§ 165, 501 (3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991); 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts & Institutions § 179 (1977 &
Supp. 1991).
4. The statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims is contained in sec-
tion 340.5, and reads, in pertinent part:
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon
such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement
of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the
plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have dis-
covered, the injury, whichever occurs first.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (Deering Supp. 1991).
5. This section reads: "If the notice is served within 90 days of the expiration of
the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action
shall be extended 90 days from the service of the notice." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 364(d) (Deering Supp. 1991).
6. Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 328, 807 P.2d at 462, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 620. In the interest
of fairness to plaintiffs with pending actions who had relied on the previous opinions
of the courts of appeal, the holding was given prospective effect and applies only to
complaints filed more than 90 days after the decision became final. Id. at 330, 807 P.2d
at 464, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
7. All references to statutory sections in this article are to the California Code of
Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
8. 87 Cal. App. 3d 507, 151 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1978). The court noted that it had
knowledge of at least two other cases which had followed the Gomez approach: Es-
trella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1982) and Paxton v. Chapman General Hosp.,
Inc., 186 Cal. App. 3d 110, 230 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1986). Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 322, 807 P.2d
at 458, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
9. 119 Cal. App. 3d 367, 174 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1981). The following cases were listed
by the court as having followed the Braham approach: Grimm v. Thayer, 188 Cal. App.
3d 866, 233 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1987); Gilbertson v. Osman, 185 Cal. App. 3d 308, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (1986); Hilburger v. Madsen, 177 Cal. App. 3d 45, 222 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1986);
Banfield v. Sierra View Local Dist. Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 3d 444, 177 Cal. Rptr. 290
(1981). Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 323, 807 P.2d at 459, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
10. 1975 CAL. STAT. 25.5 (amended by 1975 CAL. STAT. 1.193) (effective Sept. 24,
1975, operative Dec. 12, 1975).
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II. TREATMENT
In Woods, the plaintiff properly served the defendant with the
ninety-day notice of intent to sue for malpractice but filed the action
one-year and three weeks after she had discovered her injury." The
trial court dismissed the action, citing expiration of the statute of
limitations, but the appellate court reversed, finding that previous
cases allowed for a tolling of the statute of limitations.12 The
supreme court began its analysis by giving a short history of the stat-
ute and by demonstrating the incongruity created by the interplay
between sections 364(a), 364(d) and 365.13 It then analyzed the prior
appellate court holdings in Gomez and Braham.
The Gomez court had applied section 35614 to toll the statute of
limitations for ninety days from the service of the. intent to sue and,
where applicable, the extension afforded by section 364(d).15 The
majority disapproved of this construction saying it ignored the stat-
ute's plain language.' 6 To further support its position, the court in-
11. Woods, 51 Cal. 3d at 329, 807 P.2d at 463, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 320-21, 807 P.2d at 457-58, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16. Section 365 reads:
Failure to comply with this chapter shall not invalidate any proceedings of
any court of this state, nor shall it affect the jurisdiction of the court to render
a judgment therein. However, failure to comply with such provisions by any
attorney at law shall be grounds for professional discipline and the State Bar
of California shall investigate and take appropriate action in any such cases
brought to its attention.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 365 (Deering Supp. 1991). See also, 6 B. WmKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 786 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
The court noted that because section 365 placed the attorney in jeopardy of disci-
pline for failure to comply with the 90-day notice requirement of section 364(a), these
two sections acted to effectively shorten the statute of limitations to nine months. In
order to restore the full one-year statutory period, the legislature enacted section
364(d). However, the court posited the following hypothethical to demonstrate how
section 364(d) failed to remedy the situation: The plaintiff files the notice of intent to
sue 50 days before the expiration of the statutory period. After extending the statu-
tory period by 90 days, the plaintiff now has one year and 40 days to file. However, the
plaintiff is statutorily precluded from filing his action during the 90-day "waiting" pe-
riod. Thus, when this period is over, one year and 41 days have elapsed and the plain-
tiff is now time-barred from bringing his action. Id.
14. This section reads: "When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunc-
tion or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibi-
tion is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 356 (Deering Supp. 1991).
15. Gomez v. Valley View Sanitarium, 87 Cal. App. 3d 507, 510, 151 Cal. Rptr. 97,
98 (1978). The majority noted that the Gomez opinion gave consecutive treatment to
the plaintiff to lengthen the statute of limitations for a period of 90 to 180 days, de-
pending on when the section 364(a) notice of intent to sue was served. Woods, 53 Cal.
3d at 322, 807 P.2d at 458, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
16. Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 323-24, 807 P.2d at 459, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 617. The court
voked the rule of statutory construction which states that "a later,
more specific statute controls over an earlier, general statute."17
The appellate court in Braham also tolled the statute of limitations
using section 356, but concluded that the tolling period and the sec-
tion 364(d) extension would both be triggered by service of the notice
of intent to sue, and would therefore run concurrently.' 8 Although
the majority found this approach more faithful to the language of
section 364(d), it rejected this interpretation stating "it violate[d] the
rule that every provision of a statute is assumed to have meaning and
to perform a useful function."19
The court then turned to the task of giving the statute an interpre-
tation which would accomplish the legislative intent behind
MICRA.20 The court noted that the intent in imposing the section
364(a) ninety-day waiting period was to encourage settlement negoti-
ations between the parties,21 and that such settlements would pro-
mote the greater goal of MICRA to "reduce the cost and increase the
efficiency of medical malpractice litigation." 22
The court found that the legislative purpose of MICRA would "be
best effectuated by construing section 364(d) as tolling the one-year
statute of limitations when section 364(a)'s ninety-day notice of in-
tent to sue is served during, but not before, the last ninety days of
found the requirement in section 364(d), that the 90-day extension must be measured
"from the service of the notice," could not be reconciled with the Gomez court's find-
ing that the extension would run only after the section 356 tolling period had ended.
Id
17. Id at 324-25, 807 P.2d at 460, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court noted that sec-
tions 364 and 365 "were enacted in 1975 as part of MICRA, 'an interrelated legislative
scheme enacted to deal specifically with all medical malpractice claims'" (citing Young
v. Haimes, 41 Cal. 3d 883, 718 P.2d 909, 226 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1986)), while section 356 was
a general tolling provision enacted in 1872. Id
18. Braham v. Sorenson, 119 Cal. App. 3d 367, 372, 174 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (1981).
19. Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 324, 807 P.2d at 459, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (citing White v.
County of Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d 676, 681, 646 P.2d 191, 195, 183 Cal. Rptr. 520, 524
(1982); J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 26 Cal. 3d 1, 36, 603 P.2d
1306, 1327, 160 Cal. Rptr. 710, 731 (1979)). The court held that because the section 356
tolling period ran concurrently with the section 364(d) extension, the extension was
"wholly subsumed within, and thus redundant of, the 90-day tolling attributable to sec-
tions 364(a) and 356," thus depriving section 364(d) of any independent function or sig-
nificance. Id.
20. Id. at 323, 807 P.2d at 459, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 617. The court found that "'[w]ords
must be construed in context, and statutes must be harmonized, both internally and
with each other, to the extent possible.'" Id (citing California Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fair Em-
ployment & Hous. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 844, 598 P.2d 836, 840, 157 Cal. Rptr. 676,
680 (1979)).
21. See Grimm v. Thayer, 188 Cal. App. 3d at 871, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 689. For a
more extensive treatment of the intent behind MICRA, see Jenkins & Scheinfurth,
California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Chal-
lenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829 (1979).
22. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 363-64,
683 P.2d 670, 672, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 673 (1984).
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the one-year statute of limitations period." 2 3 The majority also pro-
claimed that this construction harmonized the sections at issue.24
The unanimous majority concluded by stating that although their
interpretation of section 364(d) appeared to reward the dilatory
plaintiff,25 there was no equal protection violation because it is the
plaintiff who controls when notice of intent to sue is served and the
legislature had a rational basis for preserving the ninety-day waiting
period without forfeiting the cause of action.26
III. CONCLUSION
The majority claimed that it harmonized the sections in question
and gave each of them meaning and substance. However, as Justice
Mosk pointed out in his concurrence, the majority ignored the actual
language of section 364(d) by holding that it tolled the statute of limi-
tation rather than extending it from the date of notice. 7 The effect
of the holding is that the court completely rewrote the statute. Jus-
tice Mosk recognized this, but could determine no other way to har-
monize the conflicting statutes. 2 Although superlegislation by the
courts is widely decried by both liberals and conservatives alike, diffi-
23. Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 325, 807 P.2d at 460, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 618. The court
found that the 90-day tolling period would serve the purpose of promoting settlement,
while at the same time resolving the dilemma sections 364(a) and 365 posed to attor-
neys who file cases in the last 90 days of the statutory period. Id.
24. Id. The court claimed that the legislative mandate of section 364(a) was pre-
served because the plaintiff was still required to wait 90 days before filing suit, thus
encouraging settlement. It also maintained that the purpose of section 364(d) was
given effect by allowing time for filing suit after the tolling period had expired if the
plaintiff had served notice of intent to sue during the last 90 days of the limitations
period. Finally, the court found that its approach harmonized the intent of section 365
to avoid forfeiting plaintiff's claim if the attorney had not complied with section
364(a). Id.
25. Id. at 326, 807 P.2d at 461, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 619. The majority explained that if
this apparent inequity exists, it is because the legislature inserted it and therefore in-
tended it. ld. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 3d 402, 412, 787
P.2d 996, 1002, 267 Cal. Rptr. 589, 595 (1990).
26. Woods, 53 Cal. 3d at 327-28, 807 P.2d at 462, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court
found that the rational basis was satisfied because its interpretation of these sections
preserved the intent of MICRA to ensure that settlement negotiations would occur,
thereby potentially decreasing the number of malpractice actions filed.
27. Id. at 332, 807 P.2d at 465, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Mosk, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 333, 807 P.2d at 465, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice
Mosk stated that even though he found the majority's approach "obviously unsatisfac-
tory," he "reluctantly conclude[d] that in this instance it may be the best way to re-
solve the anomalies caused by the contradictory and ineffectual statutory scheme." Id.
(Mosk, J., concurring).
cult cases such as this clearly exhibit the difficult tasks the courts
must undertake when faced with poorly written laws.
BRUCE C. YOUNG
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Legislature correctly defined "costs" as not including
expenditures paid from sources other than tax revenues
when it implemented article XIIIB, section 6 of the
California Constitution which requires the state to
reimburse local governments for the costs of new state
programs: County of Fresno v. State.
In County of Fresno v. State,' the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether California Government Code section 17556(d) is en-
forceable under article XIIIB, section 6 of the California
Constitution.2 Article XIIIB, section 6 requires that the state pay lo-
cal governments for the costs of new or increased programs enacted
by state government.3 Section 17556(d) states there are no state im-
posed costs if the local government pays for the program through
user fees.4 The issue raised was whether the legislature had the
1. 53 Cal. 3d 482, 808 P.2d 235, 280 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1991). Justice Mosk wrote the
opinion for the court which consisted of Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard,
Panelli, Kennard, and Best. Justice Best, Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal,
Fifth Appellate District, was assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Jus-
tice Arabian concurred in a separate opinion.
2. Health and Safety Code section 25513 authorizes local governments to collect
user fees for hazardous materials expenses arising from Code section 25502. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFrrY CODE § 25513 (West Supp. 1991). Rather than impose the fees, the
County of Fresno sought state reimbursement. The Commission on State Mandates
rejected the county's claim and the trial court denied the county's petition for man-
date. The court of appeal affirmed, County of Fresno v. State, 229 Cal. App. 3d 875, 268
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1990) and the supreme court granted review, 53 Cal. 3d 482, 808 P.2d
235, 280 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1991).
3. Article XIIIB, Section 6, of the California Constitution provides:
SEC. 6. Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new pro-
gram or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall pro-
vide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of
such program or increased level of service, except that the Legislature may,
but need not, provide such subvention of funds for the following mandates:
(a) Legislative mandates requested by the local agency affected;
(b) Legislation defining a new crime or changing an existing definition of a
crime; or
(c) Legislative mandates enacted prior to January 1, 1975, or executive or-
ders or regulations initially implementing legislation enacted prior to January
1, 1975.
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6. See 53 Cal. 3d at 484, 808 P.2d at 236, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
4. Section 17556 of the California Government Code provides:
The commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Sec-
tion 17514, in a claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a
hearing, the commission finds that...
(d) The local agency or school district has the authority to levy service
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power to define the terms of a constitutional amendment enacted by
initiative.5 The court held that section 17556(d) is constitutional on
its face and does not usurp article XIIIB, section 6.6
The court easily resolved the constitutionality question once it
framed the issue. The court noted that articles XIIIA7 and XIIIB of
the constitution must be interpreted together,8 as both restrict the
state's taxing power.9 User fees do not qualify as tax revenues unless
they exceed the government program's costs.1 0 A local government's
costs do not include amounts raised from non-tax sources." The
court interpreted the amendment's intent by examining the ballot
pamphlet.' 2
The court held that the actions of the legislature and the courts in
interpreting "costs" were reasonable in light of the clear language of
article XIIIB, section 8, subdivision (c).' 3 The court refused to rule
on other possible challenges to section 17556.14 The state might pos-
charges, fees or assessments sufficient to pay for the mandated program or in-
creased level of service.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17756 (West Supp. 1991). See 53 Cal. 3d at 484, 808 P.2d at 235, 280
Cal. Rptr. at 93.
5. Article XIIIB was added to the California Constitution on November 6, 1979 as
an amendment by initiative in Proposition 4. County of Fresno, 53 Cal. 3d at 486, 808
P.2d at 237, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
6. Id. at 484, 808 P.2d at 236, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
7. CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA.
8. County of Fresno, 53 Cal. 3d at 486, 808 P.2d at 237, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (citing
City of Sacramento v. State, 50 Cal. 3d 51, 59 n.1, 785 P.2d 522, 525 n.1, 266 Cal. Rptr.
139, 142 n.1 (1990)).
9. Id.
10. Id at 486-87, 808 P.2d at 237-38, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95 (quoting CAL CONST.
art. XIIIB, § 8(c)).
11. Id at 487, 808 P.2d at 238, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 95. Justice Arabian's concurring
opinion places the majority on firmer ground stating that the state constitution limits
the state's lawmaking power. Id. at 490-91, 808 P.2d at 240, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (Ara-
bian, J., concurring). The constitution and legislation should be interpreted to coincide
rather than conflict. Id at 490, 808 P.2d at 240, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (Arabian, J., con-
curring) (citing Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 723, 123 P.2d 505, 512 (1942)).
12. Id. at 488, 808 P.2d at 239, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 96. The court was not swayed by
the County's assertion of the drafter's intent. The court determined "what is crucial
here is the intent of those who voted for the measure." Id (citing County of Los An-
geles v. State, 43 Cal. 3d 46, 56, 729 P.2d 202, 207, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 43 (1987)). "Ballot
arguments may be considered where a constitutional amendment is subject to varying
interpretations." County of Fresno v. State, 228 Cal. App. 3d 875, 883 n.1, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 266, 271 n.1 (1990) (citing California Hous. Fin. Agency v. Patitucci, 22 Cal. 3d
171, 177, 583 P.2d 729, 733, 148 Cal. Rptr. 875, 879 (1978)).
13. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 8(c).
14. The court declined to rule on whether section 17556 was being implemented
within the bounds of the constitution or whether the user fees were insufficient to pay
for the program. Id at 489, 808 P.2d at 239, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
sibly expand the use of this user fee "disclaimer"l5 should its finan-
cial picture worsen.
BRANDON D. MIZNER
B. A landlord's policy requiring a minimum income level to
qualify for rental housing is not economic discrimination
under the Unruh Act because the requirement is applied
uniformly to all persons without distinctions as to the
Act's classifications and because the Act is not subject to a
disparate impact analysis: Harris v. Capital Growth
Investors XIV.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV,1 a prospective tenant
challenged a landlord's policy requiring tenants to have a minimum
income level of three times the rent by asserting that the policy vio-
lated the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("the Act")2 and had a disparate
15. San Francisco Chron., April 23, 1991, at Al.
1. 52 Cal. 3d 1142, 805 P.2d 873, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1991) (en banc). Chief Justice
Lucas wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Kennard, Arabian and Ea-
gleson concurred. Both Justice Mosk and Justice Broussard filed separate dissenting
opinions.
2. The Unruh Act is codified at sections 51 and 52 of the California Civil Code.
Section 51 provides in pertinent part:
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blind-
ness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business
establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a
person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike
to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or
blindness or other physical disability ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1991). Section 52 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes
any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex, color, race,
religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability con-
trary to the provisions of Section 51 or 51.5, is liable for each and every such
offense for the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a
jury, or a court sitting without a jury, up to a maximum of three times the
amount of actual damage but in no case less than two hundred fifty dollars
($250), and such attorney's fees as may be determined by the court in addition
thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights provided in Section 51 or
51.5 ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 52 (West 1991).
For a general discussion of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, see 12 CAL. JuR. 3D Civil
Rights §§ 3-16 (1974). See also 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitu-
tional Law §§ 747-49, 754-55 (9th ed. 1988); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D (rev. part 1) Constitutional
Law § 269 (1989); 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975) (Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination
in sale or rental of real property).
For law review articles on the Act, see Mohr and Weber, The Unruh Civil Rights
Act: Just How Far Does It Reach? 11 BEV. HiLus B.A.J. 32 (1977); Steven B. Arbuss,
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impact on women.3 The case presented the California Supreme
Court with the opportunity to reexamine prior relevant case law and
legislative history relating to the Unruh Act in determining its scope
and limitations.
In Harris, the plaintiffs brought their representative action against
the defendant real estate partnership, management company, and in-
dividual managers. The trial court sustained the defendants' general
demurrers and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.4 The court of ap-
peal reversed the trial court's dismissal of the economic discrimina-
tion claim and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the disparate
impact claim.5 Displeased with the outcome of the appellate court
ruling, the petitioners appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The court reversed the appellate decision with respect to the eco-
nomic discrimination claim and affirmed the dismissal of the dispa-
rate impact claim, stating that the landlord's minimum income policy
did not violate the Act's statutory classifications and that intentional
discrimination under the Act had not been demonstrated.6
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The court began its analysis by reexamining the development of
the legislative history and case law surrounding of the Act.7 The
Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act - An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REV.
443 (1983).
The Act has been expanded to include "all business establishments of every kind."
See Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 731, 640 P.2d 115, 120, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 502 (1982) (en banc) and Isbister v. Boys' Club, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 78, 707 P.2d 212, 215,
219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 153 (1985) ("the phrase 'business establishments' [should] be inter-
preted 'in the broadest sense reasonably possible' ").
3. Plaintiffs Tamela Harris and Muriel Jordan had applied for rental housing
from defendants. The defendants refused to provide apartments to the plaintiffs based
upon defendants' minimum monthly income policy.
The policy stated that rental applicants must have a minimum monthly income of at
least three times the monthly rent to qualify for housing. Although they could afford
to pay the monthly rent charged, plaintiffs were refused housing because their
monthly incomes did not satisfy the minimum income criteria. Plaintiffs challenged
the minimum income policy as being "both arbitrary economic discrimination and sex
discrimination based on its alleged adverse statistical impact on women." Harris, 52
Cal. 3d at 1149, 805 P.2d at 875, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
4. Id. Other remaining claims were disposed of through stipulations by both
sides. Id
5. 224 Cal. App. 3d 367, 259 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989).
6. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1175, 805 P.2d at 893, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
7. Id. at 1150, 805 P.2d at 875, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 616. The court traced the develop-
ment and scope of the Unruh Act, noting that through legislative revision, the Act has
gradually expanded to encompass many categories of discrimination by business estab-
lishments. See supra note 2.
court specifically noted that its broad holdings in the In re CoxS line
of cases implied that the Act prohibited not only the stated classifica-
tions of discrimination found within the Act but also "arbitrary
discrimination."9
A. Economic Discrimination
The court found support for the defendants' argument that the
Act's wording was not so broad as to encompass all arbitrary discrim-
ination due to the Act's specific designation of discriminatory
classes.10 However, the court disagreed with the defendants' conten-
tions that In re Cox and its progeny should be overruled, citing to
specific instances where the Act had been interpreted to encompass
classifications not listed within the Act." In addition, the court
noted that the legislature had revised the Act several times since In
re Cox, this, the court argued, implied without disturbing the hold-
ings of the In re Cox line of cases that the Legislature had acquiesced
to the holdings of these cases.12
However, the court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that legisla-
8. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). In In re Cox, the court held
that the Unruh Act encompassed a category of discrimination not specifically defined
within the Act. Id. at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
A business patron was asked to leave a shopping center's grounds because he associ-
ated with an individual "who wore long hair and dressed in an unconventional man-
ner." I& at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26. When the patron refused to leave,
he was arrested under a trespass ordinance. The court held that the Unruh Act pro-
hibited "arbitrary discrimination by a business enterprise." I& at 212, 474 P.2d at 995,
90 Cal. Rptr. at 27. However, the court stated that "reasonable regulations that are
rationally related to the services performed and facilities provided" would be permit-
ted by businesses. Id.
9. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1158, 805 P.2d at 881, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 622. The In re Cox
line of cases basically rejected the view that the Unruh Act was limited to categories of
discrimination contained in the Act. Id. at 1155, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
10. I& at 1154-55, 805 P.2d at 879-80, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
11. Id. at 1155, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court undertook a reex-
amination of its prior cases and concluded that the specific designation of discrimina-
tory classes in the Unruh Act did not bar the recognition of other categories of
discrimination not mentioned within the Act. Id. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d at 217-18, 474
P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (Act encompasses physical appearance); Marina Point,
Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982) (Act encompasses
age discrimination against children, however a discrimination exemption exists for re-
tirement communities with older citizens); Rolon v. Kulwitzky, 153 Cal. App. 3d 289,
292, 200 Cal. Rptr. 217, 218-19 (1984) (Act applies to homosexuals).
12. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1155-56, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court
stated that the legislature is presumed to be aware of the existence of prior case law
and noted that the legislature had not attempted to overrule the court's prior cases.
Id. See Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 48 Cal. 3d 602, 609, 770 P.2d 732, 736, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 320, 324 (1989) (presumption that legislature is cognizant of prior appellate case
law). The court also cited to Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734, 640
P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 504 (1982), in quoting.
[Wihen the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the pro-
vision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is pre-
sumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial
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tive silence was determinative of legislative intent.'3 The court iden-
tified two factors that discounted a finding of legislative acquiescence:
1) the factual specificity of its prior holdings in In re Cox and its
progeny,14 and 2) the Legislature's continued emphasis on the Act's
discriminatory classifications.15
To bolster its interpretation, the court undertook an analysis of the
Act's language, using the legal maxim ejusdem generis as a guide to
interpretation.16 The court reasoned that the Act's emphasis on per-
sonal characteristics and the absence of language referring to eco-
nomic discrimination denoted a legislative intent to limit the Act's
application.17 Further, the court cited to In re Cox and its progeny,
again pointing to the absence of financial discriminatory characteris-
tics and the presence of personal discriminatory characteristics.18
Next, the court reasoned that the minimum income policy satisfied
a legitimate business interest of the defendants and was not "'arbi-
trary' in the same way that race and sex discrimination are arbi-
trary," but rather, was evidence of an intent to satisfy a landlord's
interest in remaining solvent.19 The court ended its economic dis-
construction. Accordingly, reenacted portions of the statute are given the
same construction they received before the amendment.
Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1156, 805 P.2d at 879, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Thus, the court re-
jected the proposition that the legislature had overturned the prior holdings in the In
re Cox line of cases.
13. The court reiterated that the legislature's silence is not absolutely conclusive
in determining agreement with prior judicial holdings and that "legislative inaction is
a weak reed upon which to lean." Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1156, 805 P.2d at 880, 278 Cal.
Rptr. at 621 (quoting Troy Gold Indus., Ltd. v. Occupational Safety and Health Appeals
Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d 379, 391 n.6, 231 Cal. Rptr. 861, 868-69 n.6 (1986)). However, legis-
lative inaction can lead to "an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval."
Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1156, 805 P.2d at 880, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 621. (quoting Cianci v. Su-
perior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 923, 710 P.2d 375, 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586 (1985)).
14. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1156, 805 P.2d at 880, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 621.
15. 1& The court noted that the legislature in subsequent legislation, had placed
"continued emphasis on the specified categories of discrimination in the Act." Id. at
1159, 805 P.2d at 882, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
16. [Where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of per-
sons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to per-
sons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated. [It] is
based on the obvious reason that if the [writer] had intended the general
words to be used in their unrestricted sense, [he or she] would not have men-
tioned the particular things or classes of things which would in that event be-
come mere surplusage.
Id. at 1160, 805 P.2d at 882, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (quoting Scally v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806, 819, 100 Cal. Rptr. 501, 509 (1972).
17. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1160, 805 P.2d at 882, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
18. 1L at 1161, 805 P.2d at 883, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
19. 1L at 1164, 805 P.2d at 886, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
crimination analysis with a discussion of the negative impact that ju-
dicial recognition of economic discrimination claims would have upon
the judiciary, upon business, and upon the goals of the Act itself.20
Thus, the court concluded that the defendant landlord's rental in-
come policy did not violate the "language, policy or purpose" of the
Unruh Act.2 1
B. Disparate Impact
Turning to the plaintiffs' argument that the disparate impact test
should be applied to the Unruh Act, the court explained that this test
allows "plaintiff[s] in certain contexts to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that a defendant's policies or practices
have an adverse impact on a statutorily protected class of persons
such as women, Blacks, Hispanics, etc."22 The court reviewed the
history of the disparate impact test, both at the federal and California
state levels.23 The court summarized that in California, the test had
been used in employment discrimination cases, but its use had not
been extended to the area of the Unruh Act.24
20. Id at 1166, 805 P.2d at 887, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 628. The court noted three areas
in which a recognition of economic discrimination would be felt. First, the court be-
lieved that the judiciary would be affected by "a multitude of microeconomic deci-
sions" which would drastically increase costs and promote uncertainty with regard to
judicial outcomes. I& In this regard, the court predicted that trials concerning eco-
nomic discrimination would involve arguments as to which criteria would be the most
accurate indicators of economic ability to pay or the "best predictors of default." Id
Second, the court felt that banks, retailers, and numerous other businesses which
operate on credit would be in the difficult position of defending each of their credit
policies. This would further increase costs and promote uncertainty in the courts. Id.
at 1167, 805 P.2d at 887, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
Finally, the majority speculated that economic discrimination claims could "have [a]
pernicious effect] on the antidiscrimination policy of the Unruh Act itself" because
landlords and business operators would replace their race and sex neutral minimum
income policies with subjective policies. IdM at 1168, 805 P.2d at 888, 278 Cal. Rptr. at
629. The majority believed that an "objective" minimum income policy was more de-
sirable than gambling upon the possible establishment of inconsistent subjective crite-
ria. Id
21. Id at 1169, 805 P.2d at 889, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
22. Id at 1170, 805 P.2d at 890, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
23. The court began with a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, noting that the United States Supreme Court has adopted
the disparate impact test in its analysis of Title VII discrimination cases. Id. at 1171,
805 P.2d at 890, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 631. See generally Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) (the disparate impact test provides that "a facially neutral
employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the em-
ployer's subjective intent to discriminate").
The court noted that the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) has also been
analyzed under a disparate impact test. The FEHA is codified at California Govern-
ment Code § 12900 (West 1980). See also Ibarbia v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 191 Cal.
App. 3d 1318, 237 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1987); City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Em-
ployment and Hous. Comm'n., 191 Cal. App. 3d 976, 985-86, 236 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721-22
(1987).
24. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1172, 805 P.2d at 891, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
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The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments, citing to the Act's lan-
guage prohibiting intentional discrimination2 5 and to a lack of "statu-
tory language, history, or relevant authority" supporting plaintiffs'
position.26 The court concluded that a showing of intentional dis-
crimination would be required to support a claim under the Unruh
Act and further held that a disparate impact analysis was inappropri-
ate for claims under the Act.27 However, the court stated that in the
future it would allow the future use of disparate impact evidence to
support claims of intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act.28
C. Justice Moask's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Mosk concurred with Justice Broussard's dis-
senting opinion in arguing that economic discrimination should be a
cognizable claim under the Unruh Act.29 He also discussed the inap-
propriateness of sustaining a demurrer under conditions where it was
essential to conduct a factual inquiry into whether the minimum in-
come policy was arbitrary.30
D. Justice Broussard's Dissent
Justice Broussard, in his dissent, argued that the court of appeal's
decision was correct, and that In re Cox and its progeny stood for the
proposition that the Unruh Act prohibited "all arbitrary discrimina-
tion" among businesses.3 1 He further contended that the majority
improperly ignored the principles of stare decisis by disregarding the
legislature's adoption of prior holdings of the court.32
Justice Broussard asserted that the majority's emphasis on the
principle of ejusdem generis and its "personal characteristics" guide-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1173-74, 805 P.2d at 892, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 633. The court also noted that
although the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission has employed a
disparate impact analysis under Unruh Act claims as well as FEHA claims, the com-
mission's decision was based on a Title VII analysis and did "not analyze the language
or history of the Unruh Act." I. at 1175, 805 P.2d at 893, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 634. Cf
Department of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Merribrook Apartments, FEHC Dec.
No. 88-19 (1988) (using a disparate impact analysis, policy of two occupant maximum in
two bedroom apartment qualified as age discrimination as prohibited by California
Government Code § 12948 which incorporates the Unruh Act).
27. Harris, 52 Cal. 3d at 1175, 805 P.2d at 893, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
28. Id
29. Id at 1176, 805 P.2d at 898-99, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
30. 1& at 1176, 805 P.2d at 899, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 1177, 805 P.2d at 895, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1178, 805 P.2d at 895, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
lines leads directly to uncertainty in the Act's application.3 3 He re-
ferred to the established In re Cox decision in stating, "poverty is
[not] any less a personal characteristic than long hair or unconven-
tional dress."3 4 He also argued that minimum income policies would
open the door to "legitimateo" forms of discrimination against the
poor.3 5 Justice Broussard further contended that the majority's hold-
ing might lead to abuse by businesses which will "undoubtedly be
able to suggest economic reasons for their [discriminatory] policies."36
Concluding his dissent, Justice Broussard stated that discrimination
by businesses has existed and will continue to exist, especially after




Section 7031 of the California Business & Professions
Code prohibits unlicensed contractors and subcontractors
from bringing either contract or tort actions to recover
the value of work performed" Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v.
Oasis Waterpark.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v. Oasis Waterpark,' the California
Supreme Court dealt with two issues regarding section 7031 of the
California Business & Professions Code:2 (1) whether section 7031
permits an unlicensed nonresident contractor or subcontractor to sue
upon an "isolated transaction" where "exceptional circumstances"
exist;3 and (2) whether section 7031 bars fraud actions by unlicensed
33. Id. at 1180, 805 P.2d at 896, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1182, 805 P.2d at 898, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
35. Id
36. I&
37. Id. at 1182-83, 805 P.2d at 898, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 640 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
1. 52 Cal. 3d 988, 803 P.2d 370, 277 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1991). For a discussion of this
case, see 1 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 494A (9th ed. Supp.
1991).
2. The version of section 7031 applicable to this case reads:
No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor,
may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for the collection
of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which a license
is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly
licensed contractor at all times during the performance of such act or con-
tract, except that such prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each
individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with Section
7029.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (Deering 1987). All further statutory references are to
the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise specified.
3. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 992, 803 P.2d at 372, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 519. Although it
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contractors or subcontractors against the person for whom the work
-was performed.4 In dealing with the first issue, the court affirmed
the court of appeal by, unanimously5 holding that, though harsh re-
,sults may occur, the deterrent purpose of section 70316 precludes re-
covery for work performed regardless of whether exceptional
circumstances exist.7 On the second issue, a majority of the court
,reversed the court of appeal by finding that the same deterrent pur-
pose bars a plaintiff from recovery even where fraud is alleged.9
II. TREATMENT
The court stated that the purpose of the licensing law in California
is to protect the public from incompetence and dishonesty in those who pro-
vide building and construction services... [by] provid[ing] minimal assurance
that all persons offering such services in California have the requisite skill
and character, understand applicable local laws and codes, and know the rudi-
ments of administering a contracting business.10
The court noted that the section 7031 bar of recovery advanced this
purpose" even though it sometimes works injustice to the unlicensed
conceded that it had no California license, Hydrotech argued that it provided its serv-
ices on a one-time basis only and that the specialized nature of those services, per-
formed only at the insistence of Oasis, should exempt the transaction from the
requirements of section 7031. Id at 994-95, 803 P.2d at 373-74, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21.
The court of appeal rejected this argument. Hydrotech Systens, Ltd v. Oasis
Waterpark, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1507, 1512, 267 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 (1990).
4. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 992, 803 P.2d at 372, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
5. Retired Associate Justice Eagleson, sitting under assignment by the Chairper-
son of the Judicial Council, wrote the opinion joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Mosk and Kennard. Justice Arabian concurred separately. Justice Broussard,
joined by Justice Panelli, concurred on this issue only.
6. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
7. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 997, 803 P.2d at 375, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See 1 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 495 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991); 11
CAL. JuR. 3D Business & Occupation Licenses § 60 (1974). Hydrotech sued Oasis for
breach of implied contract and for money due and owing to recover more than $110,000
for equipment and materials used in the construction of a wave pool. 52 Cal. 3d at 992,
803 P.2d at 372, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
8. Justice Broussard's dissent, in which he was joined by Justice Panelli, ad-
dressed only the fraud issue. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 1003-08, 803 P.2d at 379-83, 277
Cal. Rptr. at 526-30 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
9. Id. at 1002, 803 P.2d at 379, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 526. Hydrotech's fraud count al-
leged that Oasis insisted that Hydrotech perform the work, all the while knowing that
it never intended to honor the contract and that it could refuse to pay under section
7031. Id at 993-94, 803 P.2d at 372-73, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 519-20.
10. Id. at 995, 803 P.2d at 374, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (citing Lewis & Queen v. N. M.
Ball Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 149-50, 308 P.2d 713, 718 (1957)). See 11 CAL. Jun. 3D Build-
ing & Construction Contracts § 35 (1974 & Supp. 1991).
11. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 995, 803 P.2d at 374, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 521. The court
noted that because the "obvious statutory intent is to discourage persons who have
contractor.12
The court unanimously rejected Hydrotech's argument that its iso-
lated performance of specialized services for Oasis should be exempt
from section 7031, finding neither an express nor an implied excep-
tion for "isolated" transactions.' 3 Furthermore, the court found that
the protective purpose of the licensing law is accomplished "by re-
quiring that a contractor's competence and qualifications, however
unique, be examined and certified by the expert agency charged with
the law's enforcement."14 Finally, the court rejected Hydrotech's
claim that the protective purpose of the licensing law applied only to
contractors and not to subcontractors who did not hold themselves
out to the public, finding that "an unlicensed subcontractor may not
recover compensation for his work from either the owner or the gen-
eral contractor."15
failed to comply with the licensing law from offering or providing their unlicensed
services for pay," the protective purpose of the law would be served "by withholding
judicial aid from those who seek compensation for unlicensed contract work." Id.
12. Id. The court found that "[blecause of the strength and clarity of this [protec-
tive] policy, it is well settled that section 7031 applies despite injustice to the unli-
censed contractor." Id. The court held that "[s]ection 7031 represents a legislative
determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in
the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties, and that ...
such deterrance (sic] can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain
any action for compensation in the courts of this state." I& (quoting Lewis & Queen,
48 Cal. 2d at 151, 308 P.2d at 719) (emphasis in original); see also Brown v. Solano
County Business Dev., Inc., 92 Cal. App. 3d 192, 198, 154 Cal. Rptr. 700, 703 (1979);
Rushing v. Powell, 61 Cal. App. 3d 597, 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1976).
13. The court first noted that "[t]he numerous express exemptions from the licens-
ing law (§ 7040 et seq.) do not include foreign contractors, isolated transactions, or
'unique' building services and capabilities." Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 995, 803 P.2d at
374, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (emphasis added). The court then rejected Hydrotech's argu-
ment for an implied exception, finding that "there is no implied exception for 'iso-
lated' transactions by foreign contractors." Id. at 996, 803 P.2d at 375, 277 Cal. Rptr. at
522 (citing Power City Communications, Inc. v. Calaveras Tel. Co., 280 F. Supp. 808
(E.D. Cal. 1968)).
14. Id. at 996, 803 P.2d at 375, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (emphasis added). The court
noted that the cases upon which Hydrotech attempted to rely in order to urge a recog-
nition of an exceptional circumstances exemption all dealt with some form of substan-
tial compliance. These cases state that an unlicensed contractor will not be barred
from recovery "if his licensure was defective only in form and the defendant had re-
ceived the 'full measure' of protection intended by the Legislature." Id. at 995-96, 803
P.2d at 374, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (emphasis in original); see e.g., Asdourian v. Araj, 38
Cal. 3d 276, 282-89, 696 P.2d 95, 99, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 707 (1985); Latipac, Inc. v. Supe-
rior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 278, 411 P.2d 564, 49 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1966); Gatti v. Highland Park
Builders, Inc., 27 Cal. 2d 687, 166 P.2d 265 (1946); see also 1 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAw, Contracts § 500 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991). However, since
Hydrotech had made no attempt to obtain a license, the court found no substantial
compliance. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 996, 803 P.2d at 375, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 521. Fur-
ther, the court noted that, although not applicable to the contract in dispute, the legis-
lature had amended section 7031 to provide that the substantial compliance rule "shall
not apply to this section." Id. at 996 n.5, 803 P.2d at 375 n.5, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 522 n.5.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(d) (Deering Supp. 1991); 1989 Cal. Stat. ch. 368, § 1.
15. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 997, 803 P.2d at 375, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 522. See Lewis &
Queen, 48 Cal. 2d at 152-54, 308 P.2d at 720-22; Pickens v. American Mortgage Exch.,
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Next, a majority of the justices found that the appellate court
erred in holding that section 7031 did not bar Hydrotech's recovery of
tort damages from the alleged fraud by Oasis, stating that
"[r]egardless of the equities, section 7031 bars all actions, however
they are characterized, which effectively seek 'compensation' for ille-
gal unlicensed contract work."' 6 Although the majority acknowl-
edged the possibility of abuse by general contractors and owners, 17 it
reiterated its prior position that the deterrent purpose of section 7031
should "preclude recovery even when the person who solicited the
unlicensed work did act in bad faith."'i The majority did, however,
limit its decision somewhat by holding that fraud was irrelevant only
269 Cal. App. 2d 299, 302, 74 Cal. Rptr. 788, 791 (1969). Section 7026 states, in pertinent
part, that "[t]he term contractor includes subcontractor and specialty contractor."
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7026 (Deering 1987). See 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW, Contracts § 494 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1991); 11 CAL. JuR. 3D Building &
Construction Contracts § 22 (1974). For a criticism of this policy, see James A. Bren-
nan, Note, Contracts: Interpretation of Statute Barring Action of Unlicensed Contrac-
tor, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 89 (1958).
16. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 997, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (emphasis
added) (citing Lewis & Queen, 48 Cal. 2d at 150-52, 308 P.2d at 721).
17. The majority recognized the concern expressed by the appellate court and jus-
tices Broussard and Panelli that contractors might "seek out unlicensed subcontrac-
tors, secure in the knowledge that the work obtained would not have to be
compensated." Id. at 998, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523; see id. at 1003, 803 P.2d
at 380, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). However, the
majority, noting that section 7118 provides for penalties to general contractors who
knowingly engage unlicensed subcontractors, was unpersuaded that this type of abuse
would result, stating that "it is unlikely that a rational general contractor would inten-
tionally risk liability for claims that his unlicensed subcontractor had performed sub-
standard work." Id. at 998, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
18. Id. at 999, 803 P.2d at 376-77, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24 (emphasis in original). In
arriving at this finding, the majority distinguished three court of appeal decisions cited
by Hydrotech: Grant v. Weatherholt, 123 Cal. App. 2d 34, 266 P.2d 185 (1954); Brunzell
Constr. Co. v. Barton Dev. Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 442, 49 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1966); and Pick-
ens v. American Mortgage Exch., 269 Cal. App. 2d 299, 74 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1969). Noting
that the legislature had not made specific reference to these cases in any subsequent
amendments to section 7031, the majority chose not to disapprove of these cases, hold-
ing rather that they were inapposite because the primary fraud alleged in those cases
was "external to the arrangement for construction work as such, and was thus unre-
lated to any protective concern of the licensing law." Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 1001, 803
P.2d at 378-79, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26. In his separate concurrence, Justice Arabian
wrote that he would overrule Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens "as patently inconsistent
with the statutory language and intent," citing court decisions finding that "something
more than mere silence should be required before that acquiescence is elevated into a
species of implied legislation." Id. at 1002, 803 P.2d at 379, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Ara-
bian, J., concurring) (citing People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1127-28, 459 P.2d 225,
229-30, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901-02 (1969); accord Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 300-01, 758 P.2d 58, 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 124 (1988); Cianci v. Supe-
rior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 923, 710 P.2d 375, 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586 (1985)).
in garden-variety disputes over money owed to unlicensed contrac-
tors for work they had performed.19
In dissent, Justice Broussard argued that a cause of action for fraud
should not be barred by section 7031 because of the reenactment
rule2 o and also due to policy considerations against unjust enrich-
ment.2 ' He disagreed with the majority's distinction that Oasis's al'-
leged fraud was not actionable because the fraud was not external to
the construction work performed.22 Finally, he concluded that the
majority's decision was flawed because it served to reward fraudulent
parties.2 3
III. IMPACT
Explicit in this decision is the court's determination that the legis-
lature's desire to protect owners from the potentially shoddy work of
unlicensed contractors and subcontractors in the state of California is
19. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 1002, 803 P.2d at 379, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 526. This limi-
tation is evidenced by the court's reluctance to disapprove Grant, Brunzell and Pick-
ens. See mupra note 18. As the majority noted, "if the primary fraud alleged is a false
promise to pay for unlicensed construction work, and the primary relief sought is com-
pensation for the work, section 7031 bars the action." Id To strengthen this finding,
the majority noted the recent amendment to section 7031 is to operate "regardless of
the form of action attempted, and 'regardless of the merits of the [unlicensed contrac-
tor's] cause of action."' Id at 1002 n.10, 803 P.2d at 379 n.10, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 526 n.10
(citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031(a) (Deering Supp. 1991); 1989 Cal. Stats. ch. 368,
§ 1).
20. The reenactment rule states that "[w]here a statute has been construed by ju-
dicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must
be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and approves of
It." Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at 1004, 803 P.2d at 381, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (citing People v. Haliner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393,
396 (1954); People v. Fox, 73 Cal. App. 3d 178, 181, 140 Cal. Rptr. 615, 617 (1977); Wilk-
off v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 345, 353, 696 P.2d 134, 140, 211 Cal. Rptr. 742, 748
(1985)). For an informative look at the reenactment rule, see William N. Eskridge Jr.,
Patterson v. McLean: Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
Thus, because Grant, Brunzell and Pickens specifically allowed a cause of action for
fraud by an unlicensed contractor, and the legislature had amended section 7031 subse-
quent to those decisions without specifically forbidding causes of action for fraud, Jus-
tice Broussard concluded that the judicial construction of section 7031 had been
approved and was not subject to application to specific facts. Hydrotech, 52 Cal. 3d at
1004, 803 P.2d at 381, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
21. Id. at 1005, 803 P.2d at 381, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 528 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
22. Id. at 1007-08, 803 P.2d at 383, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (Broussard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
23. Justice Broussard felt that the distinction made by the majority was untena-
ble, stating that "[a]s between fraudulent wrongdoers who seek to take advantage of
their victims on the basis of section 7031 and those who indulge in other fraudulent
conduct, the law should be most concerned with those whose fraudulent schemes seek
to take advantage of the statute." I& (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting). Jus-
tice Broussard concluded that the majority misapplied its own rule because the basic
contractual agreement between Hydrotech and Oasis was for the sale of equipment,
not for construction services or supervision, thus making them collateral to the con-
tract. I& (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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more compelling than any equitable misfortunes which may befall
those who perform the work. In upholding the protective policy be-
hind this legislation, the court chose to place the rights of the owners
above those of the unlicensed contractors and subcontractors.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority assumed that a combina-
tion of the contractor's good faith and the fear of potential statutory
reprisal for shoddy work performed by unlicensed subcontractors
will be sufficient to compensate for the loss of a cause of action for
fraud.24 However, the court's prohibition of fraud actions does cover
the unscrupulous contractor with a seemingly impenetrable umbrella
of security.25 Nevertheless, regardless of the underlying equities or
social responsibilities the court's decision potentially affects, the
message concerning section 7031 is clear: if you do not have a license,
do not do the work.
BRUCE C. YOUNG
V. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Private parties lack standing to challenge criminal
prosecutions; recall and resentencing under California
Penal Code section 1170(d) allow consideration of events
subsequent to the imposition of the initial sentence;
resentencing need not occur within the 120-day limit for
recalk Dix v. Superior Court of Humboldt County.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Dix v. Superior Court of Humboldt County' the California
Supreme Court addressed two areas of criminal procedure: (1) the
right of a crime victim to seek a writ of mandate or prohibition and
(2) the availability of the post-commitment recall and resentencing
process. The court held that neither crime victims nor members of
the general public have a beneficial interest, a public interest, or a
statutory right to intervene in the commencement, conduct, or con-
24. Id at 998, 803 P.2d at 376, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
25. For example, the contractor, secure in the knowledge that section 7031 will
prevent the unlicensed subcontractor from recovering, may fraudulently induce the
subcontractor to engage in the work, receive work that will pass building code stan-
dards, and then refuse to pay.
1. 53 Cal. 3d 442, 807 P.2d 1063, 279 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1991). Justice Baxter wrote
the unanimous opinion of the court. Justice Mosk added a separate concurring
opinion.
clusion of criminal prosecutions.2 Such proceedings are the exclusive
domain of the public prosecutor.3 Thus, prosecutors exercise com-
plete discretion in pursuing criminal justice, subject only to "'the
general rules of law and professional ethics that bind all counsel.'"'4
As a result, no matter how dissatisfied they may be with a judge's or
prosecutor's decision, citizens lack standing to petition for mandamus
or prohibition.5
In order to provide guidance to lower courts, the supreme court
also ruled on the merits of the issue pertaining to recall and resen-
tencing.6 The court held that although resentencing must "eliminate
disparity" and "promote conformity," these requirements do not ap-
ply to recall. 7 The court also upheld the judge's consideration of
events subsequent to the initial sentencing in making his recall deci-
sion.8 Finally, the court ruled that although the recall must take
place within 120 days of sentencing, the actual resentencing need not
occur within this period.9
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The district attorney brought charges against respondent for aggra-
vated assault after he shot petitioner in the head with a pistol for
failure to pay off a drug deal.10 Respondent admitted his intent to
cause petitioner great bodily harm and pled guilty to assault with a
firearm. The court sentenced respondent to seven years in state
prison," but recalled the sentence on its own motion 118 days later.'2
2. See infra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
3. Dix v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837
(citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26500-26501 (West 1988)).
4. Id at 452, 807 P.2d at 1067, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (quoting Taliaferro v. Locke,
182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 6 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1960)).
5. Id at 451, 454, 807 P.2d at 1066, 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837, 839.
6. Id at 454, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(b).
7. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 459, 807 P.2d at 1072, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 843. For an explana-
tion of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
8. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 463, 807 P.2d at 1074, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
9. Id. at 464, 807 P.2d at 1075, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
10. Id at 448, 807 P.2d at 1064, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
11. Id The seven-year sentence, the maximum allowed, consisted of a four-year
base term for aggravated assault and a three-year enhancement for the great bodily
injury. Id "Base term" means the determinate prison term prescribed by statute or
law. An "enhancement" is an additional period of incarceration added to the base
term. CAL. R. CT. 405(b) & (c) (West 1991).
12. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 448, 807 P.2d at 1064, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 835. Section 1170(d)
of the Penal Code authorizes such a motion within 120 days of sentencing. See infra
note 45 for statutory text.
The court recalled petitioner's sentence at the request of a district attorney inter-
ested in prosecuting a notorious drug lord, Kellotat, for allegedly paying a hit man for
a murder. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 449, 807 P.2d at 1065, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 836. The district
attorney argued that petitioner's statement was critical to the proceeding against Kel-
lotat. The court had originally dismissed the case against Kellotat because the actual
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Apparently, respondent had agreed, subsequent to his imprisonment,
to provide crucial testimony in a "hitman-for-hire" prosecution if the
court would resentence him to county jail instead of state prison.
Thereafter, the authorities transferred respondent to county jail.
At one point respondent was released on his own recognizance, but
was subsequently returned to custody.13 In a letter to the court, peti-
tioner conveyed his distress over the recall and release, citing respon-
dent's substantial felony record and a threatening note displayed by
respondent during the trial on the assault charges.'4 Due to various
court orders postponing the resentencing hearing, respondent has
never been resentenced.i5
Retaining a lawyer on his own, petitioner sought a writ of prohibi-
tion and/or mandamus to prevent further continuances and to com-
pel respondent's prompt return to prison.' 6 The court of appeal
issued a writ of mandate.17 The People and respondent, real parties
in interest, requested supreme court review.' 8
III. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Standing to Challenge Criminal Proceedings
A writ of mandate compels performance of an official duty' 9 and a
writ of prohibition curbs court action in excess of its jurisdictional
power.20 Both require that the party seeking the writ be otherwise
faced with an inadequate legal remedy.2 ' As a general rule, courts
may only issue these writs to persons with a "beneficial interest" in
assassin refused to take the witness stand. Respondent asserted that he would testify
that Kellotat had tried to hire him to do the killing. Id.
13. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 448-49, 807 P.2d at 1065, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
14. Id. at 449, 807 P.2d at 1065, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 449-50, 807 P.2d at 1065, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 836. For a distinction between
mandamus and prohibition and the requirements of each, see infra notes 19-24 and ac-
companying text.
17. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 450, 807 P.2d at 1065, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 836. In granting the
writ, the court of appeal held that a victim of criminal assault had "public interest"
standing. The appellate court also ruled that the superior court violated section
1170(d) of the Penal Code by considering events subsequent to commitment. I
18. Id. at 450, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
19. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1085 (West 1980).
20. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1102 (West 1980). For an overview of the use of prohi-
bition in criminal actions, as well as specific examples of when prohibition is and is not
proper, see generally 22 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 3888-98 (1985).
21. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1086, 1103 (West 1980). See generally 8 B. WmTKIN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs §§ 3-4,15 (3d ed. 1985).
the case.22 There are two ways to circumvent the general rule: (1)
the public interest exception for mandamus23 or (2) through a finding
of independent statutory authority.24
1. Crime Victims Do Not Have a "Beneficial Interest" in
Criminal Cases.
One argument dealt with the meaning of the term "beneficial in-
terest" found within California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1086
and 1103.25 Petitioner claimed that his status as the victim of the as-
sault, combined with respondent's threat to inflict further harm, es-
tablished a beneficial interest in having respondent appropriately
confined.26 The court rejected this argument, finding that responsi-
bility for the prosecution of criminal violations rests solely with the
public prosecutor.27 The court noted that it is the prosecutor alone
who decides "whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, and
what punishment to seek."28 Thus, regardless of how personally of-
fended members of the public may be, they cannot initiate their own
criminal proceedings.2 9 The court then reasoned that due to impor-
tant policy considerations, "exclusive prosecutorial discretion may
also extend to the conduct of a criminal action once [it has been]
commenced."30
22. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1086, 1103 (West 1980). For explanatory material on
the nature of beneficial interests, see generally, 8 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Extraordinary Writs §§ 65-68 (3d ed. 1985) (must be a substantial practical benefit to
petitioner); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus §§ 43, 49 (1948 & Supp. 1991) (outlining nature of in-
terest necessary and giving examples of sufficient and insufficient beneficial interests).
23. See generally, 8 B. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extrordinary Writs § 74
(3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 47 (1948).
24. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837. See generally, 55
C.J.S. Mandamus § 43 (1948) (noting that access to mandamus may be statutuorily
granted to particular interested parties).
25. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1086, 1103 (West 1980). See supra note 22.
26. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
27. Id. Section 26500 of the California Government Code states that "[t]he public
prosecutor shall ... within his or her discretion ... initiate and conduct on behalf of
the people all prosecutions for public offenses," CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26500 (West
1988)(emphasis added).
28. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837. See, e.g., People v.
Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 375 P.2d 641, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (holding that district at-
torney has primary responsibility for determining punitive consequences of recidivism
in narcotics cases and discretion to dismiss all charges), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Hucks, 217 Cal. App. 3d 260, 266 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1990).
29. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837. See, e.g., Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976) (only district attorney can authorize institution of criminal proceedings). But
see J. J. Monticelli, Annotation, Private Citizen's Right to Institute Mandamus to Com-
pel a Magistrate or Other Appropriate Official to Issue a Warran or the Like, for an
Arrest, 49 A.L.R 2D 1285 (1956) (noting that a private citizen need not have a special
or legal interest other than an interest in having the law executed).
30. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 452, 807 P.2d at 1066-87, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38. The court
noted that discretionary decisions to pursue prosecution are "'legitimately founded on
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2. Members of the Public, Including Crime Victims, Do Not
Have "Public Interest Standing."
The public interest doctrine allows a private citizen to enforce a
public right by seeking mandamus to compel the fulfillment of a pub-
lic duty.3 1 However, public prosecutors have no enforceable "duty"
to conduct criminal proceedings in any particular manner; their only
obligation is to exercise sound professional judgment over their
prosecutorial role.32 The court held that citizen intervention in crim-
inal prosecutions would be inimical to public policy because it "would
undermine the People's status as exclusive party plaintiff in criminal
actions,3 3 interfere with the prosecutor's broad discretion in criminal
matters, and disrupt the orderly administration of justice."34
3. The "Victim's Bill of Rights" Does Not Provide Standing to
Intervene in Criminal Prosecutions.
If a person has neither a beneficial interest nor a public interest in
the complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of
law enforcement.'" Id. at 451, 807 P.2d at 1066, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 837 (quoting People v.
Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 506, 758 P.2d 1081, 1098, 250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 567 (1988)). The
court reasoned that the complex considerations involved in exercising prosecutorial
discretion created a public interest which outweighed the personal interests of victims.
Id. at 452, 807 P.2d at 1067, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 838. Due to this important public interest,
the court found that prosecutorial discretion should also apply to decisions which
"seek, oppose, accept or challenge judicial actions or rulings." Id.
31. See Green v. Obledo, 29 Cal. 3d 126, 624 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1981)
(holding citizen had standing to compel proper calculation of welfare benefits); Com-
mon Cause v. Board of Supervisors, 49 Cal. 3d 432, 777 P.2d 610, 261 Cal. Rptr. 574
(1989) (finding taxpayer had standing to enforce statute regarding voter outreach pro-
gram). But see Carsten v. Psychology Examining Comm., 27 Cal. 3d 793, 614 P.2d 276,
166 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1980) (denying citizen-taxpayer standing to challenge rulings of ad-
ministrative agency because of overriding public policy).
32. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 453, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
33. Individual citizens are never parties to criminal proceedings. Section 100(b) of
the California Government Code provides that "all prosecutions shall be conducted in
[the name of the People] and by their authority." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100(b) (West
1980). Thus, according to the court, members of the public are, in essence, "strangers"
to criminal proceedings. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 453, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839.Q' 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 49 (1948).
34. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 454, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839. However, the
court preserved the right of citizen-taxpayers to bring other actions raising criminal
justice issues. Id. at 454 n.7, 807 P.2d at 1068 n.7, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839 n.7. See, e.g.,
Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980) (allowing tax-
payer to bring an action to enjoin use of public funds to sustain operation of bail and
"own recognizance release" systems). For more examples of valid independent actions,
see generally Annotation, Standing of Media Representatives or Organizations to Seek
Review of, or to Intervene to Oppose, Order Closing Criminal Proceedings to Public, 74
A.L.R. 4TH 476 (1989).
the case, standing may be obtained pursuant to statutory or constitu-
tional authority.3 5 In this regard, petitioner pointed out that the Cal-
ifornia Constitution, in a section commonly known as the "Victim's
Bill of Rights,"3 6 declares "that felony victims have the 'right' to ex-
pect the appropriate detention, trial, and punishment of those who
injured them."37 The petitioners then inferred that corresponding
remedies must likewise exist to enforce these rights; otherwise, citi-
zens would have a right without a remedy.38 However, the court felt
that these constitutional provisions, rather then creating enforceable
rights in felony victims, simply expressed moral and philosophical
support for a substantive reformation of criminal law.39 The court
reasoned that, in enacting the Victim's Bill of Rights, the Legislature
could not possibly have intended to drastically change standard crim-
inal practice,40 especially when there are constitutional and statutory
provisions that create specific rights in felony victims.41 As a result,
the supreme court found that the appellate court had erred in finding
that the petitioner had standing to challenge the recall of respon-
dent's sentence.42
B. Recall and Resentencing Under California Penal Code Section
1170(d)
Although the resolution of the standing issue made it unnecessary
to address the merits of the recall and resentencing issue, the court
exercised its discretion to do so. 43 Contained within the Determinate
35. See supra note 24.
36. The "Victim's Bill of Rights" is found in Article I, section 28 of the California
Constitution. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(a).
37. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 452, 807 P.2d at 1067, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (citing CAL.




41. Examples include: The right to attend the sentencing hearing and to state
views regarding sentencing, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1991); the right to
introduce a written or videotaped statement if in lieu of personal attendance, CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 1191.15 (West Supp. 1991); and the right to notification that the state in-
tends to seek a sentence modification or reduction, case dismissal or early parole in
exchange for the in-custody informant's testimony in another case, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1191.25 (West Supp. 1991). Another example is the right to restitution in certain cir-
cumstances, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (all victims of criminal activity have the
right to restitution). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (authorizing labor in camps,
farms or other public work to cover restitution, parole supervision costs, and fines);
§ 1203.1g (authorizing court to tequire restitution for medical expenses for treatment
of sexual assault victims); § 1203.11 (authorizing restitution for cost of emergency re-
sponse) (West Supp. 1991).
42. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 454, 807 P.2d at 1069, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
43. Id Because it found the sentencing issues "significant" and both sides had
fully briefed the issues in anticipation of a ruling on the merits, the court agreed to
exercise its discretion to rule on the merits in order to guide the lower courts. I& See,
e.g., DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Department of Employment, 56 Cal. 2d 54, 362 P.2d 487,
[Vol. 19: 207, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Sentencing Act,44 section 1170(d) of the California Penal Code pro-
vides a sentencing court with recall and resentencing authority.45
Under section 1170(d), there are two limitations on a sentencing
court's ability to cancel sentence once it goes into effect: (1) the re-
call must occur within 120 days of the commitment date and (2) the
recall must be pursuant to the court's own motion, the advice of the
Director of Corrections or the recommendation of the Board of
Prison Terms.4 6 Once rescinded, the sentence can be reinstated or
revised, as long as the new sentence (1) is not greater than the origi-
nal sentence and (2) includes credit for time served.47
1. The Sentencing Court Can Recall For Any Reason Logically
Related to Lawful Sentencing.
Petitioner argued that post-commitment recall and resentencing
authority under section 1170(d) exists only to eliminate disparity and
13 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1961) (court heard merits even though appeal was moot); People v.
West Coast Shows, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 89 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1970) (same).
44. 1976 Cal. Stat. 5140 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-70.95 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1991)). The purpose of the Act is to eliminate disparity and promote uniformity
in punishment by limiting the possible prison term to a statutorily-fixed period, de-
pending upon the seriousness of the crime. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 1985).
Further statutory references will be to the California Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
45. Section 1170(d) provides, in pertinent part:
When a defendant ... has been sentenced to be imprisoned in the state prison
... the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own mo-
tion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections
or the Board of Prison Terms, recall the sentence ... and resentence the de-
fendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously been sen-
tenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence. The resentence under this subdivision shall apply the sentencing
rules of the Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit shall be given for time served.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West Supp. 1991). See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 1544 (1989) (recognizing statutory and constitutional guidance in controlling judicial
exercise of resentencing power); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3413, 3426 (1985)
(discussing recall process in both determinate and indeterminate sentencing settings).
46. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 456, 807 P.2d at 1069, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
47. Id. at 456, 807 P.2d at 1070, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 841. See generally R.D. Hursh,
Annotation, Right to Credit for Time Served Under Erroneous or Void Sentence or In-
valid Judgment of Conviction Necessitating New Trial, 35 A.L.R. 2D 1283 (1954). Sec-
tion 1170(d) of the California Penal Code is a statutory exception to the common law
rule that a court loses resentencing jurisdiction when the original sentence goes into
effect. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 445, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citing Holder v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 779, 783, 463 P.2d 705, 707, 83 Cal. Rptr. 353, 355 (1970)); Peo-
ple v. Delson, 161 Cal. App. 3d 56, 62, 207 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248 (1984); People v. Calhoun,
72 Cal. App. 3d 494, 497, 140 Cal. Rptr. 225, 226 (1977)). Thus, a court does not exceed
its sentencing jurisdiction when acting within the scope of section 1170(d).
promote uniformity.48 After examining the statutory predecessor to
section 1170(d) and noting the changes the Legislature made,49 the
court concluded that the Legislature intended to retain the judicial
power to consider individual grounds for vacating sentences.5o Fur-
thermore, the court noted that section 1170(f)(1), not 1170(d), con-
tains the procedure for actually correcting disparate sentences. The
court reasoned that because section 1170(f) already "assures careful
and orderly disparity review of every determinate prison sentence,
there is little reason for a separate, discretionary procedure under
section 1170(d)."51 Thus, the court held that it is only when ulti-
mately imposing the new sentence that the court must comply with
the "anti-disparity" and "pro-conformity" provision.5 2
2. In Making Its Decision to Recall a Sentence, The Court Can
Consider Events Subsequent to Commitment.
Petitioner also argued that when evaluating the availability of re-
call, the court can consider only those circumstances present at the
time of original sentencing. 53 In response, the court noted that sec-
tion 1170(d) does not contain any such express limitation.54 More-
over, the statutory language provides that the court may resentence
"as if" no previous sentence ever occurred, thus allowing an infer-
ence that the facts the court may consider are the same "as if" the
48. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 455, 807 P.2d at 1068, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839. Although peti-
tioner perceived recall as subject to the same limitations as resentencing, because re-
call is a necessary precursor to resentencing, the court rejected this inference since
"the statutory language does not link recall with disparity at all." Id. at 456, 807 P.2d at
1070, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
49. Id at 457-58, 807 P.2d at 1070-71, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 841-42. The former indeter-
minate sentencing provision contained a parallel provision authorizing recall either
upon a court's own motion or upon recommendation of the Director, if the Director's
diagnostic study, which focused on the prisoner's individual circumstances and char-
acteristics, warranted such action. The court observed that the Legislature removed
the limiting reference to the Director's diagnostic study, but made no changes that
"suggest a new and exclusive focus on sentence uniformity and disparity." Id. at 458,
807 P.2d at 1071, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
50. Id. at 458, 807 P.2d at 1071, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
51. Id. at 459, 807 P.2d at 1072, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 843. This interpretation also com-
ports with the 1985 Classification Manual and the 1990 Department Operations Manual
of the California Department of Corrections. Moreover, the court stated that if it ac-
cepted petitioner's interpretation, "the statute would contain two separate, inconsis-
tent, and confusing mechanisms for the sole purpose of correcting disparate
sentences." Id Thus in keeping with the general rule of statutory construction that
courts should avoid rendering certain provisions useless or superfluous whenever pos-
sible, the court rejected petitioner's interpretation. I (citing People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.
3d 638, 647, 685 P.2d 52, 58, 205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 498 (1984); Bowland v. Municipal Court,
18 Cal. 3d 479, 489, 556 P.2d 1081, 1086, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1976)).
52. d at 456, 807 P.2d at 1070, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
53. Id. at 455, 807 P.2d at 1069, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
54. Id at 460, 807 P.2d at 1072, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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resentencing were the original sentencing 5 5 As a result, the court
held that events occurring after the initial sentencing that impact the
recall-resentencing decision deserve consideration.55
3. Resentencing Need Not Take Place Within the 120-day Time
Limit for Recall.
Petitioner contended that, by failing to impose a new sentence
within the 120-day period of section 1170(d), the court had lost its re-
sentencing jurisdiction.57 Although the court acknowledged the
value of this interpretation, it found the statutory language to be
more readily understood as preserving the court's jurisdiction when
recall occurs within 120 days.58 Support for this interpretation stems
from the fact that the statute imposes no jurisdictional requirement
of immediate resentencing when the recall recommendation
originates from the Board or Director.5 9 The court reasoned that it
would not make sense for the Legislature to create a more rigid re-
sentencing rule after a timely recall upon the court's own motion
55. Id. For text of Penal Code section 1170(d), see supra note 45. As support for
this proposition, the court analogized to established resentencing law for cases re-
manded for resentencing after an appeal. The court noted that in those situations, the
defendant is entitled to all of the usual rights and procedures accessible at the original
sentencing. Id (citing People v. Foley, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1047, 216 Cal. Rptr. 865,
868 (1985); Van Velzer v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 3d 742, 744, 199 Cal. Rptr. 695,
696 (1984)). This includes consideration of any relevant circumstances arising after the
imposition of the prior sentence. See People v. Flores, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1156, 1160-62,
244 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324-25 (1988).
56. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 460, 807 P.2d at 1072-73, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44. This ap-
proach agrees with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which permit a federal
court to reduce a sentence to reflect the accused's substantial assistance "subsequent to
imposition of the sentence in the investigation or prosecution of another person." FED.
R. CmM. P. § 35(b) (emphasis added). See generally 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1544
(1989).
57. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 464, 807 P.2d at 1075, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 846. The court ac-
knowledged that there are cases which hold that recall must occur within the 120-day
limit or the court loses "own-motion" jurisdiction. I& See, e.g., People v. Roe, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 112, 195 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1983) (jurisdiction lost for failure to recall within 120
days); see also People v. Calhoun, 72 Cal. App. 3d 494, 140 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1977) (hold-
ing that court cannot reinvoke recall power in successive 120-day periods). However,
the court pointed out that no decision had held that "both recall and resentencing
must occur within the statutory [120-day] limit." 53 Cal. 3d at 464, 807 P.2d at 1075, 279
Cal. Rptr. at 846 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
58. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 464, 807 P.2d at 1075, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
59. "ITihe court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own mo-
tion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the
Board of Prison Terms, recall the sentence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West 1985)
(emphasis added).
than a recall upon Board advice or Director recommendation.60
IV. IMPACT
If ever there was a perfect fact scenario to justify a judicial decision
allowing a crime victim standing to intervene in the prosecution of
his aggressor, this would have been it. Petitioner, having been shot
in the head over an unpaid drug deal, had a justifiable fear that his
life was in danger when respondent was released on his own recogni-
zance after having been sentenced to seven years in prison.61 In-
stead, the court created a clear-cut rule that members of the public,
including crime victims, cannot challenge the judge's or the prosecu-
tor's decisions in criminal proceedings.6 2 The only way this rule will
change is through the enactment of a statute which clearly grants
crime victims rights in criminal proceedings under specific
circumstances.6 3
The court's decision with regard to the recall and resentencing pro-
visions of section 1170(d) enables criminal prosecutors to bargain for
testimony needed in other cases.64 The decision may be subject to
some abuse, however, as criminals learn of their new-found leverage
to bargain for lighter sentences after conviction. 65 It seems the only
check on such abuse is the judge's ability, when resentencing, to con-
sider all facts available at that time. Thus, if a convict lied about the
truth of his testimony in order to manipulate the system and procure
a lighter sentence, the court could consider this factor when imposing
a new sentence.6 6
60. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 464, 807 P.2d at 1075, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
61. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
62. Dix, 53 Cal. 3d at 454 n.7, 807 P.2d at 1068 n.7, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 839 n.7. For
further clarity, the court expressly limited its decision by stating that this decision
would not jeopardize citizen-taxpayer suits that raise criminal justice issues. Id. See
supra note 34. From a policy standpoint, the ruling makes sense. The job of the public
prosecutor would be much more difficult if she had to contend with the victim as well
as the offender. Moreover, criminal activity is a violation against all members of soci-
ety and the public prosecutor has more objectivity than the person injured.
63. Since the statutory and public interest exceptions are the only two ways
around the beneficial interest requirement of the standing rule, and the court found no
public interest, it would appear that the rights of future crime victims have been left
in the hands of the legislature. It is only through the enactment of a statutory excep-
tion that victim standing could be granted. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying
text.
64. Lisa Stansky, Crime Defendants Get a Rare Break From High Court; Victims
Not Permitted to Interfere With Resentencings, THE RECORDER, Apr. 19, 1991 at 1.
65. The case represents a rare break for criminals in light of the court's recent
tough attitude toward crime. Harriet Chiang, Victim Gets No Say In Attacker's Sen-
tence Ruling in Bizarre Humbolt County Case, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 19, 1991, at A26.
66. One problem here is that a lie may be difficult to prove. Also, the convict's
help may not result in a conviction in the other case. Kellotat, the drug kingpin
against whom respondent testified, was ultimately acquitted of the hitman employ-
ment charges. Id In an attempt to lessen this problem, the federal rules require sub-
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V. CONCLUSION
Faced with a choice between appeasing popular sentiment or main-
taining control over prosecutorial procedure, the California Supreme
Court chose the latter. The unfortunate effect of this decision is that
it tends to elevate the rights of criminal defendants over the rights of
the victim. The unanimous decision thus leaves it to the Legislature
to decide whether to create a statutory exception that establishes
standing in individual victims. In the meantime, the judge, public
prosecutor and defense counsel alone control a criminal's fate.
LORRAINE A. MUSKO
B. A defendant charged under section 666 of the Penal Code
for petty theft with a prior theft conviction may stipulate
to a prior conviction and thus preclude the jury from
learning of that conviction People v. Bouzas
In People v. Bouzas,1 the California Supreme Court resolved a con-
flict between the courts of appeal regarding the correct interpreta-
tion of the "prior theft conviction" provision of Penal Code section
6662 under article I, section 28, subdivision (f) of the California Con-
stitution.3 The court held that the prior conviction requirement of
stantial assistance in another's prosecution in order to qualify for a reduced sentence.
FED. R. CRXm. P. § 35(b).
1. 53 Cal. 3d 467, 807 P.2d 1076, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1991). Defendant Bouzas was
suspected of stealing ten syringes from a pharmacy after acting suspiciously and refus-
ing to pay for the syringes. Although the police never recovered the syringes, defend-
ant was charged with petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction. The court
rejected the defendant's request to stipulate to the prior felony conviction and thus
preclude the jury from hearing about it. Instead, the court permitted the prosecutor to
prove the prior conviction and the jury found the defendant guilty of petty theft with a
prior conviction of theft. Id at 470, 807 P.2d at 1078, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 849. The court of
appeal affirmed the trial court's rejection of defendant's request to stipulate to the
prior felony conviction allegation under section 666. Id The California Supreme
Court granted review to resolve a conflict on this issue in the courts of appeal. Id at
469, 807 P.2d at 1077, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 1988). Until 1976, § 666 addressed only misde-
meanor, theft-related prior convictions resulting in incarceration. However, later in
1976, the Legislature rewrote § 666 and merged it with former § 667. Former § 667
made a current conviction for petty theft punishable as either a misdemeanor or a fel-
ony if the defendant had been convicted earlier and served time for "any felony."
Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 807 P.2d at 1078, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 849. Present § 666 com-
bines the two former sections and provides that a defendant who has been convicted
and imprisoned for theft-related crimes and who is subsequently convicted of petty
theft "is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in
state prison." CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 1988).
3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f). This section provides in pertinent part: "When a
section 666 is a sentencing matter for the trial court and not an "ele-
ment" of a section 666 "offense" that must be determined by a jury.4
Because the defendant's prior theft-related conviction was not deter-
mined to be an element of his later offense, the court concluded that
the defendant may stipulate to his prior felony conviction and thus
preclude the jury from learning of that conviction.5
In Bouzas, the court stressed that since the original adoption of sec-
tion 666 in 1872, courts treated the prior theft conviction provision as
a sentencing factor only.6 Further, the court reasoned that because
the legislature showed no intent to alter the judicial interpretation of
previous versions of section 666, the present revised version of section
666 should receive a like interpretation.7 The court also criticized an
alternate line of cases which failed to distinguish statutes defining
substantive crimes from section 666 which merely establishes penal-
ties and regulates sentencing.8 Finally, the court asserted that a jury
prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the
trier of fact in open court." See also 22 CAL. JuR. Punishment §§ 3378-33 (1985 &
Supp. 1991).
4. Bouzas v. People, 53 Cal. 3d 467, 473-74, 807 P.2d 1076, 1080, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847,
851 (1991). Numerous cases have treated the prior conviction provision under § 666 as
a sentencing factor. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 155-56 n.7, 616 P.2d 826, 833
n.7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 851 n.7 (1980) (approving defense stipulation to a prior convic-
tion of petty theft to keep such information from the jury); People v. Pierson, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 130, 132, 77 Cal. Rptr. 888, 889 (1969) (stating "it is well settled in this state
that in a prosecution for petty theft with a prior conviction of a felony, the fact of the
former conviction is not an element of the crime, but merely a penalty-increasing de-
vice"); People v. Gallinger, 212 Cal. App. 2d 851, 855, 28 Cal. Rptr. 472, 474 (1963) (stat-
ing "[t]he fact of a former conviction is not an element of the crime").
5. Bouza8, 53 Cal. 3d 467, 480, 807 P.2d 1076, 1085, 279 Cal. Rptr. 847, 856. Chief
Justice Lucas authored the unanimous decision of the court. Id. at 469, 807 P.2d at
1077, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 848. Defendant requested to stipulate to his prior conviction
based upon § 1025 of the Penal Code. Id. at 471, 807 P.2d at 1079, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985). Section 1025 provides that the defend-
ant must be asked whether he admits or denies the prior conviction, and if he admits
it, the matter may not be heard by the jury. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985).
6. I& at 471, 807 P.2d at 1081, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 849. See supra note 4.
7. Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d at 475, 807 P.2d at 1081, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 852. The Bouzas
court stated that the legislature had "amended former sections 666 and 667 at least 10
times between 1903 and 1976." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that "the Legisla-
ture is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts' construction of
that statute." Id. (citing Wilkoff v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 345, 353, 696 P.2d 134,
141, 211 Cal. Rptr. 742, 750 (1985)).
8. Id. at 477, 807 P.2d at 1083, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 854. The court distinguished the
instant case from situations where the former conviction is an element of the offense
for which the defendant is being tried. The court cited a prosecution under § 12021 of
the Penal Code, which makes it illegal for an ex-felon to be in possession of a firearm.
Id. at 497, 807 P.2d at 1084, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The prior conviction as well as the
possession of the firearm must be proved, and thus the prior conviction is an element
of the crime. Id. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616 P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr.
844 (1980) (stating in dicta that a prior felony conviction in the context of a § 12021
trial is indistinguishable from a § 666 trial); People v. Sherren, 89 Cal. App. 3d 752, 152
Cal. Rptr. 828 (1977) (stating that a prior conviction under § 666 was just as much an
"element" of that statute as is an ex-felon statute under § 12021).
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did not need to be made cognizant of a defendant's prior theft convic-
tion in order to resolve whether that defendant has committed the
requisite elements of the substantive crime of petty theft.9
By defining the phrase "prior theft conviction" under Penal Code
section 666 to be applicable as a sentencing factor only, the court has
enunciated a bright-line standard by which lower courts may now
uniformly interpret section 666.10 This statutory interpretation pre-
serves the fundamental fairness of the trial process by preventing a
jury from becoming unduly prejudiced by a defendant's prior theft
conviction and ensuring that the specific charge against the defend-
ant will be decided on the merits."
ANDREA WasON
C. The provisions of Proposition 115 that benefit the
criminal defendant and which modify the conduct of
trials and preliminary hearings apply to the prosecution
of crimes that occurred prior to the measure's effective
date: Tapia v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tapia v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether the provisions of Proposition 115, the "Crime Vic-
tims Justice Reform Initiative,"2 apply retrospectively to events that
9. Bouzas, 53 Cal. 3d at 479, 807 P.2d at 1084, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 855. The court
recognizes that a jury that does not hear evidence of a past conviction under a § 12021
situation may acquit a defendant because they do "not believe that possessing a con-
cealable firearm should be criminal." Id (quoting People v. Hall, 28 Cal. 3d 143, 616
P.2d 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1989)).
10. I (stating "that, on its face, section 666 is a sentence-enhancing statute, not a
substantive 'offense' statute").
11. Id. The court concluded that "'section 1025 represents a fundamental declara-
tion of public policy."' Id. at 480, 807 P.2d at 1085, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (quoting Peo-
ple v. Rolon, 66 Cal. 2d 690, 693, 427 P.2d 196, 199, 58 Cal. Rptr. 596, 597 (1967)).
1. 53 Cal. 3d 282, 807 P.2d 434, 279 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1991). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Arabian and
Baxter concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Broussard
joined. Justice Broussard also wrote a separate dissent.
2. On June 5, 1990, California adopted Proposition 115 by referendum. It became
effective the following day, June 6, 1990. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 286, 807 P.2d at 435, 279
Cal. Rptr. at 593. Proposition 115 was adopted by California voters pursuant to their
power to create reform though the use of initiatives and referenda. "The people re-
serve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." CAL. CoNST. art. IV, § 1.
The California Constitution states, "[ain initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8. This constitutional limitation on initiatives is known as the "single subject" rule.
occurred prior to the effective date of the measure. Relying on Col-
lins v. Youngblood,s in which the United States Supreme Court re-
fined its definition of ex post facto laws,4 the California Supreme
Court held that the provisions of Proposition 115 which accrue to the
benefit of a criminal defendant, and the provisions which modify the
conduct of trials and preliminary hearings, apply to cases where the
alleged crime occurred before the effective date of the law.5
Robert Allen Tapia was accused of committing first degree murder
with special circumstances on February 12, 1990. When Proposition
115 took effect on June 6, 1990, Tapia's case was pending before the
superior court in Tulare County. The superior court adopted the new
procedural provisions of Proposition 115 and announced that the
court would conduct voir dire.6 Tapia petitioned the court of appeal
for a writ of mandate vacating the superior court order. He argued
that since his alleged crime occurred before the enactment of Propo-
sition 115, application of the law would be retrospective and in viola-
tion of state and federal constitutional ex post facto provisions. The
court of appeal denied the writ. The California Supreme Court
granted review, directed a writ vacating the trial court order, and
stayed the lower court proceeding. 7
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
A. Majority Opinion
From the outset, the supreme court acknowledged the well settled
rule that new statutes are presumed to apply prospectively,8 unless
an express declaration of retrospective application is found in the
body of the statute, or legislative or electoral intent clearly estab-
lishes that the new law is to have retrospective application.9 Proposi-
Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 347, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 332
(1990). Although Proposition 115 is a multi-faceted compendium of reforms, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that it did not violate the "single subject" rule. Id at 349,
801 P.2d at 1085, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
3. 110 S. Ct. 2715 (1990).
4. 1& at 2718-20. For a discussion of ex post facto laws, see generally 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law §§ 414-416 (1984 & Supp. 1991) and 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law §§ 634-654 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
5. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 297-301, 807 P.2d at 443-46, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 601-04.
6. Under Proposition 115, "the court rather than the attorneys 'shall conduct the
examination of prospective jurors' and... the examination 'shall be conducted only in
the aid of the exercises of challenges for cause.'" Id. at 286-87, 807 P.2d at 435-36, 279
Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
7. Id at 286-87, 807 P.2d at 435-36, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
8. Id. at 287, 807 P.2d at 436, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594. See 13 CAL. JUR. 3D ConstitU-
tional Law § 341 (1989 & Supp. 1991); 7 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Con-
stitutional Law §§ 495-496 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
9. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 287, 807 P.2d at 436, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594. See People v.
Hayes, 49 Cal. 3d 1260, 1274, 783 P.2d 719, 728, 265 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141 (1989); Evange-
latos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1206-09, 753 P.2d 585, 596-98, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629,
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tion 115 is silent as to retrospectivity, thus the court found that it was
designed to be implemented prospectively.10 Working from this
foundation, the supreme court addressed the more difficult issue
whether the proposed application of Proposition 115 in this case was
in fact retrospective."
Tapia argued that applying any statute passed after the crime was
committed is prohibited by the ex post facto provisions of both the
federal and state constitutions.12 The supreme court agreed, but cau-
tioned that an ex post facto limitation can be invoked only when the
new law changes the legal consequences of the defendant's criminal
act after the date of the alleged crime.13 Noting that laws which
guide the conduct of pending trials would not change "the legal con-
sequences of past conduct,"14 the supreme court reasoned that an ex
post facto analysis was inappropriate in this case.15
The supreme court rejected Tapia's contention that precedent for
interpretation of Proposition 115 was found in People v. Smith,'8 a
case decided by the same court in 1983.17 In Smith, the supreme
court held that Proposition 8, the "Victims Bill of Rights," applied
only to crimes committed after the effective date of the initiative.' s
In that case, the supreme court looked to electoral intent and found
language supporting prospectivity.19 The court, however, found no
such specific language in Proposition 115.20
Moreover, the court noted that the concern expressed in Smith
about possible ex post facto constitutional claims had been allayed by
the United States Supreme Court's explicit holding in Collins v.
Youngblood.21 In Collins, the Supreme Court adopted an earlier for-
mulation of ex post facto law and delineated the types of laws which
639-42 (1988); see generally CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 3 (West 1982); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3 (West 1988).
10. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 287, 807 P.2d at 436, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
11. Id. at 288-97, 807 P.2d at 436-43, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594-601.
12. Id at 288, 807 P.2d at 436, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9. See 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law §§ 419-422 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).
13. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 288-89, 807 P.2d at 436-38, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594-96.
14. Id. at 289-91, 807 P.2d at 437-39, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 595-97.
15. Id at 288, 807 P.2d at 436-37, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95.
16. 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983).
17. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 292-93, 807 P.2d at 439-40, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98.
18. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d at 251, 667 P.2d at 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
19. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 293, 807 P.2d at 440, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
20. Id at 293, 807 P.2d at 440, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
21. Id at 293-94, 807 P.2d at 440-41, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 598-99.
could be considered ex post facto.22 The Court declared:
[A]ny statute [1] which punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done; (2] which makes more burdensome the pun-
ishment for a crime, after its commission, or [3] which deprives one charged
with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the
act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.23
Since the proposed application of Proposition 115 in Tapia's case did
not fall into any of these categories, the California Supreme Court re-
iterated its belief that operation of the new law would not be an ex
post facto violation.24
The supreme court also rejected Tapia's reliance on the definition
of "retrospective law" enunciated in Evangelatos v. Superior Court.25
This definition incorporated the doctrine of "substantial protec-
tions" 26 which the United States Supreme Court had repudiated in
Collins.27 Thus, the California Supreme Court was able to revisit its
own construction of retrospective law and redefine its current
position.2 8
In so doing, the supreme court rejected the petitioner's contention
that the California Supreme Court should adopt the "substantial pro-
tection" doctrine as state law.29 Reviewing the history of both the
California Constitutional Convention and state case law, the supreme
court found that the "substantial protection" analysis was imposed
under the Supremacy ClausesO by United States Supreme Court deci-
sions and had never been adopted as a valid interpretation of the
state constitution.31
After clarifying its views on retrospectivity and ex post facto laws,
22. Collins v. Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2719 (1990).
23. Id (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)). See also LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE, AMEmCAN CONSTImT ONAL LAW 632-41 (2d ed. 1988).
24. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 296, 807 P.2d at 443, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
25. Id at 290-91, 807 P.2d at 438-39, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97. See Evangelatos v.
Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1206, 753 P.2d 585, 596, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 639-40
(1988).
26. The doctrine of "substantial protection" was first outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Missouri:
[A]n ex post facto law is one which ... in relation to the offence or its conse-
quences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage; but the prescribing
of different modes of procedure and the abolition of courts and the creation of
new ones, leaving untouched all the substantial protections with which the ex-
isting law surrounds the person accused of crime, are not considered within
the constitutional inhibition.
Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1894) (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 329 (5th ed. 1883) (citations and emphasis omitted)). In Collins,
the Court stated that this doctrine was created to prevent legislators from skirting ex
post facto scrutiny by labeling a law "procedural." Collins, 110 S. Ct. at 2721.
27. Collins, 110 S. Ct. at 2721.
28. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 292-94, 807 P.2d at 439-41, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 597-99.
29. Id at 295, 807 P.2d at 441, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
30. Id at 296, 807 P.2d at 443, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI).
31. Id at 296, 807 P.2d at 442, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (citing People v. Ward, 50 Cal.
2d 702, 707, 328 P.2d 777, 779-80 (1958)).
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the supreme court determined which of Proposition 115's provisions
could be applied to the prosecution of a crime that occurred prior to
the law's enactment. The court separated the provisions of Proposi-
tion 115 into four separate categories: (1) those which have a detri-
mental effect on the legal consequences of criminal behavior; (2)
those which clearly benefit the defendant; (3) procedural changes
which affect the conduct of trials and preliminary hearings; and (4) a
provision which codifies existing law. 32
The court held retrospective application of the first category of
provisions to be a clear violation of ex post facto laws.33 However,
prior case law supports the immediate implementation of the second
category which benefits criminal defendants.? Finally, the supreme
court concluded that the voir dire and reciprocal discovery provisions
were not retrospective and could be incorporated in Tapia's trial.35
Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal.
B. Dissenting Opinions
In dissent, Justice Mosk took issue with the majority's interpreta-
tion of electoral intent.36 Invoking considerations of fairness, 3 7 he
stated that "the general rule [of ex post facto] is that there is no gen-
eral rule."3 8 Thus, in this instance, Justice Mosk found People v.
Smith controlling.3 9 He dismissed the difference in electoral intent
between Proposition 8 and Proposition 115 as contrived. 40 Justice
Mosk distinguished Smith from Collins by pointing out that the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court grounded its argument in Smith on the ex post
32. Id. at 297, 807 P.2d at 443, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
33. /d. at 297-98, 807 P.2d at 443-44, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 601-02.
34. Id. at 300-01, 807 P.2d at 445-46, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 603-04. See, e.g., In re Estrada,
63 Cal. 2d 740, 745-48, 408 P.2d 948, 952-53, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175-77 (1965).
35. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 299-300, 807 P.2d at 444-45, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 602-03.
36. Id. at 302, 807 P.2d at 446-47, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
37. "The presumption of prospectivity is... based on policy considerations involv-
ing fairness." Id. at 304-05, 807 P.2d at 448, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 606 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 306, 807 P.2d at 449-50, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(quoting People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 260, 667 P.2d 149, 153, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696
(1983)). See Russell v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 810, 230 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1986).
39. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 307, 807 P.2d at 450, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 608, (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). Smith held that all the provisions of Proposition 8, the "Victims Bill of Rights,"
would apply prospectively. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d at 258, 667 P.2d at 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. at
695.
40. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 307-08, 807 P.2d at 450-51, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
facto clause of the California Constitution alone. 41 Finally, Justice
Mosk indicated that the framers of Proposition 115 had, at a mini-
mum, constructive notice of the recent reaffirmation of prospectivity
in Evangelatos and the prospective application of Proposition 8 in
Smith.42 If the drafters had intended the measure to apply to crimes
alleged to have occurred prior to the initiative's passage, said Mosk,
they would have specified that intent.43
Justice Mosk would not accept the majority's premise that prospec-
tivity is mandated only when a change in the law modifies the legal
consequences of the past act.44 He noted that the distinction between
procedural and substantive law must be judged by its effect rather
than by its statutory form.45 Justice Mosk posited that when sub-
stantial procedural changes are made, the effect must be retroactive
because it changes the legal effect of past events.46
Justice Broussard joined Justice Mosk in his dissent, and wrote a
brief dissenting opinion of his own. He reiterated the position that
all parties in the Proposition 115 process labored under the common
assumption that every provision of the criminal law reform initiative
would be applied prospectively.47 This assumption, he believed, dis-
pelled any voter concern about the fairness of possible retroactive ap-
plication.48 Thus, Justice Broussard declared that the majority's
peremptory redefinition of retrospectivity flew in the face of electo-
ral intent.49
III. IMPACT
It is only in that gray area of "procedural cum substantive" law
that the interpretation of Proposition 115 generates any controversy.
In the pursuit of the voters' professed desire to "create a system in
which justice is swift and fair,"50 there is concern that swift and
mechanical justice may outstrip fair and equitable justice. If a crimi-
41. Id. at 309, 807 P.2d at 451, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See
Smith, 34 Cal. 3d at 259, 667 P.2d at 152, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
42. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 309, 807 P.2d at 451, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (Mosk, J.
dissenting).
43. Id. at 310, 807 P.2d at 452, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
44. 1. at 311, 807 P.2d at 452-53, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 312, 807 P.2d at 453, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, 393-94,
182 P.2d 159, 161-62 (1947)).
46. Id, at 312, 807 P.2d at 453, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 611 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
47. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 313-14, 807 P.2d at 454, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48. Tapia, 53 Cal. 3d at 314, 807 P.2d at 454, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
49. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 293, 807 P.2d at 440, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 598 (quoting Proposition 115, § 1(b),
(c)).
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nal defendant is to be properly represented, all parties must play by
the same set of rules. In Tapia, the judge conducted voir dire and the
People waived reciprocal discovery.51 In addition, the supreme court
failed to recognize any injury to the defendant. A district attorney in
another case may attempt to employ a different provision of Proposi-
tion 115. The resulting case by case adjudication of discovery, in
chambers if necessary,52 will only add to the courts' caseload. Until
the backlog of criminal cases arrives at the point where commission
of the alleged crime occurred after the effective date of Proposition
115, added litigation over the implementation of the procedural as-




Proposition 99, a voter approved initiative which
establishes a fund to help alleviate tobacco-related
problems, is constitutionally valid and does not violate
the single-purpose rule imposed upon initiatives:
Kennedy Wholesale, Incorporated v. State Board of
Equalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization,' a to-
bacco products distributor challenged the constitutionality of Proposi-
tion 99, a voter approved initiative which taxed tobacco products to
fund programs associated with tobacco-related problems.2 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to evalu-
ate initiative tax increases such as Proposition 99, in light of article
XIII A, sections 3 and 4 of the California Constitution3 and the sin-
51. Id. at 286, 807 P.2d at 435, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
52. Id. at 300, 807 P.2d at 445, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
1. 53 Cal. 3d 245, 806 P.2d 1360, 279 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1991) (en banc). Justice
Panelli wrote the opinion of the court with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Brous-
sard, Kennard, Arabian and Baxter concurring. Justice Mosk concurred in a separate
opinion.
2. In Kennedy, the petitioner Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. was engaged in the busi-
ness of tobacco distribution. In 1988, Kennedy paid $50,510.49 in increased taxes due to
Proposition 99. Id. at 248, 806 P.2d 1362, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327. Proposition 99 is codi-
fied under the California Revenue and Taxation Code § 30121 et seq. (West 1991).
Proposition 99 was enacted on November 8, 1988 by initiative.
3. Section 3 provides:
gle-purpose rule of article II, section 8.4
In Kennedy, the petitioner protested the increased tobacco taxes it
had paid under Proposition 99 and requested a refund from the State
Board of Equalization ("the Board").? The Board rejected Kennedy's
claim and Kennedy filed an action in superior court.6 The Board's
motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted. Displeased with
the outcome, Kennedy appealed to the appellate court which af-
firmed the trial court's judgment.7
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by examining
Kennedy's claim that Proposition 99 violated provisions of the Cali-
From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in State taxes
enacted for the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto
whether by increased rates or changes in methods of computation must be im-
posed by an Act passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to
each of the two houses of the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem
taxes on real property, or sales or transaction taxes on the sales of real prop-
erty may be imposed.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 3. Section 4 provides:
Cities, counties and special districts, by a two-thirds vote of the qualified elec-
tors of such district, may impose special taxes on such district, except ad
valorem taxes on real property or a transaction tax or sales tax on the sale of
real property within such City, County or special district.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 4.
4. Section 8 provides:
(a) The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amend-
ments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.
(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of
State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment
to the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in
number to 5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an
amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all candidates for Governor at
the last gubernatorial election.
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general
election held at least 131 days after it qualifies or at any special statewide elec-
tion held prior to that general election. The Governor may call a special state-
wide election for the measure.
(d) An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be sub-
mitted to the electors or have any effect.
CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 8. See also Tinsley v. Superior Court of San Mateo, 150 Cal. App.
3d 90, 197 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1983) (single-subject rule discussed).
For a discussion of the initiative procedure, see 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Refer-
endum §§ 1-9 (1989). See generally 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 10-11
(1989); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 103 (1988)
(single subject rule). For law review articles on the single-subject rule see Cynthia L.
Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutional-
ity of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988); Daniel H. Lowenstein,
California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983); Steven
W. Ray, Comment, California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single-Subject
Rule, 14 PAc. L.J. 1095 (1983).
5. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 248, 806 P.2d at 1362, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
6. Id.
7. Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 227 Cal. App. 3d 228, 265
Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
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fornia Constitution. The court emphasized that article XIII A, sec-
tion 3, allows tax increases to be instituted by a two-thirds vote of the
Legislative members and, as the petitioner argued, the plain meaning
of the article was prone to an interpretation that only the Legislature
may increase taxes.8
However, the court stated that such an interpretation would con-
flict with article IV, section 1, which provides for the people's powers
of initiative and referendum.9 The court acknowledged the peti-
tioner's argument that the subsequent enactment of section 3 to sec-
tion 4 created conflict and ambiguity because section 3 is silent as to
the people's initiative and referendum powers contained in section
4.10 The court rejected this argument and stated that although sec-
tion 3 was enacted subsequent to section 4, section 3 did not super-
sede or otherwise repeal section 4. To find otherwise would be
contrary to the voter's intent" and the underlying policy against re-
peals by implication.12 The court concluded that the voters had not
intended to limit their power of initiative and rejected both the peti-
tioner's proposition that section 3 impliedly repealed section 4, as
well as other arguments.' 3
8. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 249, 806 P.2d at 1362, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
9. The court referred to article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution which
provides: '"he legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature
which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum." The court stated that the petitioner's interpreta-
tion of section 3 would interfere with the people's initiative power. Id. at 249 n.1, 806
P.2d at 1362 n.1, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327 n.1. See also Arvin Union School Dist. v. Ross,
176 Cal. App. 3d 189, 221 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985) (the people reserve the right of initiative
and referendum). See generally 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 110-113, 117,
122 (1989); 38 CAL. JuR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-9 (1977); Greg M. Salvato,
New Limits on the California Initiative: An Analysis and Critique, 19 LoY. L.A.L.
REV. 1045 (1986).
10. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 249, 806 P.2d at 1362, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
11. Noting that the power of initiative is "one of the most precious rights of our
democratic process," the court reasoned that the voters had not intended to restrict
their ability to increase taxes through statutory initiatives. Id. at 250, 608 P.2d at 1363,
279 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting Associated Home Builders Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d 473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976) (en banc)).
12. Id. at 249, 806 P.2d at 1363, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28. The court quoted Board of
Supervisors v. Longergan in stating "the law shuns repeals by implication." Id. (quot-
ing Board of Supervisors v. Longergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 868, 616 P.2d 802, 810, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 820, 828 (1980)). The court further reasoned that a prior measure would only be
repealed by a subsequent measure if the latter "constitut[ed] a revision of the entire
subject, so that the court may say that it was intended to be a substitute for the first."
Id. (quoting Penziner v. West Am. Fin. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 176, 74 P.2d 252, 260 (1937)).
13. Kennedy also argued that the two-thirds voting passage requirement of article
XIII A, section 3, should apply to the electorate as well as the legislative body. How-
ever, the court cited to the "majority" language of article II, section 10 in rejecting ar-
Asserting that Proposition 99 does not violate section 3, the court
then examined Kennedy's argument that Proposition 99 violated the
single-subject rule of article II, section 8 of the California Constitu-
tion because the initiative permits expenditures towards areas which
are not directly tobacco-related. 14 The court reasoned that although
tax revenues were used for programs such as wildlife habitat pre-
serves and recreation area enhancement, the initiative did not fail the
single-purpose test because initiatives "may have collateral effects."'15
The court also rejected further arguments that Proposition 99 "log-
roll[ed] or exploit[ed] the initiative process" because it intentionally
grouped together provisions which would not have had adequate
guments that section 3's two-third voting requirement was imposed upon the
electorate. Id.
Article II, section 10 of the California Constitution provides in pertinent part: (a)
An initiative statute or referendum approved by a maiority of votes thereon takes ef-
fect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise ...... CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added).
In addition, Kennedy argued that article XIII A, section 4 "set[s] out the exclusive
means for raising taxes," thereby effectively eliminating the voters' ability to raise
taxes through a majority vote. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 252, 806 P.2d at 1364, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 329. The court disagreed, reaffirming that the voters have the "power to raise
taxes by statutory initiative." Id.
Finally, it should be noted that a recurring argument utilized by Kennedy was that
the adoption of Proposition 13 affected the voters' powers of initiative and referendum.
This argument was also rejected by the court. Id. at 253, 608 P.2d at 1365, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 330.
14. For a discussion of the single-subject rule, see supra note 4.
The plaintiff argued that Proposition 99 violated the single-subject rule because not
every expenditure of the measure is related to tobacco problems. Proposition 99
utilizes tax revenue from tobacco products to support a surtax fund which may be used
for the following purposes:
(1) Tobacco-related school and community health education programs.
(2) Tobacco-related disease research.
(3) Medical and hospital care and treatment of patients who cannot afford to
pay for those services, and for whom payment will not be made through any
private coverage or by any program funded in whole or in part by the federal
government.
(4) Programs for fire prevention; environmental conservation; protection, res-
toration, enhancement, and maintenance of fish, waterfowl, and wildlife
habitat areas; and enhancement of state and local park and recreation pur-
poses ....
CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 30122 (West 1991).
15. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 253, 806 P.2d at 1365, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (citing
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
230, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248 (1978)). In Raven v. Deukmejian, 52
Cal. 3d 336, 346, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 332 (1990), the court summa-
rized "well settled" principles regarding the single-subject rule. The court reiterated
that "an initiative measure does not violate the single-subject requirement 'if, despite
varied collateral effects, all of its parts are 'reasonably germane" to each other,' and to
the general purpose or object of the initiative." Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
For the same proposition, see also Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 245, 651 P.2d
274, 279, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 35 (1982) (en banc); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.
3d 805, 841-42, 771 P.2d 1247, 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 184 (1989) (en banc); Harbor v.
Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 1098-99, 742 P.2d 1290, 1302, 240 Cal. Rptr. 569, 581 (1987)
(en banc).
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voter support if presented separately.I6
In his concurrence, Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's hold-
ing, but expressed concern over the potential use of voter initiatives
to repeal various state income taxes. Justice Mosk questioned
whether a ballot initiative to reduce taxes could gain adequate sup-
port and warned that if passed, such an initiative "would render state
government virtually impotent."17 However, his comment was not
intended as a warning, but as a suggestion for future legislative
inquiry.'S
III. IMPACT
Kennedy affirms the initiative and referendum power of the people
to enact tax increases via Proposition 99, an initiative declared consti-
tutional by the California Supreme Court. The court examined the
legislative and statutory history of article XIII A, sections 3 and 4 in
its analysis. Allowing voters the right to enact tax increases by initia-
tive is justified because the voters have preserved this right by their
intent. This right permits the collection of revenue for necessary
programs and future needed services. However, as foreshadowed by
the dissent, an amendment to the constitution may be necessary to
prevent a catastrophic situation resulting from an initiative designed
to reduce or eliminate taxes by means of the initiative power.
AUGUSTINE GERARD YEE
16. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 255, 806 P.2d at 1366, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 331. The court
reasoned that Proposition 99 did not violate the single-subject rule of article II, section
8 of the California Constitution, thus a claim of "logrolling" was meritless. Id. Article
II, section 8 is designed to guard against the misuse of the initiative process.
See generally, Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 348-49, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083, 276
Cal. Rptr. 326, 333 (1990) (the single-subject rule does not "contemplateD some func-
tional interrelationship or interdependence, or 'require[ ] a showing that each one of a
measure's several provisions was capable of gaining voter approval independently of
the other provisions.'" (citations omitted)).
17. Kennedy, 53 Cal. 3d at 256, 608 P.2d at 1367, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
18. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
The state of California must, before treating an
employee's unexcused absence as a resignation under the
AWOL statute, give the employee notice of the facts
supporting resignation and an opportunity to respond.
The employee does not have a due process right to a post-
severance evidentiary hearing: Coleman v. Department of
Personnel Administration.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Coleman v. Department of Personnel Administration,1 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court considered whether removing an employee by
"automatic resignation" requires the same procedural protection for
the employee as a dismissal for cause. Section 19996.2(a) 2 of the Gov-
ernment Code [hereinafter the AWOL statute] provides that a state
employee is deemed to have resigned upon being absent without
leave for five consecutive days. Under this statute, petitioner Cole-
man was found to have automatically resigned. He sought to over-
turn his dismissal by having the AWOL statute declared
unconstitutional. 3 The trial court found that the due process clause
of the United States Constitution was not violated when Coleman's
state employer decided not to allow Coleman to return to work.4
The appellate court determined that the AWOL statute was consti-
tutional as written and that it had been applied in a manner which
1. 52 Cal. 3d 1102, 805 P.2d 300, 278 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1991). Justice Kennard wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Panelli and Chief Justice Lucas con-
curred. Justice Eagleson, assigned in the place of Justice Baxter, concurred in the
judgment only. Justices Broussard and Arabian each wrote separate concurring and
dissenting opinions.
2. Government Code section 19996.2 provides:
(a) Absence without leave, whether voluntary or involuntary, for five con-
secutive working days is an automatic resignation from state service, as of the
last date on which the employee worked.
A permanent or probationary employee may within 90 days of the effective
date of such separation, file a written request with the department for rein-
statement; provided, that if the appointing power has notified the employee of
his or her automatic resignation, any request for reinstatement must be made
in writing and filed within 15 days of the service of notice of separation. Ser-
vice of notice shall be made as provided in Section 18575 and is complete on
mailing. Reinstatement may be granted only if the employee makes a satis-
factory explanation to the department as to the cause of his or her absence
and his or her failure to obtain leave therefor, and the department finds that
he or she is ready, able, and willing to resume the discharge of the duties of
his or her position or, if not, that he or she has obtained the consent of his or
her appointing power to a leave of absence to commence upon reinstatement.
An employee so reinstated shall not be paid salary for the period of his or
her absence or separation or for any portion thereof.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19996.2(a) (West 1991).
3. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1110, 805 P.2d at 303, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
4. Id. at 1124, 805 P.2d at 313, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
[VoL 19- 207, 1991] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
satisfied due process.5 The supreme court affirmed the appellate de-
cision, but added the requirement that the employer must give the
employee written notice and an opportunity to respond before termi-
nation.6 The court noted this additional requirement would place
"no undue administrative or financial burden on the state."7 The
supreme court quickly disposed of Coleman's contention that he was
entitled to a hearing after being removed from his job. The court in-
dicated that a post-severance hearing would not serve any purpose
given the pre-termination requirements.8
The California Supreme Court granted review in this case to re-
solve inconsistent appellate court decisions.9 The court recognized
that the due process clause of the United States Constitution con-
trolled this decision.10 The United States Supreme Court has held
that a legislature can define a property right but once that right is
created, it cannot be taken away without due process." The Califor-
nia Supreme Court, therefore, had to determine whether the state
was actually depriving the employee of a property right. Because the
5. Coleman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1016, 1033, 242
Cal. Rptr. 839, 850 (1987).
6. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1122-23, 805 P.2d at 312, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
7. Id. at 1122, 805 P.2d at 312, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
8. Id. at 1122, 805 P.2d at 311, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
9. Id at 1109, 805 P.2d at 302-03, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49. A number of cases
seemed to favor upholding the AWOL statute: Willson v. State Personnel Bd., 113 Cal.
App. 3d 312, 169 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1981) (resignation was automatic and not the result of
state action); Arminstead v. California State Personnel Bd., 124 Cal. App. 3d 61, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 7 (1981) (automatic resignation did not violate due process); Bidwell v. State, 164
Cal. App. 3d 213, 210 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1985) (state employee loses disability benefits
upon resigning); Goggin v. California State Personnel Bd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 96, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 587 (1984) (automatic resignation did not violate substantive due process); Kirk-
patrick v. Civil Service Comm'n, 77 Cal. App. 3d 940, 144 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1978) (proba-
tion officer not entitled to reinstatement); Phillips v. Civil Service Comm'n, 192 Cal.
App. 3d 996, 237 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1987) (employee not reinstated or given back pay).
Other cases indicated the AWOL statute was deficient: Phillips v. California State
Personnel Bd., 184 Cal. App, 3d 651, 229 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1986) (due process requires no-
tice, opportunity to respond and post-termination hearing); Zike v. State Personnel
Bd., 145 Cal. App. 3d 817, 193 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1983) (due process was lacking for an em-
ployee who disputed the facts); Curia v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Comm'n,
126 Cal. App. 3d 994, 179 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1981) (burden of proof on employer at eviden-
tiary hearing); Allen v. Department of Personnel Admin., 193 Cal. App. 3d 355, 238
Cal. Rptr. 317 (1987) (automatic termination only available when employee admits he
is AWOL or employer reasonably believes employee abandoned job); Harris v. State
Personnel Bd., 170 Cal. App. 3d 639, 216 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1985) (automatic termination
requires procedural due process).
10. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1108, 805 P.2d at 302, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
11. Id. at 1114, 805 P.2d at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)).
employee's resignation was not voluntary, the court determined there
was state action.1 2 Once that was determined, it was a simple matter
to discern the procedure the United States Constitution required.Is
II. BACKGROUND
Coleman was a civil servant with a statutory property right14 in his
continued employment.15 As a "permanent employee" of the state,
Coleman could not be deprived of his property right without due pro-
cess.16 "'While the legislature may elect not to confer a property in-
terest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize
the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropri-
ate procedural safeguards. "17
Deprivation of a property interest requires procedural due process
only if the state is responsible for the loss.'8 The initial inquiry is
whether the state has taken any action at all where it accepts an "au-
tomatic resignation."'19 After painstaking analysis, the majority
grudgingly concluded that there was, indeed, state action.20 How-
ever, Justice Broussard pointed out in his dissent that the state can-
not forego due process by simply changing the name of the procedure
it uses to dismiss an employee.2 '
Ultimately, the question is how much due process is necessary.
The court weighed the employee's interest, the risk of a wrongful
termination, the value of procedural safeguards, and the govern-
12. Id. at 1117-18, 805 P.2d at 308-09, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55.
13. Id at 1118, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
14. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1112, 805 P.2d at 304-05, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51. See
also 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Agencu and Employment §§ 192-93
(9th ed. 1987); 52 CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officers §§ 123, 130 (Supp. 1991); 16D C. J. S.
§§ 1239, 1294 (1985 & Supp. 1991).
15. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1109, 1112, 805 P.2d at 302, 305, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 348,
351, (citing Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1975) (a "permanent employee" has a property right in his employment which cannot
be removed without due process)).
16. Id at 1112, 805 P.2d at 304-05, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51 (citing Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (teacher had no property right, as defined by state law,
in a nontenured position)). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976) (respondent
was not deprived of a property interest in his reputation when police distributed a
flyer showing him to be a shoplifter).
17. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1114, 805 P.2d at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (alteration in original)).
18. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1112, 805 P.2d at 305, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (citations
omitted). The court noted that "constructive resignation under the AWOL statute im-
plicates due process only if, in invoking the statute, the state acts to effect a property
deprivation." Id (citations omitted).
19. Id
20. Id at 1118, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355. The court's finding was
based, in part, on the fact that the state could not invoke the AWOL statute without
making "factual determinations." Id.
21. Id at 1129, 805 P.2d at 316, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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ment's interests.22 Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillm
serves as a useful guide in determining the level of due process re-
quired. The United States Supreme Court made it clear that pre-ter-
mination notice and a hearing are required.2 4 However, the Court
also required a post-termination hearing for Loudermill as set out in
applicable Ohio law.25 The dilemma for the California Supreme
Court was whether the post-termination hearing was required be-
cause it was essential or only because it was part of the state law de-
fining the property right. Eventually the court compromised.2 6 It
rejected the extremes of not requiring any notice2 7 or mandating a
post-termination hearing.2 8 An employee must be given notice and
an opportunity to respond. The court established a reasonable
guideline.30
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The California Department of General Services employed appel-
lant Stanley Coleman, Jr. as a full-time telecommunications assistant
for about eighteen months. On April 18, 1984, after an argument
with his supervisor, Coleman became sick and fainted. After seeking
medical treatment, Coleman received disability benefits until June
15, 1984. On July 3, 1984, Coleman spoke with his supervisor by tele-
phone. They discussed whether Coleman could continue to receive
disability benefits. Coleman indicated he felt he was still entitled to
the benefits. On July 19, 1984, Coleman's supervisor tried to contact
him by telephone but was unable to reach him. On July 19, Coleman
22. Id at 1119, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
23. 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
24. Id at 541-42.
25. Id at 546-47.
26. See Gerald F. Uelmen, The Disappearing Dissenters, CALIFORNIA LAWYER,
June 1991, at 34 (discussing a trend in the California Supreme Court to arrive at con-
sensus rather than leave the law in flux).
27. Coleman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 53 Cal. 3d 1102, 1136, 805 P.2d
300, 321, 278 Cal. Rptr. 346, 367 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1126, 805 P.2d at 314, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
29. Id, at 1122, 805 P.2d at 312, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
30. See Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wronaful Discharge,
1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 60. As for the private sector, West states that "state legislatures
could keep the procedure and administrative costs to a minimum by providing for one
hearing rather than two. The most meaningful time for such a hearing would be prior
to the effective date of the termination. This proposed procedure would require an
employer to give written notice to an employee of the proposed termination and the
reasons supporting it." Id.
was notified in writing that his failure to report to work was an "au-
tomatic resignation" under California Government Code section
19996.2(a). 31
Pursuant to section 19996.2(a), Coleman attempted to return to his
job. At an administrative hearing, it was determined that Coleman
did not have an acceptable reason for missing work and that he was
not "ready, able, and willing"3 2 to return to work. Coleman sought a
writ of administrative mandamus to declare the AWOL statute un-
constitutional for lack of due process. He also requested a reversal of
the hearing officer's finding in order to return to work. The superior
court ruled against Coleman.33
The court of appeal affirmed the superior court, stating that the
statute itself provided adequate notice to employees.3 4 The appellate
court held that since the state had complied with the statute, Cole-
man had received due process.3 5 The supreme court superseded this
holding with an analysis that identified what the constitution, not
merely the legislature, required.
IV. TREATMENT
A. 7te Majority Opinion
The state must give an employee written notice of the decision to
invoke the AWOL statute as well as an opportunity to dispute the
facts, all of which must be contained in the notice.3 6 In deciding
what procedures must be followed, the court examined three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirements would entail.3 7
To begin with, the supreme court compared the private interest of
an employee automatically resigning with an employee being re-
moved for cause and concluded that the employee in both cases lost
the property right in a job.3 8 The court felt, however, that it was not
as harmful to the employee to resign automatically as it was to be re-
31. See supra note 2 (text of section 19996.2).
32. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1110, 805 P.2d at 303, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
33. Id
34. Coleman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1016, 1029, 242
Cal. Rptr. 839, 849 (1987).
35. Id. at 1030, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 848. "Miihe employee has no constitutional entitle-
ment to any more process than that which the statute provides." Id
36. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1122-23, 805 P.2d at 312, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
37. Id at 1119, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)).
38. Id at 1119, 805 P.2d at 310, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
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moved for cause39 because "a resignation ... carries no stigma."40
Also, an employee who has "automatically resigned " can return to
work if she convinces a hearing officer that she is worthy.41
Second, the court felt that there was little risk of employees being
erroneously deprived of their jobs.42 The number of days missed
could be determined simply by looking at the records.43
The third factor considered was the government's interest in
promptly removing truant employees.44 The court concluded that a
few extra days for notice and allowing an employee to respond
"places no undue administrative or financial burden on the state."4 5
The court went to great lengths to distinguish the present case
from Loudermill.46 While the court conceded that the state had not
given Coleman proper procedural protection,47 it also indicated that
notice makes very little difference. The court found Coleman was
not entitled to reinstatement even though it would never be known if
he could have convinced an impartial panel that he should retain his
39. Id. at 1120-21, 805 P.2d at 310-11, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57.
40. Id at 1120, 805 P.2d at 310, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
41. Id at 1120-21, 805 P.2d at 310, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 19996.2(a)). This provision of the AWOL statute was of little help to Coleman.
42. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1121, 805 P.2d at 311, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
43. Id.
44. Id at 1122, 805 P.2d at 311-12, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
45. Id at 1122, 805 P.2d at 312, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
46. "Unlike the Ohio statutory scheme considered in Loudermill, the AWOL stat-
ute at issue here does not prescribe any procedures that the state must follow before it
can terminate an employee. The AWOL statute merely defines when an unauthorized
absence constitutes an 'automatic resignation."' Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1114, 805 P.2d
at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352. The AWOL statute does not prescribe procedures as does
the Ohio statute because it is more severe than the Ohio statute. Id at 1114, 805 P.2d
at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
In Loudermill, the United States Supreme Court described what was essentially the
California Supreme Court's position in Coleman. "[Wihere the grant of a substantive
right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the
bitter with the sweet." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540 (1985)
(quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974)). In the instant case, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court justified its "bitter with the sweet" position, stating that "[t]he
statutory terms that define a particular right to employment determine its dimensions
and scope." Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1114, 805 P.2d at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352 (citing
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 'This [bitter with the sweet] view
garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifically rejected by the other six justices."
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 540 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 166-67 (Powell, J.,joined by Blackmun, J.)); id. at 177-78 (White, J.); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., joined by
Douglas and Brennan, JJ.). "More recently, however, the Court has clearly rejected
it." Id. at 541 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980); Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982)).
47. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1124, 805 P.2d at 313, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
job.48
Coleman contended he did not receive the same protection as
would an employee dismissed for cause. The court concluded, how-
ever, that Coleman was not similarly situated.49 The court also de-
clined to decide whether the reinstatement denial should be reviewed
under the "independent judgment test."50 Because the trial court ex-
ercised "independent judgment," the fact that the reinstatement
board's power arose from statutory rather than constitutional sources
was irrelevant.51
B. Justice Broussard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard agreed that notice and an opportunity to respond
are necessary procedural protections that the state must apply to the
AWOL statute.52 He would also require a "post-termination hearing
at which the state employer bears the burden" of showing the AWOL
statute was properly invoked.53 Justice Broussard believed Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudernil54 and Skelly v. State Personnel
Board,55 which both required post-termination hearings, controlled
this case.56
What the state calls its dismissal procedures should make little dif-
ference. "It is the state's act in terminating the employment, not the
suspected conduct of the employee, that constitutes the state action
that brings the procedural due process protections into play."57 Jus-
tice Broussard attacked the majority's painstaking efforts to analo-
gize this case to Texaco and Locke, pointing out the difference
between procedural and substantive due process.58 The statute itself
can serve as substantive notice of its existence but mere knowledge
of the statute is insufficient for procedural due process.59
Broussard dispensed with the majority's three step test in his own
extensive analysis of the necessary procedural protection.60 Instead,
48. I. at 1124, 805 P.2d at 313, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
49. Id. at 1125, 805 P.2d at 314, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Justice Broussard pointed out
that the more serious offender has more opportunity to be heard. Id, at 1136, 805 P.2d
at 321, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 1126, 805 P.2d at 314, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
51. Id,
52. Id. at 1126, 805 P.2d at 314, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (Broussard, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 1136, 805 P.2d at 321, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
54. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
55. 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
56. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1127, 805 P.2d at 314-15, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1128, 805 P.2d at 316, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1129-30, 805 P.2d at 316-17, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63 (Broussard, J., dis-
senting). See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 452 U.S. 516 (1982); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84 (1985).
59. Id. at 1130, 805 P.2d at 317, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1131-32, 805 P.2d at 318, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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he focused on the state's depriving a citizen of his property right.6 '
In this respect, his analysis may be more realistic than the majority's
in determining the effect an "automatic resignation" has on the em-
ployee.62 Broussard's analysis of employment as a property right
raises the question whether the government's interest should even be
considered.
C. Justice Arabian's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Arabian's opinion, on the other hand, considers more prac-
tical issues, such as "fiscal constraints."6 3 His opinion would effec-
tively overrule Skelly v. State Personnel Board64 by making an
employee's property right in employment secondary to the interests
of the government employer.
Justice Arabian's overriding concern was the state's ability to de-
fine property.65 "Authority to define a property interest according to
state law necessarily contemplates the ability to restrict or qualify it
as the Legislature reasonably deems appropriate to its purpose."66
Arabian viewed Coleman's "automatic resignation" as resulting solely
from his unilateral conduct.67 In any event, Arabian asserted, due
process does not require "error-free determinations."6 8
V. IMPACT
The requirements of notice and an opportunity to respond increase
procedural protection for employees who "automatically resign."6 9
The court's decision should also insure consistent decisions in the
lower courts.70 The portion of the decision that may draw closer
scrutiny may be the absence of a "post-severance evidentiary hear-
ing"71 requirement since the omission of a hearing following dismis-
61. Id. at 1133, 805 P.2d at 319, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 1135, 805 P.2d at 321, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
63. Id (Arabian, J., dissenting).
64. 15 Cal. 3d 194, 219, 539 P.2d 774, 788-89, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14, 28-29 (1975) (before
removal, an employee shall receive notice, be informed why removal is sought, be told
of the charges and facts, and be allowed to respond to the party seeking removal).
65. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1138, 805 P.2d at 322, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Arabian, J.,
dissenting) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)).
66. Id (citations omitted).
67. Id at 1141, 805 P.2d at 325, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 1141, 805 P.2d at 324, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Arabian, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)).
69. See id at 1119, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
70. See id at 1109, 805 P.2d at 302-03, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
71. See id at 1119, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
sal may not be consistent with Loudermill.72
California courts must now use the Supreme Court's three prong
test 73 which differs from the pure due process approach Broussard
advocates, 74 as well as the efficiency of labor theory Arabian ad-
vanced.75 The court's shift76 to less stringent requirements expands
the state's ability to define employment property rights. 77
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the employee's responsibility to obtain supervisor authoriza-
tion to be absent from work for five consecutive days, thus it is ap-
propriate that the burden in "automatic resignations" should fall on
the employee. This is unlike other employee dismissals where the
employer has the burden of proof. The supreme court proceeded on
the belief that Coleman's absence was voluntary, and therefore it
reached the appropriate result.78
BRANDON D. MIZNER
VIII. HEALTH CARE LAW
The State of California may penalize a health care entity
for violating the provisions of Health and Safety Code
section 1424. Government Code section 818 was not
intended to prevent statutory civil penalties from being
imposed against government entities but was intended to
apply primarily to torts: Kizer v. County of San Mateo.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kizer v. County of San Mateo,' the California Supreme Court
unanimously heeded the call of the court of appeal2 and found that
statutory penalties could be imposed on a government operated
health care facility.8 The court considered whether statutory penal-
72. Id at 1128, 805 P.2d at 315, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (Broussard, J., dissenting). ,
73. I. at 1119, 805 P.2d at 309, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976)).
74. Id. at 1127, 805 P.2d at 315, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 1137, 805 P.2d at 322, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
76. Cf Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1975) (the State Personnel Board was ordered to reconsider a doctor's appeal when he
was terminated and the statute did not provide for notice in advance of the effective
date).
77. Coleman, 52 Cal. 3d at 1114, 805 P.2d at 306, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
78. Id at 1111 n.4, 805 P.2d at 304 n.4, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 350 n.4.
1. 53 Cal. 3d 139, 806 P.2d 1353, 279 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1991).
2. Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1164, 1171, 266 Cal. Rptr. 704,
708 (1990) (urging the supreme court or the legislature to change the law).
3. Kizer v County of San Mateo, 53 Cal. 3d at 141, 806 P.2d at 1354, 279 Cal. Rptr.
at 319. The County of San Mateo operates Crystal Springs Rehabilitation Center, a
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ties imposed to enforce safety regulations were punitive, and thus,
unenforceable under the Tort Claims Act.4 The supreme court de-
cided that the Tort Claims Act does not shield government run
health facilities from state imposed civil penalties.5
The Tort Claims Act6 bars recovery of punitive damages from gov-
ernment organizations. 7 The Long-Term Care, Health, Safety and
Security Act of 19738 provides for supervising and penalizing health
care facilities.9 The penalties provided for in enforcing safety stan-
dards could not be imposed if they were punitive as defined in the
Tort Claims Act.'0 In People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court," the
supreme court upheld civil penalties against the publicly owned Port
of Oakland;12 however, the civil penalties were held to be compensa-
tory rather than punitive.13 Applying the Younger analysis, the ap-
pellate court found that the civil penalties were punitive since they
did not serve to compensate the patients who might be injured by the
unsafe conditions.14 The supreme court disagreed, finding that the
penalties were not punitive.15
In Kizer,'6 Crystal Springs Rehabilitation Center, run by the
County of San Mateo,17 was fined $27,750 by the State Department of
Health Services. 1 8 The Attorney General brought suit to enforce the
health care entity. The State Department of Health Services cited Crystal Springs for
violations that ended in the death of one patient and put two others in "imminent dan-
ger or substantial probability of harm." Id. at 141-142, 143-144, 806 P.2d at 1354, 1355
279 Cal. Rptr. at 319-320. Justice Panelli wrote the decision in which Justices Mosk,
Broussard, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter and Chief Justice Lucas concurred.
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
5. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 144, 806 P.2d at 1356, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
7. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for
damages awarded under Section 3294 of the Civil Code or other damages imposed pri-
marily for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." Kizer, 53 Cal.
3d at 141 n.1, 806 P.2d at 1354 n.1, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 319 n.1 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 818) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991)).
8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1417-1439.8 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
9. See Id.
10. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810-997.6 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
11. 19 Cal. 3d 30, 544 P.2d 1322, 127 Cal Rptr. 122 (1976)
12. Id. at 37-39, 544 P.2d at 1326-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27 (1976).
13. I&
14. Kizer, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1171, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
15. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 146, 806 P.2d 1357, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
16. 53 Cal. 3d 139, 806 P.2d 1353, 279 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1991).
17. "12 counties statewide provide a total of 2,200 nursing home beds." Stansky,
Death Penalty Stands Despite Mistyped Instruction, THE RECORDER, Mar. 29, 1991, at
3.
18. Crystal Springs was cited for one class AA violation and two class A violations.
penaltieslo and the County demurred. The trial court sustained the
demurrer, and the appellate court affirmed.20 The appellate court la-
bored under the presumption that "civil penalties are punitive in na-
ture.... "21 The court believed civil penalties were not punitive only
when they were also compensatory.2 2 The damages paid by Crystal
Springs were to go to the State Department of Health Services to be
used to pay enforcement costs.2 3 In Younger, the supreme court
found that damage caused by an oil spill resulted in actual damage to
the people of the state, and civil penalties served to compensate them
by going into the cleanup fund.24 Similarly, in Kizer, the state argued
that the dangerous conditions at the health care facility also damaged
the people of the state.2 5 However, the court of appeal refused to ac-
cept this reasoning, instead stating that "a principled analysis which
detects a compensatory function in those penalties is impossible."26
II. TREATMENT
Although the supreme court responded to the appellate court's
urging, the high court stated that the appellate court was not as
bound by precedent as it believed.27 The supreme court did not try to
say that the damages in the present case were compensatory,2 8
thereby avoiding the questionable "proposition that the public is enti-
tled to compensatory damages for some intangible or abstract harm
Among the criteria that define a class AA violation, the most serious class is a
determination by the Department that the violation was 'a direct proximate
cause of death of a patient.' The penalty for a class AA violation is not less
than $5,000 and not more than $25,000. Class A violations are those that pres-
ent either an imminent danger or a substantial probability that death or seri-
ous harm to patients would result. The penalty for a class A violation is not
less than $1,000 and not more than $10,000 (citations omitted).
Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 142, 806 P.2d at 1354, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (citing CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1424(b) - (c) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991)).
19. The County contested the imposition of penalties by the State Department of
Health Services. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 144, 806 P.2d at 1355, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 320. "When
a licensee contests a class AA or a class A citation after the administrative review, the
Attorney General must 'promptly take all appropriate action to enforce the citation
and recover the penalty ... ' IcE at 142, 806 P.2d at 1354, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 319 (citing
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1428(a) - (b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991)).
20. Kizer, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1164, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
21. Id. at 1170, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
22. 1&
23. Kizer 53 Cal. 3d at 142, 806 P.2d at 1354, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
24. People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 37-39, 544 P.2d 1322,
1326-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126-27 (1976).
25. Kizer, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1170, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
26. Id. at 1171, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
27. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 144, 806 P.2d at 1355-56, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 320. An incorrect
reading of Younger led the court of appeal to the faulty conclusion that the law would
not support the penalties the state sought. See Kizer, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1170-71, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
28. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 145, 806 P.2d at 1356, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
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which may result when its laws are violated."29 Instead, the court
looked at the legislature's intent and determined that the Tort
Claims Act applies to torts and not to state regulation of enforcement
methods.30
The civil penalties here were not intended to be punitive in the
same sense as punitive damages in a tort cause of action.3 ' The
supreme court looked at basic tort law which requires an actual in-
jury before punitive damages can be awarded.32 However, civil pen-
alties can be imposed even if no actual injury occurred.3 3 "While the
civil penalties may have a punitive or deterrent aspect, their primary
purpose is to secure obedience to statutes and regulations imposed to
assure important public policy objectives."3 4 Public policy favors an
enforcement system that allows the state to maintain minimum stan-
dards by fining health care facilities.35
III. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court used a common sense approach in
deciding Kizer.3 6 "Clearly, the emphasis of the Tort Claims Act is on
torts. '37 Moreover, penalties enforcing minimum standards may be
the only way to catch the attention of some institutions.38 Since the
court limited its discussion of Younger, it is not clear how far puni-
tive damages may be subsumed in compensatory damages. The court
showed little concern for the taxpayer who will ultimately pay the
29. Kizer, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1171, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
30. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 146, 806 P.2d at 1357, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 146-47, 806 P.2d at 1357-58, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. See generally A. VAN
ALsTYNE, CALIFORNIA GovERNMENT TORT LIABILTY PRACTICE § 2.7 (1980); 5 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §§ 138, 241-62 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1990).
33. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 147, 806 P.2d at 1358, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
34. Id at 147-48, 806 P.2d at 1358, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 323 (citing Hale v. Morgan, 22
Cal. 3d 388, 398, 584 P.2d 512, 518, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375, 381 (1978)).
35. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 148, 806 P.2d at 1358, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
36. In a similar decision, the California Attorney General found that Government
Code section 818 did not prevent publicly operated health care entities from paying
penalties under Health and Safety Code section 442.3. The Attorney General (John K.
Van de Kamp) decided "the penalty provisions of section 442.3 have an additional, non-
punitive purpose and do not come within the grant of immunity found in Government
Code section 818; thus, publicly owned health facilities are subject to such penalty pro-
visions." 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (Mar. 15, 1985).
37. Kizer, 53 Cal. 3d at 145 n.4, 806 P.2d at 1356 n.4, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 321 n.4 (em-
phasis omitted).




A. Predudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291 is
unavailable to an insured who prevails in an action
against his insurer for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing because such action is not
"brought to recover damages for personal injury":
Gourley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company.
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 1982, the California legislature enacted section 3291 of
the Civil Code' to promote pre-trial settlements of personal injury
litigation.2 Section 3291 permits a plaintiff to recover prejudgment
interest on the damages awarded in "any [tort] action brought to re-
cover damages for personal injury"3 if (1) the plaintiff makes a pre-
trial settlement offer pursuant to section 998 of the Code of Civil
Procedure,4 (2) the defendant fails to accept the offer within the stat-
utory time limit, and (3) the plaintiff procures a judgment in excess
of the section 998 offer to compromise. 5 The California Supreme
39. "The high court's decision may wind up depriving counties of services that
could be bought with those dollars .. " Stansky, supra note 17, at 3.
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1991) (added by 1982 Cal. Stat. 493).
2. Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 806 P.2d 1342,
1345, 279 Cal. Rptr. 307, 310 (citing Morin v. ABA Recovery Serv., Inc., 195 Cal. App.
3d 200, 206-07 & n.1, 240 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 & n.1 (1987)); Woodard v. Southern Cal.
Permanente Medical Group, 171 Cal. App. 3d 656, 666, 217 Cal. Rptr. 514, 521 (1985);
Op. Cal. Legis. Counsel No. 17984 (Nov. 2, 1982) (judgment and prejudgment interest)),
modfied, 53 Cal. 3d 1040a (1991). See also Gutierrez v. State Ranch Serv., 150 Cal.
App. 3d 83, 88, 198 Cal. Rptr. 16, 20 (1983).
3. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1991).
4. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West Supp. 1991). Section 998, subdivision (b),
provides: "Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial, any party may serve
an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken in
accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time."
5. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3291. The relevant language of section 3291 states:
In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained by
any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, cor-
poration, association, or partnership.... it is lawful for the plaintiff in the
complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as provided in this section.
If the plaintiff makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which the defendant does not accept prior to trial or within 30
days, whichever occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judg-
ment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per an-
num calculated from the date of the plaintiff's first offer pursuant to Section
998 ....
Id. See generally Christopher J. Day, Pr g t Interest in Personal Injury Litiga-
tion; California's Long-Awaited Remedy in Civil Code Section 3291, 11 WEST. ST. U. L.
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Court in Gourley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.6
limited the application of section 3291 to causes of action which by
their nature seek recovery for personal injury.7 Declaring that an ac-
tion against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing primarily pursues recovery for economic loss,s
the court held that an insurance bad faith action is not a personal in-
jury action within the scope of section 3291.9
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
After examining the nature of the insurance bad faith action and
its allowance of damages for emotional distress, the court determined
that an insurance company found liable in a bad faith action cannot
be required to pay prejudgment interest under section 3291.10 As a
REV. 85 (1983) (discussing legislative history behind section 3291); 6 B. WrrKIN, Sum-
MARY OF CALIFORIIA LAW Torts §§ 1399-1400 (9th ed. & Supp. 1991) (overview of sec-
tion 3291); William L. Winslow, Prejudgment Interest A Settling Fffect, 7 L.A. LAW.
March 1984, at 42 (discussing impact of section 3291 on pre-trial settlements).
6. 53 Cal. 3d 121, 806 P.2d 1342, 279 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1991). After being struck by
an uninsured drunk driver, Gourley filed a claim under her automobile policy with
State Farm, seeking to invoke her uninsured motorist coverage. The parties submitted
a series of extremely diverse settlement offers to each other. State Farm's low offers
stemmed from the belief that Gourley's injuries would have been substantially reduced
if she had been wearing a seat belt. Nevertheless, Gourley ultimately prevailed at the
arbitration proceedings. Gourley then sued State Farm for breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, claiming that she suffered mental and emotional
distress as a result of State Farm's inadequate provision of benefits under the policy.
Gourley also filed a settlement offer of $249,099 under section 998 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which State Farm rejected. The jury returned a verdict in Gourley's favor,
awarding $15,765 in actual damages and $1,576,500 in punitive damages. The trial court
subsequently awarded an additional $300,000 in prejudgment interest under Civil Code
section 3291. Id at 124-25, 806 P.2d at 343-44, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09. The court of
appeal affirmed, finding that an insurance bad faith action is properly classified as a
personal injury action within section 3291. Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
227 Cal. App. 3d 1099, 1113-14, 265 Cal. Rptr. 634, 643 (1990), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 121, 806
P.2d 1342, 279 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1991). The California Supreme Court granted review in
Gourley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 341, 268 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1990).
Chief Justice Lucas wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Kennard,
Arabian, and Baxter concurred. Justice Broussard dissented separately, joined by Jus-
tice Mosk.
7. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 123, 129-30, 806 P.2d at 1343, 1347, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 308,
312.
8. Id. at 123, 129, 806 P.2d at 1343, 1347, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 308, 312.
9. Id. at 123, 130, 806 P.2d at 1343, 1348, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 308, 313. See generally 6
B. WmUIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFoRNiA LAW Torts § 1400 (Supp. 1991) (summary of the
California Supreme Court's ruling in Gourley).
10. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 126-29, 806 P.2d at 1345-47, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 310-12. See
infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
preliminary matter, the court noted that insurance bad faith actions
arise out of the recognition that an insurer owes a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the insured." This duty requires an insurer to ac-
cept reasonable settlement offers by a third party who has a claim
against the insured and to pay benefits to the insured for losses cov-
ered by the policy. 12
The court has historically allowed recovery for mental and emo-
tional distress caused by an insurer's breach of the implied cove-
nant.13 However, the court emphasized that the allowance for these
types of personal injury damages does not cause the action to be clas-
sified as a personal injury suit.14 The court viewed the emotional dis-
tress damages as incidentally flowing from the insurer's breach.'s
As such, an insurance bad faith action does not hinge on the emo-
11. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 127, 806 P.2d at 1345-46, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11. See
generally 1 B. WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Contracts § 749 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1991); 39 CAL. JuR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage § 410 (1977 & Supp.
1991).
12. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 127, 806 P.2d at 1345, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 310-11. See gener-
ally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw Torts § 656 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1991); 6 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFORNIA LAw Torts § 1143 (9th ed. 1988); 39 CALt
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage §§ 411-412 (1977 & Supp. 1991); Annotation,
Duty of Liability Insurer to Settle or Compromise, 40 A.L.R. 2D 168 (1955 & later case
serv. 1980).
The cause of action resulting from the first type of situation is commonly referred to
as a "third party" case and the cause of action deriving from the second is referred to
as a "first party" case. See Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 26-27,
148 Cal. Rptr. 653, 670 (1978). See generally Glenn L. Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law:
The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982) (tracing the history of
third and first party insurance bad faith litigation). For examples of third party insur-
ance bad faith litigation, see Johansen v. California State Auto. Assoc. Inter-Insurance
Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Kelly v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1,
239 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1987); Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1984); Miller v. Elite Ins. Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 739, 161 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1980);
Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1975).
For examples of first party bad faith litigation, see Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, reprinted as modified, 620 P.2d 141, 169
Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21
Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.
3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11
Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Richardson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 117
Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981); Austero, 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653
(1978); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970). Gourley is a first party case.
13. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 127-28, 806 P.2d at 1346, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 311. See gener-
ally Annotation, Emotional or Mental Distress as Element of Damages for Liability In-
surer's Wrongful Refusal to Settle, 57 A.L.R. 4TH 801 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
14. See Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 128, 806 P.2d at 1346, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 311. The court
found that the court of appeals misinterpreted prior case law on this point, which led it
to reach a contrary result. Id. at 127, 806 P.2d at 1345, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
15. Id. at 128, 806 P.2d at 1346, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 311 (citing and quoting Gruenberg,
9 Cal. 3d at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490). See also Richardson, 117 Cal.
App. 3d at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
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tional distress suffered by the insured.16 Rather, the court main-
tained that the purpose of an insurance bad faith action is to recover
for economic loss caused by the tortious interference with the in-
sured's property rights - i.e., the financial loss suffered as a result of
the insurer's bad faith handling of the insured's claim.17
The court employed a California court of appeal case, Richardson
v. Allstate Insurance Co.,18 to support its conclusion that an action
against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is an action based on interference with a property
right, not personal injury.19 In Richardson, the court found that
"[b]reach of the implied covenant of good faith is actionable because
such conduct causes financial loss to the insured, and it is the finan-
cial loss or risk of financial loss [that] defines the cause of action [to
which mental distress damages are appended] as an aggravation of
the financial damages, not as a separate cause of action."20 The ma-
jority in Gourley agreed with the Richardson court's concentration
on the nature of the interest sued upon instead of the nature of the
damages sought when classifying an insurance bad faith action.2 1
The supreme court thus held that an insurance bad faith suit is not a
personal injury action and therefore is not subject to the provision
for prejudgment interest in section 3291 of the Civil Code.22
16. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 128, 806 P.2d at 1346, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
17. Id. at 128-29, 806 P.2d at 1346-47, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12 (citing and quoting
Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490; Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at
433-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19; Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 172
Cal. Rptr. at 426).
18. 117 Cal. App. 3d 8, 172 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1981). In Richardson, the court of ap-
peal held that insurance bad faith actions are governed by the two year statute of limi-
tations applicable to infringement of property right cases. Id. at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
426.
19. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 129, 806 P.2d at 1347, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 312. The court of
appeal disregarded Richardson because it dealt with a statute of limitations defense in-
stead of an award of prejudgment interest under section 3291. Id. The California
Supreme Court deemed the distinction irrelevant. Id.
20. Richardson, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 13, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 426 (footnote omitted).
21. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 129, 806 P.2d at 1347, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 3112.
22. Id. at 130, 806 P.2d at 1348, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 313. The court subsequently modi-
fied the opinion after the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), which set forth factors for determining the consti-
tutionality of a state's method for awarding punitive damages. Gourley v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 1040a (1991). The modification thus allowed the court of
appeal to review the constitutionality of Gourley's $1.5 million punitive damage award.
hI
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard dissented on the basis that the majority's failure
to consider "the related prejudgment interest code provisions, the lit-
eral meaning of the language of section 3291, and the basic policies
underlying the award of prejudgment interest" led the court to erro-
neously deny prejudgment interest in insurance bad faith actions.2 3
Although Justice Broussard did not dispute the court's conclusion
that the nature of an insurance bad faith action arises from interfer-
ence with property interests, he felt that the related provisions for
prejudgment interest clearly establish the legislature's intent to al-
low recovery for prejudgment interest in property cases.24 In addi-
tion, Justice Broussard thought that since section 3291 provides for
"any action brought to recover damages for personal injury,"25 the
section is broad enough to encompass any tort action, whether based
on a property right or personal injury, that seeks recovery for per-
sonal injury damages.26 Finally, Justice Broussard indicated that the
court's decision conflicts with the legislative policy behind section
329127 in that it effectively discourages insurers from settling bad
faith claims.2 8
III. CONCLUSION
The effect of Gourley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. on the willingness of insurers to settle bad faith claims has yet to
be seen. Although the decision does not conform to the legislature's
desire to provide incentives for early settlement, jury sentiment
against insurers,29 as traditionally reflected in high punitive damage
awards,30 may prevent insurance companies from feeling free to dis-
regard legitimate settlement offers due to the non-threat of a pre-
judgment interest award.
The Gourley decision illustrates the California Supreme Court's re-
luctance to broaden insurance bad faith recoveries. This reluctance is
evident in recent supreme court rulings in favor of insurance compa-
23. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 131, 806 P.2d at 1348, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Mosk joined in the dissent.
24. Id. at 131-34, 806 P.2d at 1348-50, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 313-15 (Broussard, J., dis-
senting). Justice Broussard discussed at length the prejudgment interest provisions
governing property cases. Id. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3287-3288 (West 1980).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
26. Gourle, 53 Cal. 3d at 134-38, 806 P.2d at 1351-53, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 316-18
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
27. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
28. Gourley, 53 Cal. 3d at 131, 133-34 & 137, 806 P.2d at 1348, 1350 & 1353, 279 Cal.
Rptr. at 313, 315 & 318 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
29. See Allen, supra note 12, at 853.
30. For example, the jury's punitive damages award to Mrs. Gourley was 100 times
the amount of her actual damage award. See supra note 6.
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nies involved in bad faith litigation3' and may stem from the fear
that insurance bad faith law is approaching strict liability status.
SUSAN LEIGH SPARKS
B. Section 533 of the California Insurance Code excludes
liability coverage for an insured's sexual molestation of a
child, regardless of the molester's subjective intent to
harm: J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M. K.
I. INTRODUCTION
In JC Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M. K,1 the California
Supreme Court considered whether an insurer that issues a home-
owner's policy to an insured who sexually molests a child should be
obligated under the policy to pay damages from a civil judgment
against the insured.2 To do so, the court limited the scope of intent
necessary to prove molestation as a "wilful act" under section 533 of
the California Insurance Code.3 The court also considered whether
an underlying judgment should collaterally estop an insurer from lit-
igating the issue of noncoverage in a subsequent declaratory judg-
ment action.4
31. Meg Fletcher, Prejdgment Interest Denied in Bad-Faith Case, Bus. INs., Apr.
8, 1991, at 2 (discussing the California Supreme Court's pro-insurer trend and citing
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr.
116 (1988), and the decertification of Beatty v. State Farm Mut. Auto Inx. Co., 213 Cal.
App. 3d 379, 262 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1989) (ordered not published Nov. 16, 1989), as
examples).
1. 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 804 P.2d 689, 278 Cal, Rptr. 64 (1991), cert denied, No. 90-8495
(U.S. Oct. 7, 1991).
2. Id. at 1014, 804 P.2d at 690, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
3. Section 533 of the California Insurance Code reads: "Wilful act of insured -
An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured; but he is not
exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's agents or others."
CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (Deering 1988). See also 1 B. WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW Contracts § 632 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991); 39 CAL. JuR. 3D Insurance Contracts
and Coverage § 245 (1977 & Supp. 1991). All further statutory references are to the
California Insurance Code unless otherwise specified.
4. J. C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1014, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65. See also 6
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 1142 (9th ed. 1988). After J. C. Pen-
ney appealed the trial court's decision on the declaratory judgment, M. K. and her
mother raised the collateral estoppel issue in their answer. J.C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at
1014, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65. See CAL. RuLES OF COURT 28(e)(5) (requir-
ing additional issues be raised in answer). As in the court's opinion, the parties will be
referred to in this article by their initials, with R. H. occasionally being referred to as
"the insured" and S. K. as "the mother." See J.C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1009 n.1, 804
P.2d at 690 n.1, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65 n.1.
II. BACKGROUND
The section 533 exclusion for insurance coverage of wilful acts has
existed in one form or another for over one hundred years.5 The
public policy behind section 533 is to discourage wilful torts by disal-
lowing parties to contract for coverage of such acts.6 However, to
prevent insurers from denying coverage for accidental loss under sec-
tion 533, the court has been careful to stress the distinction between
wilful acts, which are excluded from coverage, and negligent or reck-
less acts, which are not.7 Thus, the pivotal determination to be made
in such cases is whether the particular act was indeed "wilful."
In Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co.,8 a case involving a convic-
tion for second degree murder, the California Supreme Court stated
"that even an act which is 'intentional' or 'willful' within the mean-
ing of traditional tort principles will not exonerate the insurer from
liability under Insurance Code section 533 unless it is done with a
'preconceived design to inflict injury.' "9 However, in Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Kim W.,1o a case of child molestation where the insured
had admitted violating Penal Code section 288,11 an appellate court
held as a matter of law that "a violation of Penal Code section 288 is
a wilful act within the meaning of Insurance Code section 533."12
The court in Kim W., believing that the violation of Penal Code sec-
tion 288 was sufficient in itself to show intentional harm under sec-
tion 533,13 refused to apply the Clemmer "preconceived design"
5. Section 533 has remained unchanged since its passage in 1935. See 1935 Cal.
Stat. 510. Before 1935, a virtually identical exclusion existed in former Civil Code sec-
tion 2629 following its amendment in 1873. 1873-74 Cal. Stat. 256.
6. See Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 648, 394 P.2d 571, 577, 39
Cal. Rptr. 731, 737 (1964).
7. As noted in a case construing the exclusion contained in former Civil Code
section 2629, "N]o form of negligence on the part of the insured, or his agents or
others, leading to a loss avoids the policy, unless it amounts to a wilful act on the part
of the insured." McKenzie v. Scottish U. & N. Ins. Co., 112 Cal. 548, 557-58, 44 P. 922,
925 (1896). See also Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 55, 642 P.2d 1305, 1311,
181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1982) (noting that reckless conduct such as drunk driving was
not wilful under section 533).
8. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1978).
9. Clemmet, 22 Cal. 3d at 887, 587 P.2d at 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 297 (quoting Wal-
ters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 783, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1960)).
10. 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984).
11. This section states:
Any person who shall willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act
including any of the acts constituting other crimes provided for in Part I of
this code upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child
under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratify-
ing the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or the child, shall be
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of
three, six, or eight years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (Deering 1988).
12. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 333, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
13. Id
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test.14 When facts essentially identical to those in Kim W. arose in
the instant case, the supreme court agreed to resolve the issue of req-
uisite intent necessary to show wilfulness under section 533 in sexual
molestation cases.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1984, M. K., a five-year-old girl, informed her mother, S. K., that
she had been sexually molested15 by their neighbor, R. H., a male
friend of S. K.16 R. H. pleaded guilty to one count of intentionally
committing lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of four-
teen, a violation of California Penal Code section 288,17, and was sen-
tenced to six years in prison.'S M. K. and S. K. then filed a civil
action against R. H., seeking damages for the child under a negli-
gence cause of action and for the mother under the theory of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.19 The jury awarded $400,000 in
damages to M. K. and $100,000 to S. K.20
After the trial on liability and damages had concluded, the trial
court heard J. C. Penney's declaratory relief action. The court held
that section 533 precluded recovery for M. K.21 but that S. K. could
14. Id at 333-34, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
15. R. H. admitted fondling M. K.'s genitals, holding her over his head with his
thumb inserted in her vagina, and orally copulating her. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at
1015, 804 P.2d at 691, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
16. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1014, 804 P.2d at 690, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
17. For the text of Penal Code section 288, see supra note 11.
18. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1014, 804 P.2d at 690, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
19. Id. at 1015, 804 P.2d at 691, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 66. The original action sought
damages under causes of action for negligence and intentional tort, but the intentional
tort causes of action were dropped before trial and the trial proceeded on only the neg-
ligence and emotional distress theories. Id.
20. After R. H. stipulated to his negligence regarding the child, the trial court en-
tered a directed verdict against him as to M. K.'s negligence action. The jury also
found that R. H. was negligent as to S. K. and that she had suffered compensable dam-
age as a result of that negligence. Id
Regarding the jury award to S. K. based on negligent infliction of emotional distress,
the supreme court noted that the decisions in Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771
P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989) (establishing the requirement of presence at the
scene for bystander recovery under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress) and Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770
P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989) (rejecting the theory that parents can generally re-
cover for emotional distress where their children are sexually molested), would appear
to preclude the award. However, the court noted, that because these cases were de-
cided after the judgment against R. H. was final, he would be unable to collaterally
attack on these bases. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1016 n.3, 804 P.2d at 691 n.3, 278 Cal.
Rptr. at 66 n.3.
21. The trial court found that because R. H.'s negligence as to M. K. was stipulated
still recover under the policy.22 Both J. C. Penney and M. K.
appealed.2 3
The appellate court reversed on the collateral estoppel issue, hold-
ing that J. C. Penney's timely reservation of rights precluded the use
of collateral estoppel to prevent litigating the issue of coverage.24
The appellate court also reversed on the coverage issue, holding that
the court needed to explore whether R. H. had a "preconceived de-
sign" to injure M. K.25
The supreme court agreed to hear the section 533 exclusion issue
as well as the collateral estoppel issue.2 6 As to collateral estoppel, a
majority27 of the court agreed with the appellate court that the judg-
ment of the trial court should not estop J. C. Penney from denying
coverage in the subsequent declaratory relief action because it had
made a timely reservation of rights.28 On the main issue, the major-
ity reversed the appellate court and held that section 533 of the Cali-
fornia Insurance Code excluded coverage under homeowners' policies
for damages caused by an insured's sexual molestation of a child.29
rather than litigated, J. C. Penney should be allowed to overcome the presumption of
negligence by offering sufficient proof. The trial court then determined that R.H.'s vi-
olation of Penal Code section 288 was sufficient proof that he willfully molested M. K.
as a matter of law under Insurance Code section 533, thereby precluding liability
under the policy. J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1016, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
22. The trial court found that because the parties fully litigated the issue of negli-
gence as to the mother, J. C. Penney was collaterally estopped from arguing in its de-
claratory relief action that section 533 precluded coverage as to the mother. Id.
23. J. C. Penney argued it should not be collaterally estopped from arguing non-
coverage as to the mother. J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K., 209 Cal. App. 3d
1208, 257 Cal. Rptr. 801, 802 (1989). J. C. Penney also argued that the decision in Kim
W precluded coverage for an insured's acts of child molestation. Id, at 486-87, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 802.
M. K. argued that collateral estoppel should also apply in her case to preclude J. C.
Penney from denying coverage and that the trial court erred in relying on Kim W to
prevent her recovery. Id. at 487, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
24. Id. at 492, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
25. Id. at 499, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The appellate court held that the trial court's
reliance on Kim W was inappropriate since there was no factual determination con-
cerning R. H.'s subjective intent to harm. The court therefore concluded that this is-
sue should be retried as to both M. K. and S. K. Id.
26. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K., 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 1117, 804 P.2d 689, 692,
278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1991), cert denied, No. 90-8495 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1991).
27. Retired Associate Justice Eagleson, sitting under assignment by the Chairper-
son of the Judicial Council, wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard and Arabian. Justice Broussard wrote
a separate dissent.
28. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1017, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 67. J. C. Pen-
ney sent R. H. a letter reserving its right to contest coverage in December of 1984. Id.
at 1015, 804 P.2d at 690-91, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
29. Id. at 1028, 804 P.2d at 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 75.





- M. K. and her mother challenged the appellate court's finding that
J. C. Penney was not collaterally estopped from arguing that section
533 precluded coverage.3 0 They. alleged that J. C. Penney "wrong-
fully interfered with R. H.'s right 'to control his defense' of the un-
derlying action" by interfering with his Cumis 3 ' counsel's attempts
to settle the case.3 2 The majority noted that, absent evidence that J.
C. Penney had waived its reservation of rights,33 or that it had as-
signed those rights to M. K. or her mother,3 4 J. C. Penney's reserva-
tion of rights was adequate to allow it to argue that section 533
precluded coverage.3 5
30. 1& at 1017, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 67. See supra notes 21 & 22 and
accompanying text.
31. See San Diego Federal Credit Union v. Curies Ins. Society, Inc., 162 Cal. App.
3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984). See also 6 B. WrmO, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Torts § 1139 (9th ed. 1988); 50 A.L.R. 4TH 913 (1986).
32. J. C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1018, 804 P.2d at 693, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68. As per the
rule in Cumis, J. C. Penney provided counsel for R. H. in the damages action. The
attorney was the same attorney who had represented him in the criminal proceeding.
However, a dispute arose between J. C. Penney, R. H. and the original attorney result-
ing in J. C. Penney's hiring replacement counsel. M. K. and her mother argued that
the removal of the first attorney deprived R. H. of Cumis counsel. Id. at 1018 n.4, 804
P.2d at 693 n.4, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68 n.4.
33. The majority cited the rule that, after a proper reservation of rights, for the
insurer to waive the right to deny coverage the insured must show that "the insurer
either intentionally relinquished a known right, or acted in such a manner as to cause
the insured to reasonably believe the insurer had relinquished such right, and that the
insured relied upon such conduct to his detriment." Id at 1018-19, 804 P.2d at 692, 278
Cal. Rptr. at 67 (quoting Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 53 Cal.
App. 3d 576, 587, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 273 (1975)). Because M. K. and her mother did not
assert such a waiver, and the record did not support such a finding, the court found
that J. C. Penney had not waived its reservation of rights. Id at 1018, 804 P.2d at 692-
93, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68.
34. The majority stated that because the policy behind requiring Cumia counsel
was to protect the rights of the insured, if any dispute arose concerning an interfer-
ence with Cumis counsel, the dispute would be between R. H. and J. C. Penney. Id at
1018, 804 P.2d at 693, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68. R. H. had made no such claim. Noting that
R.H. made no assignment of his Cumis counsel rights to M. K. or S. K., the majority
ruled that "in the absence of an assignment a third party claimant cannot bring an ac-
tion upon a duty owed to the insured by the insurer." ICE at 1019, 804 P.2d at 693, 278
Cal. Rptr. at 69 (quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 889, 587 P.2d
1098, 1111-12, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288-89 (1978); Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d
937, 943-44, 553 P.2d 584, 588, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428 (1976)).
35. The court quoted the general rule as follows:
[I]f the insurer adequately reserves its right to assert the noncoverage defense
later, it will not be bound by the judgment. If the injured party prevails, that
2. Sexual Molestation as an Intentional Act
J. C. Penney's primary argument was that section 533 precluded
coverage for sexually molesting children because such acts are wil-
ful.36 Conversely, M. K. and several amici curiaeS1 argued that sec-
tion 533 should not preclude coverage because an act is not
intentional or wilful unless the insured acted "with a preconceived
design to inflict injury."38
a, Wilful vs. Negligent Act Under Section 533
The majority began its analysis by attempting to ascertain the leg-
islative intent behind the statute.3 9 After determining that the lan-
guage of section 533 was "internally inconsistent" 40 and that there
party or the insured will assert his claim against the insurer. (Footnote omit-
ted.) At this time the insurer can raise the noncoverage defense previously
reserved.
Id. at 1017, 804 P.2d at 692, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 263, 279, 419 P.2d 168, 178, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 114 (1966)). Although the quoted state-
ment from Gray was dictum, it "has long been the established law of California." Id
(citing Insurance Co. of the West v. Haralambos Beverage Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1308,
1319, 241 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 (1987); Val's Painting & Drywall, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
53 Cal. App. 3d 576, 585-86, 126 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272 (1975)).
36. J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1019, 804 P.2d at 693, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68. The Asso-
ciation for California Tort Reform, the Association of California Insurance Companies,
the National Association of Independent Insurers, the Alliance of American Insurers,
and several other liability insurers appeared as amici curiae for J.C. Penney. Id. at
1019 n.6, 804 P.2d at 693 n.6, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68 n.6.
37. The Children's Advocacy Institute, California Trial Lawyer's Association, and
the Crime Victim's Legal Clinic appeared in support of M.K.. Id, at 1019 n.6, 804 P.2d
at 693 n.6, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68 n.6.
38. Id, at 1019, 804 P.2d at 693, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 68. M. K. and the amici argued
that psychiatric testimony established that certain sexual molesters like R. H. intend
no harm by their acts, asserting that "the molestation is often a misguided attempt to
display love and affection." Id. The supreme court originally used the "preconceived
design to inflict injury" language in Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 887,
587 P.2d 1098, 1110, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 297 (1978). See supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
39. J.C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1020, 804 P.2d at 694, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (citing De-
laney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 798, 789 P.2d 934, 940, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753, 759
(1990)). The court of appeal found that section 533 was subject to the rule of strict
construction against the insurer. J. C. Penney, 220 Cal. App. 3d 484, 493, 257 Cal. Rptr.
801, 806 (1989) (citing Congregation of Rodef Sholom v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
93 Cal. App. 3d 690, 697, 154 Cal. Rptr. 348, 352 (1979)). The majority noted that the
court of appeal was incorrect because section 533 is a statute, and therefore "is subject
to the rules of statutory construction, not the rules of contract interpretation." J. C
Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1020 n.9, 804 P.2d, at 694 n.9, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 69 n.9. Thus, the
majority disapproved Rodef to the extent that it held that section 533 was subject to
strict construction against the insurer. Id.
40. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1020, 804 P.2d at 694, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 69. The ma-
jority noted that the first sentence of the statute excludes coverage for all wilful acts,
yet the second sentence declared that negligence on the insured's behalf would not ex-
clude coverage. The majority felt that this was internally inconsistent because
"[n]egligence is often, perhaps generally, the result of a 'willful act.'" Id. (footnote
omitted).
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was no legislative history to clarify the language,41 the majority de-
ferred to prior precedent to help define the scope of "wilful" under
section 533. The court stated that "[ilt is settled that 'wilful act' in
section 533 means 'something more than the mere intentional doing
of an act constituting [ordinary] negligence.' "42 Thus, as noted
above, ordinarily negligent or reckless acts are not precluded by sec-
tion 533. 43 The majority then ruled as a matter of law that sexual
molestation of children could never be negligent or reckless because
the nature of sexual molestation was such that "the intent to molest
is, by itself, the same as the intent to harm.""
b. Clemmer Test
M. K.'s strongest argument was that Clemmer supported coverage,
unless the insured acted with a "preconceived design to inflict in-
jury."45 M. K. argued that this language should allow her to present
psychiatric testimony to establish that R. H. had acted without such
"preconceived design." 46 The majority rejected this argument, hold-
ing that the C/emmer "preconceived design" language applied only
where the insured's mental capacity to commit the wrongful act was
at issue.4 7 The majority then concurred with the reasoning of the
dissenting judge from the court of appeal who stated that "the only
question in C/emmer was the mental capacity of [the defendant] to
intend the act; there was no holding by the supreme court in C7em-
mer that intent to injure, standing alone, was a dispositive issue."46
41. Id
42. Id at 1021, 804 P.2d at 695, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 70 (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Ab-
bott, 204, Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1019, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1988) (bracketed material in
original quotation)).
43. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
44. .C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1021, 804 P.2d at 695, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
45. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
46. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1021, 804 P.2d at 695, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 70. In fact,
two experts, one a board-certified psychologist and the other a psychiatrist specializing
in sexual abuse of children, testified that R. H. lacked intent to harm when he mo-
lested M. K. J. C. Penney, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 499 n.4, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 809, n.4.
47. J.C. Pennney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1023, 804 P.2d at 696, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 71. In Clem-
nter, the murder defendant claimed insanity, and thus that he lacked the "mental ca-
pacity necessary to deliberate or premeditate or to form the specific intent to shoot
and harm the victim." C/emmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 878, 587 P.2d at 1104, 151 Cal. Rptr. at
291 (citing testimony of psychiatric expert).
48. J. C Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1023, 804 P.2d at 696, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (quoting J.
C. Penney, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 504 257 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (Nares, J., dissenting)). (Em-
phasis in original).
c. Kim W
The majority then looked to the decision in Kim W. to determine
whether child molestation was wilful under section 533. The major-
ity agreed with the reasoning in Kim W. that if the molester has ad-
mitted that his conduct violated Penal Code section 288, he has
admitted that he "intended to arouse, appeal to, or gratify sexual de-
sire with a child."49 The court also adopted the finding in Kim W.
that "[i]mplicit in the [Legislature's] determination that children
must be protected from such acts is a determination that at least
some harm is inherent in and inevitably results from those acts."50
Combining its rationales of Caemmer and Kim W., the court held
that since the harm is inherent in the act itself, a determination
whether the insured had a "preconceived design" to injure was irrele-
vant.5 1 To further support its conclusion, the majority noted that all
49. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1025, 804 P.2d at 698, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
50. Id (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim W., 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 332-33, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 613) (bracketed information in original). While the majority adopted this
position, it rejected the alternate ground for denial of coverage proposed by Kim W.,
i.e., that the intentional nature of the act could be shown merely by an admission of
the insured in his answer to the complaint. J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1025 n.13, 804
P.2d at 698 n.13, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73 n.13. The majority stated that because it felt that
"child molestation is willful as a matter of law under section 533, we do not base our
decision on the insured's admissions of wrongdoing." Id This language tends to show
that the court requires more than a mere admission of wrongdoing in a pleading before
it will deny coverage, ie, the fact of molestation must be shown before the insurer can
deny coverage. However, the majority then stated that "[n]either an admission by the
insured nor a criminal conviction is necessary to give rise to the exclusion under sec-
tion 533." Id This statement appears to cast doubt on what type of proof, if any, is
necessary to give rise to the exclusion.
This dilemma was recently faced by the Ninth Circuit in State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Nycum, 1991 No. 90-15706 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1991). In that case, State Farm ar-
gued that the language in J. C. Penney asserting that neither an admission nor a con-
viction is necessary to invoke the section 533 exclusion actually means that the insurer
has no duty "to indemnify or even defend suits alleging child molestation." Id. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, asserting that the "passage from J. C Pen-
ney means only that allegations of child molestation that are accompanied by proof of
willfulness - whether by criminal conviction, stipulation or otherwise - are pre-
sumed to be willful as a matter of law, and hence are excluded from coverage by sec-
tion 533." Id To interpret otherwise would mean that beyond the mere allegation of
molestation, no proof would be necessary to exclude.
51. J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1026, 804 P.2d at 699, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 73. To illus-
trate why subjective intent was irrelevant in molestation cases, the majority analyzed
the opinion upon which Clemmer relied in creating the "preconceived design" require-
ment, Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960). In
Walters, an insured sought reimbursement of a settlement paid to a third party bat-
tered by the insured. The insured admitted that the battery was intentional, but
claimed self-defense justified the act and made it unintentional for purposes of cover-
age. The court found that when the insured acted in self-defense, "although he 'in-
tended the act,' [he] acted by chance and without a preconceived design to inflict
injury." Id at 783, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 670. The majority in J.C. Penney noted that in Wal-
ters, "[t]he insured's motive (self-defense) was relevant only to the question of
whether he acted wrongfully in the first instance." J7. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1024, 804
P.2d at 697, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 71. Because the court's reading of Kim W. assumes child
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other court decisions interpreting California law52 and the majority
of courts in other jurisdictions had also disallowed insurance recov-
ery in sexual molestation cases. 53
B. Justice Broussard's Dissent
Justice Broussard argued that the "preconceived design" test in
C/emmer should be applied in all cases involving a claim of exclusion
under section 533.54 He decried the majority's "repudiation" of CZem-
mer, stating that the "inherently harmful" standard created by the
court had no support in the language of section 533 and should be re-
jected on that basis alone.55 He also argued that the plain language
of the statute should determine the case.5 6 Justice Broussard sug-
gested that even if the language could be interpreted to exclude in-
herently harmful conduct,5 7 concern for the rights of victims of such
crimes should preclude such an exclusion.5 8 Thus, according to Jus-
tice Broussard, "[c]oncern for the innocent victims of crime out-
molestation is always wrongful as a matter of law, the Walters question of motive or
intent is irrelevant. I&
52. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1026, 804 P.2d at 699, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (citing Kim
W., 160 Cal. App. 3d 326, 206 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1984); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal.
App. 3d 1012, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449 (9th
Cir. 1988), State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.
1989); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1989)).
53. The majority noted that the decision in Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d at 1025-26, 251
Cal. Rptr. at 628-30 gives an extensive review of out-of-state authority. J.C. Penney, 52
Cal. 3d at 1027, 804 P.2d at 699, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 74. See also 11 INS. LIT. REP. 289, 290-
91 (1989).
54. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1029, 804 P.2d at 701, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard,
J., dissenting). Justice Broussard cited the language from Clemmer and interpreted it
to mean that all cases involving section 533 should satisfy this test. Id.
55. Id at 1032, 804 P.2d at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Broussard argued that "[t]o read 'inherently harmful' into this straightforward
statute can only be categorized as judicial legislation." Id. (footnote omitted).
56. Id (Broussard, J., dissenting).
57. Id (Broussard, J., dissenting). By proposing at least two possible constructions
of the language in section 533, Justice Broussard as much as admits that the section is
ambiguous. However, according to Justice Broussard, the only plausible and acceptable
construction of section 533 "is that the word 'wilful' in the second section relates to the
caused loss or that the 'act' referred to as a 'wilful act' is an act intended to cause the
loss. Id at 1030, 804 P.2d at 701, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting). In his
opinion, this was the construction given the code section in CZemmer. Id at 1030, 804
P.2d at 701-02, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1032, 804 P.2d at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Broussard also stated that the "inherently harmful" construction espoused by the
majority "flies in the face of our constitutional command for the 'enactment of com-
prehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for victims of crime. . ."' Id
at 1029, 804 P.2d at 701, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citing CAL.
CoNST. art. I, § 28(a)).
weighs the policy of deterrence or penalizing the wrongdoer and
strongly militates against an interpretation expanding section 533's
prohibition of insurance coverage." 59 Justice Broussard concluded by
stating that where there is expert testimony to the contrary the jury
should be allowed to reject the inference that child molestation in-
herently carries an intent to harm.60
V. IMPACT
Insurers in future coverage denials must show that the conduct of
the insured constituted sexual molestation of the child. Thus, the
definition of sexual molestation contained in Penal Code section 288,
becomes the crucial element of proof.61 Although subjective intent to
harm is irrelevant because the harm is inherent in the act, the in-
surer must still establish that the insured had the "intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of
either [himself] or the child."62
Justice Broussard argued that an "inherently harmful" standard
creates the danger that insurers will "deny coverage in substantially
all cases involving criminal conduct"63 However, the majority was
very careful to emphasize that it was deciding only whether sexual
molestation of a child was precluded under section 533.64 This state-
59. Id. at 1032-33, 804 P.2d at 703, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Broussard, J., dissenting)
(citing James M. Fischer, The Fxclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses Caused by
the Intentional Acts of the Insured A Policy in Search of a Justfication, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 95, 96-99 (1990); Dietmar Greilman, Insurance Coverage for Child Sex-
ual Abuse Under California Law: Should Intent to Harm be Specifically Proven or
Imputed as a Matter of Law?, 18 Sw. U. L. REv. 171, 173-79 (1988)).
60. J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1035, 804 P.2d at 705, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Broussard,
J., dissenting). The reference to expert testimony was in response to the majority's
rejection of the use of psychiatric testimony to establish that the molester intended no
harm. See id. at 1028, 804 P.2d at 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 75 (majority stating that such
testimony "flies 'in the face of all reason, common sense, and experience.' ") (citations
omitted). According to Justice Broussard, this view was "a shocking attack on the sci-
ence of psychiatry" and constituted a poor attempt by the majority to practice psychia-
try on its own. Id. at 1034, 804 P.2d at 704, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 79 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
61. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also State Farm Fire & Casu-
alty Co. v. Nycum, No. 90-15706 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1991). In Nycum, the Ninth Circuit
held that the decision in J. C. Penney did not "relieve the insurer of its initial burden
of showing that the act was intentional molestation." Id. The court in Nycum held
that if there is no conviction for a violation of Penal Code 288 and the insurer fails to
prove that the touching was intentional molestation, recovery for a negligent touching
was possible. Id.
62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
63. J. C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1032 n.1, 804 P.2d at 703 n.1, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 78 n.1
(Broussard, J., dissenting). Justice Broussard reasoned that because "[all1 criminal
conduct is 'repugnant and reprehensible,"' the burden would be on the courts to make
determinations of levels of repugnancy in choosing whether to deny coverage. Id.
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1028, 804 P.2d at 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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ment was in direct response to the concerns of Justice Broussard and
the various amici, and appears to show that the majority was aware
of the importance of keeping the issue narrow65
VI. CONCLUSION
The court determined that the policy of deterring indemnification
for intentional wrongs was more important than providing coverage
for the victims' damages. However, the majority noted that because
both the majority and the dissent recognized that section 533 was sus-
ceptible to more than one construction, the duty to resolve the con-
flict might very well rest with the Legislature.6 6
BRUCE C. YOUNG
x. LABOR LAW
The Federal Housing and Employment Act does not
supersede common law or state law causes of action for
employment discrimination, nor does it require
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Act
before an aggrieved employee pursues such nonstatutory
claims, which may include a claim for tortious discharge
in contravention of public policy due to sexual
harassment: Rojo v. Kliger.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rojo v. Kliger,' the California Supreme Court considered
whether sexually harassed employees may seek judicial relief by as-
serting common law causes of action, including wrongful discharge in
contravention of public policy, notwithstanding the Fair Employment
and Housing Act2 (hereinafter "FEHA" or "Act") and before ex-
65. Id. The majority stated that "[w]e cannot emphasize too strongly to the bench
and bar the narrowness of the issue before us. The only wrongdoing we assess is the
sexual molestation of a child. Whether other types of wrongdoing are also excluded as
a matter of law by section 533 is not before us." Id (footnote omitted).
66. See id.
1. 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990). Justice Panelli wrote the
opinion for the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Eagleson, and
Anderson concurred. Justice Broussard concurred separately, joined by Justice
Kennard.
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12999 (West 1980). See infra notes 16-28 and accom-
panying text for an overview of the Act as it relates to employment discrimination
claims.
hausting administrative remedies under the Act.3 After a compre-
hensive examination of the Act's provisions,4 the Act's legislative
history,5 California procedural law,6 and public policy as it relates to
sexual harassment in the workplace,7 the court delivered a three part
ruling.8 First, the court held that common law and state law claims
for employment discrimination are not preempted by the Fair Hous-
ing and Employment Act.9 Second, the court explained that although
a plaintiff employee is required to exhaust administrative remedies
for claims brought under the Act before initiating a civil action, the
employee may immediately seek judicial relief for the nonstatutory
claims.10 Lastly, the court held that allegations of sexual harass-
ment, if properly pled, could sustain a claim for tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy."
II. BACKGROUND
The California legislature enacted the California Fair Employment
and Housing ActI2 in 1980. The Act served to combine the provisions
of two former acts, the Fair Employment Practice Act' 3 and the
Rumford Fair Housing Act,' 4 in order to provide a statutory frame-
work for eliminating discrimination in employment and housing.15
The Act identifies freedom from employment discrimination on
the basis of sex as a "civil right."l6 In addition, the Act proclaims
that discrimination on the basis of sex is against public policy17 and
3. Roj, 52 Cal. 3d at 70-71, 801 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
4. See ic. at 72-73, 801 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
5. See id. at 75-79, 801 P.2d at 378-81, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135-38.
6. See id. at 80-82, 801 P.2d at 381-83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138-40 (discussion of exclu-
sive remedy); id. at 82-88, 801 P.2d at 384-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140-45 (discussion of ex-
haustion doctrine).
7. See it, at 89-91, 801 P.2d at 389, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
8. See ic. at 70-71, 801 P.2d at 375, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33.
9. I, at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140
10. 1d at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
11. Id, at 90-91, 801 P.2d at 389-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47.
12. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12900-12999 (West 1980) (added by 1980 Cal. Stat. 3140,
ch. 992, § 4).
13. 1959 Cal. Stat. 1999, ch. 121, § 1 (repealed 1980).
14. 1963 Cal. Stat. 3823, ch. 1853, §§ 2-4 (repealed 1980).
15. See Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 77, 801 P.2d 373, 379, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 136
(1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920. See generally 8 B. WrmnIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAw Constitutional Law §§ 756-757 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the nature, purpose, and
scope of FEHA).
16. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12921 (West 1980). See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Anno-
tation, On-The-Job Sexual Harassment as Violation of State Civil Rights Law, 18'
A.L.R. 4TH 328 (1982 and Supp. 1991). Sexual harassment is viewed as a type of sex
discrimination. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Sexual
Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1990) (interpreting sex discrimination to include sex-
ual harassment). See also Reo, 52 Cal. 3d at 73 n.4, 801 P.2d at 376 n.4, 276 Cal. Rptr.
at 133 n.4.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980).
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constitutes an unlawful' 8 employment practice.19 Consequently, the
espoused objective of the Act is "to provide effective remedies which
will eliminate such discriminatory practices." 20 To achieve this end,
the Act requires the Department of Fair Employment and Housing
to investigate a complaint filed with it.21 The Act further provides
that if the Department decides that the complaint has merit, it must
attempt to eradicate the unlawful practice "by conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion."22 If the Department's efforts prove unsuccess-
ful or if the Department determines that "circumstances warrant,"
the Department may issue a written accusation. 2 3 It is at this point
that the Department assumes the role of a prosecutor and presents
the case against the employer before the Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Commission.2 4 If the Commission finds that the employer is
guilty of a discriminatory practice, the Commission will issue a "cease
and desist" order, requiring the employer to take numerous measures
to remedy the situation.2 5 The Commission, however, may not pro-
vide relief in the form of compensatory or punitive damages to a
complainant in a sexual harassment case.m
An aggrieved employee may bring a civil action pursuant to the
Act only if he or she obtains a "right to sue" letter from the Depart-
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980).
19. R*o, 52 Cal. 3d at 72, 801 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (citing Commodore
Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 213, 649 P.2d 912, 913, 185 Cal. Rptr.
270, 271 (1982)). See generally 8 B. WrrIKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitu-
tional Law § 760 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing sex discrimination under the Act).
20. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980).
21. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12963 (West 1980). The Department's powers, functions
and duties are set forth in Government Code section 12930. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12930 (West 1980). See generally 8 B. WrIIN, SUMMARY OF CA IFORNIA LAW Consti-
tutional Law § 758 (9th ed. 1988).
22. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12963.7 (West 1980). See generally 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law § 767 (9th ed. 1988) (summary of investigatory
and conciliatory procedures).
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965 (West 1980).
24. CAL GOV'T CODE § 12969 (West 1980); Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 72, 801 P.2d
373, 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1990).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12970(a) (West 1980). See generally 8 B. WITKiN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law §§ 768-769 (9th ed. 1988) (summary of accusa-
tion, hearing, order, and judicial enforcement stages).
26. See Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
52 Cal. 3d 40, 801 P.2d 357, 276 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1990) (prohibiting compensatory damage
awards); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 743
P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987) (prohibiting punitive damage awards). See also Rodo,
52 Cal. 3d at 80, 801 P.2d at 382, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
ment.2 7 The Act requires the Department to issue a "right to sue"
letter if it decides not to prosecute the case or if 150 days have passed
since the filing of the complaint and the Department has not yet is-
sued an accusation.2 8
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August, 1986, plaintiffs Emma Rojo and Teresa Maloney filed a
complaint in the superior court for "Violation of Civil Rights and In-
tentional Infliction of Emotional Distress."29 The complaint alleged
that their employer, Erwin Kliger,30 subjected them to sexual ad-
vances, verbal sexual harassment, and demands for sexual favors.
The plaintiffs claimed that these acts constituted a violation of sec-
tion 12940 of the Fair Employment and Housing Act3l and caused
them to suffer emotional distress.
Kliger moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs
were precluded from bringing the civil action because the plaintiffs
neglected to pursue and exhaust their administrative remedies under
the Act. In addition to opposing the motion, the plaintiffs expressed
a desire to amend their complaint to include claims for assault, bat-
tery, and tortious discharge in contravention of public policy.3 2 Nev-
ertheless, the trial court granted Kliger's motion on the grounds that
sexual discrimination suits may be filed in superior court only after
they have been filed with the Fair Employment and Housing Depart-
ment and only after all administrative remedies have been
exhausted.
The court of appeal reversed.33 Although the court agreed that the
section 12940 claim must proceed under the Act, the court held that
the plaintiffs could bring common law and state law claims directly
to court, finding that the FEHA does not provide the exclusive rem-
edy for sex discrimination claims?34 The court also held that the
plaintiffs could amend their complaint to allege tortious discharge in
27. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 72, 801 P.2d at 376, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (citing CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980)).
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980).
29. See Rojo v. Kliger, 220 Cal. App. 3d 412, 417, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160-61 (1989),
aff'd, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 801 P.2d 373, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1990).
30. I& at 417, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The complaint actually named two defendants:
Erwin Kliger, a physician, and Erwin H. Kliger, M.D., a corporation. Id.
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980). See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
32. Rojo, 220 Cal. App. 3d at 416-17, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The facts underlying a
claim for tortious discharge in contravention of public policy included assertions that
Kliger's sexual harassment and the plaintiffs' unwillingness to comply with his de-
mands led to the wrongful discharge of Maloney, and the constructive wrongful dis-
charge of Rojo. Id. at 430, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
33. Id at 432, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
34. Id. at 432, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
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contravention of public policy.35 The California Supreme Court
granted review.3 6
IV. TREATMENT
A Me Majority Opinion
1. The Fair Employment and Housing Act is Not The Exclusive
Remedy
The court pointed to the express language in section 12993, subdivi-
sion (a) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act 3 7 as proof that the
Act does not supplant any remedies existing under common law or
state law for damages caused by employment related discrimina-
tion.3 8 This provision states: "Nothing contained in this part shall be
deemed to repeal any of the provisions of the Civil Rights Law or of
any other law of this state relating to discrimination because of...
sex .... ,,39 The court made three comments regarding the savings
clause. First, the court noted that the "'law' of this state includes
the common law as well as the Constitution and the codes." 40 Sec-
ond, the court explained4' that California common law furnishes a
number of theories upon which a person may seek relief for injuries
"relating to discrimination."42 The court cited common law theories
35. Id at 432, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
36. Rojo v. Kliger, 775 P.2d 1035, 260 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1989).
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1980).
38. Rojo v. Kilger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 73, 801 P.2d 373, 377, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (1990).
39. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (emphasis added).
40. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 801 P.2d at 377, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citing CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §§ 1895, 1899 (West 1983); Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal.
App. 2d 222, 229, 270 P.2d 604, 609 (1954)).
41. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 801 P.2d at 377, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Moreover, the
court indicated that an attorney representing an employee in a discrimination case has
a duty to plead as many causes of action as necessary "to fully protect the interests of
his or her client," whether based on constructions of statutory or common law. Id
(quoting Brown v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 3d 477, 486, 691 P.2d 272, 277, 208 Cal. Rptr. 724,
729 (1984); citing Alice Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practi-
tioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 879 (1980)). See generally
Dave Linn, Sex Discrimination" Sexual Harassment Creating A Hostile Work Envi-
ronment, 50 Am. JUR. PROOF OF FACTs 2D 127 (1988) (indicating that sexual harass-
ment at the workplace may give rise to common law tort actions of battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
interference with employment relationship); John F. Major, Wrongful Discharge of
At-Will Employee-Sexual Harassment, 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 335 (1982)
(discussing conduct in employment that may constitute sexual harassment leading to a
cause of action for wrongful discharge).
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1980).
of emotional distress and wrongful discharge as examples,43 pointing
out that it had indicated in previous cases that victims of employment
discrimination may pursue such causes of action in court.44 Third,
the court related that the term "repeal," as used in statutes, encom-
passes both statutory and common law.45 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the plain language of section 12993, subdivision (a)46
expresses the legislative intent to preserve an employee's common
law and state law causes of action for employment discrimination.47
The defendant claimed48 that, based on the language in section
12993, subdivision (c), 49 of the Act, the legislature designed the
FEHA to override all state law relating to discrimination in employ-
ment and housing, including common law, with the specific exception
of section 51 of the Civil Code.50 This provision of the FEHA states:
While it is the intention of the Legislature to occupy the field of regulation of
discrimination in employment and housing encompassed by the provisions of
this part, exclusive of all other laws banning discrimination in employment
and housing by any city, city and county, county or other political subdivision
of this state, nothing contained in this part shall be construed, in any manner
or way, to limit or restrict the application of Section 51 of the Civil Code.5 1
In response to the defendant's argument, the court initially observed
the ambiguous nature of section 12993, subdivision (c).5 2 The court
43. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 801 P.2d at 377, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citing Brown, 37
Cal. 3d at 481, 691 P.2d at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 725). In Brown, the plaintiff, a victim
of race discrimination, filed a final amended complaint asserting common law causes of
action for emotional distress and wrongful discharge, as well as an FEHA cause of ac-
tion. Brown, 37 Cal. 3d at 481, 691 P.2d at 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
44. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 801 P.2d at 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (citing Dyna-Med,
Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1403, 743 P.2d 1323, 1338,
241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 81 (1987); Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 3d
211, 220, 649 P.2d 912, 917, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1982); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2
Cal. 3d 493, 498, 468 P.2d 216, 218-19, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 (1970)).
45. Id. at 75, 801 P.2d at 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (citations omitted).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(a) (West 1980).
47. Rajo, 52 Cal. 3d at 75, 801 P.2d at 378, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
48. Id. at 76, 801 P.2d at 279, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
49. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(c) (West 1980). See infa text accompanying note 51
(text of provision).
50. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). Civil Code section 51, com-
monly referred to as the Unruh Civil Rights Act, provides in pertinent part: "[a]ll per-
sons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex... are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. See gen-
erally 8 B. WrrKIN, SuMMARY OF CALIFOxRNIA LAw Constitutional Law § 748 (9th ed.
1988).
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12993(c).
52. Rcjo, 52 Cal. 3d at 76, 801 P.2d at 379, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The court consid-
ered that three phrases of subdivision (c) may be subject to more than one interpreta-
tion. The first phrase was "occupy the field." Id. (comparing Pacific Scene, Inc. v.
Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 407, 411-13, 758 P.2d 1182, 1185, 250 Cal. Rptr. 651, 653-55
(1988) and Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 574-75, 565 P.2d 122, 128, 139 Cal. Rptr.
97, 103-04 (1977), disapproved on other grounds in Ochoa v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d
159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985) with Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230, rev'd, Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) and Cohen v. Board of Su-
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then turned to the legislative history for guidance on how to construe
the provision.53 The court's examination revealed that because sec-
tion 51 of the Civil Code bans discrimination in housing and grants
enforcement authority to local law divisions,54 the legislature in-
tended for the FEHA to eliminate local laws relating to housing dis-
crimination but did not intend to alter the power of local
communities to enforce state laws banning housing discrimination. 5
Hence, because the FEHA only preempts local law, statutory and
common law remain intact.5 6
The court then addressed the defendant's assertion that the FEHA
should be applied to the exclusion of all other state law relating to
employment discrimination under the "new right - exclusive rem-
edy" doctrine of statutory construction.57 The court responded by de-
claring that such "artificial canons of construction" are inapplicable
in situations where, as in the case at bar, the statutory language
clearly states the degree of exclusivity possessed by the Act.5 8 How-
pervisors, 40 Cal. 3d 277, 290-91, 707 P.2d 840, 847-48, 219 Cal. Rptr. 467, 474 (1985)).
The second ambiguous phrase was "exclusive of all other laws... " Id. (emphasis ad-
ded by court) (comparing definition contained in WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 890 (2d ed. 1935) with the parties' interpretation). The third area of
ambiguity was the word "by" preceding "any city, city and county... " Id. at 76-77,
801 P.2d at 379, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
53. Id. at 77, 801 P.2d at 379, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The court had stated earlier
that it would be improper to construe a statute unless an ambiguity revealed itself. See
id at 73, 801 P.2d at 377, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (citing Solberg v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d
182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (1977)). See also Caminetti v. Pa-
cific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 2d 344, 353-54, 139 P.2d 908, 913, cert denied, Neblett v.
Caminetti, 320 U.S. 802 (1944).
54. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 51, 52(c)-(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1991). See also supra
note 49. See generally 8 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Constitutional Law
§ 755 (discussing enforcement of enumerated rights in section 51).
55. Ro*, 52 Cal. 3d at 78-79, 801 P.2d at 380-81, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38. In tracing
the legislative history, the court primarily relied upon David B. Oppenheimer & Mar-
garet M. Baumgartner, Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge: Does
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act Displace Common Law Remedies?,
23 U.S.F. L. REV. 145, 174-77 (1989) and the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.'s amicus curiae brief. See Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 77 n.6, 801 P.2d at 379 n.6, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 136 n.6.
56. Id. at 78-79, 801 P.2d at 380-81, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38.
57. Id. at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138. The "new right - exclusive
remedy" rule provides that "where a statute creates a right that did not exist at com-
mon law and provides a comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme for its enforce-
ment, the statutory remedy is exclusive." Id (citing Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club,
55 Cal. 2d 736, 746-47, 361 P.2d 921, 927-28, 13 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207-08 (1961)). See
Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 301, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 166 (1982). See gen-
erally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE Actions § 7 (3d. ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990)
(explaining the general rule for exclusiveness of statutory remedy).
58. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138. See supra note 52
ever, the court implied that if a rule of construction applied to the
FEHA, it would undoubtedly be the "pre-existing right - cumulative
remedies" doctrine because a number of common law theories supply
avenues for redress for employees who have suffered
discrimination. 59
The court easily dispelled the defendant's final claim that refer-
ences to the FEHA as a "comprehensive scheme" indicate judicial
recognition of the Act's complete dominion over employment and
housing discrimination actions.60 The court explained that the con-
text in which courts made such statements alluded to an expansion
of the aggrieved employee's rights under the Act, rather than to a
limitation of the employee's remedies provided by the Act.6 ' The
court further stressed that the FEHA falls short of demonstrating
the level of comprehensive coverage needed to deduce a legislative
intent to exclude all other state law relating to employment discrimi-
nation.62 Therefore, the court concluded that the FEHA does not
(discussing the impropriety of construing explicit statute). See also supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text (court's indication of the statute's clarity with regard to section
12993(a)). The court rejected the defendant's reliance on Strauss v. A.L. Randall Co.,
144 Cal. App. 3d 514, 194 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1983), and several federal decisions. Rojo, 52
Cal. 3d at 82 n.9, 801 P.2d at 383 n.9, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140 n.9. This was because the
court in those cases erroneously applied the "new right - exclusive remedy" rule of
construction. Id. at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
59. Ro,, 52 Cal. 3d at 79, 801 P.2d at 381, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (citing Brown v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 477, 486, 691 P.2d 272, 277, 208 Cal. Rptr. 724, 729 (1984);
Commodore Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 220, 649 P.2d 912, 917, 185 Cal.
Rptr. 270, 275 (1982); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498-500, 468 P.2d 216,
218-20, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90-92 (1970)). The "preexisting right - cumulative remedy"
doctrine provides that if a common law right existed before the creation of the new
statutory remedy, the new remedy is merely cumulative, giving the plaintiff the option
to pursue an additional course of action. See id; 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
Actions § 8 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990). See also supra note 41 (listing common law
theories available to victims of sexual harassment in employment).
60. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 80-81, 801 P.2d at 381-82, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
61. Id. at 80, 801 P.2d at 382, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (citing Brown, 37 Cal. 3d at 487,
691 P.2d at 277-78, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30; State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 3d 422, 431, 703 P.2d 354, 359, 217 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21 (1985); Snipes
v. City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861, 868-69, 193 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762 (1983)). The
court similarly declined to follow a line of cases which relied upon the phrase in Gov-
ernment Code section 12993, subdivision (c), indicating the legislature's intent to "oc-
cupy the field." Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 81, 801 P.2d at 382-83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40 (citing
Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489, 492, 238 Cal. Rptr. 360, 361-62 (1987);
Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1124-25, 228 Cal. Rptr. 591,
600-01 (1986)). The court reasoned that the phrase, when read in context, referred to
the Act's preemption of local law, not state law. I& at 81, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal.
Rptr. at 140. See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
62. Rjo, 52 Cal. 3d at 80, 801 P.2d at 382, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 139. As examples, the
court pointed to the Act's application to "employers" of not less than five persons, id
(citing CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12926(c), 12940(h) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991)), the inapplica-
bility of the Act to religious associations or nonprofit corporations, id (citing CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12926(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991)), the denial of protection to people
who have been discriminated against based on their sexual orientation, id. (citing Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal.
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prevent an employee's pursuit of causes of action for employment
discrimination based upon statutory or common law theories of
recovery.63
2. The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine Does
Not Apply to Nonstatutory Claims
The supreme court rejected the argument that the FEHA adminis-
trative process must be exhausted before an aggrieved employee may
file a civil action seeking damages based upon causes of action outside
of the Act.64 Although the court agreed that an employee bringing a
civil suit under the FEHA must first obtain a "right to sue" letter by
completing the administrative procedure,65 it posited that the exhaus-
tion requirement should not extend to causes of action beyond the
legislative scheme. 66
Rptr. 14 (1979)), and the inability of the Fair Employment and Housing Commission to
award either compensatory or punitive damages, id. (citing Peralta Community Col-
lege Dist. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 52 Cal. 3d 40, 56, 801 P.2d 357, 367, 276
Cal. Rptr. 114, 124 (1990) (compensatory damages); Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employ-
ment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1404, 743 P.2d 1323, 1338, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 82
(1987) (punitive damages)).
63. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 82, 801 P.2d at 383, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
64. 1I at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
65. 1i at 83-84, 801 P.2d at 384, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The court noted that the Act
itself, as well as a considerable amount of case law, supported this viewpoint. Id. (cit-
ing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12965(b) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991); State Personnel Bd. v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 39 Cal. 3d 422, 433 n.11, 703 P.2d 354, 360 n.11, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 16, 22 n.11 (1985); Commodore Home Sys. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 218,
649 P.2d 912, 916, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 274 (1982); Yurick v. Superior Ct., 209 Cal. App. 3d
1116, 1123, 257 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (1989); Robinson v. Department of Fair Employment
& Hous. Comm'n, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1414, 1416, 239 Cal. Rptr. 908, 909 (1987); Miller v.
United Airlines, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 878, 890, 220 Cal. Rptr. 684, 691-92 (1985); Myers
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1063, 218 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1985); Snipes v.
City of Bakersfield, 145 Cal. App. 3d 861, 866, 193 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762-63 (1983)). See
supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (explaining necessity of "right to sue" letter
prior to commencement of civil action alleging statutory claims under Act and how
plaintiff obtains "right to sue" letter).
66. Rqjo, 52 Cal. 3d at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144. To this end, the
court declined to apply the general rule that a complainant must first exhaust the stat-
utory relief available from the administrative framework, created to supply the rem-
edy, before resorting to the courts. Id, at 84-85, 801 P.2d at 385, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
The court referenced George Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations
Bd., 40 Cal. 3d 654, 710 P.2d 288, 221 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1985), and Abelleira v. District
Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (1941), as demonstrative of judicial adher-
ence to the exhaustion requirement based upon the rule. Rjo, 52 Cal. 3d at 84-85, 801
P.2d at 835, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 142. However, the court pointed out that the general rule
only applies to the relief supplied for a statutory right through administrative
processes and, consequently, the rule has no application to the availability of remedies
independent of the statute. fI at 84, 801 P.2d at 385, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 142. See gener-
The court distinguished those cases that have expanded the ex-
haustion requirement to causes of action outside the particular ad-
ministrative scheme on two grounds.6 7 First, it noted that in those
prior cases, the subject matter required a "pervasive and self-con-
tained system of administrative procedure" to deal with the prob-
lem,68 whereas the FEHA lacks such a system for evaluating and
controlling discrimination in employment. 69 Second, the court em-
phasized that, unlike the factually complex issues involved in other
cases, 70 the issues involved in an employment discrimination case do
not require a special technical competence or particular expertise
which would make the administrative agency's determination indis-
pensable to the judge or jury.71
In addition, the court reasoned that the policy considerations nor-
mally furthered by the exhaustion requirement 72 would not be ad-
vanced by requiring exhaustion of the FEHA administrative
ally 3 B. WrKm, CALFORmA PROCEDURE, Actions § 234 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991)
(discussing exhaustion requirement).
67. See Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 87-88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court
briefly traced the expansion of the exhaustion requirement to encompass nonstatutory
causes of action. Id. at 87, 801 P.2d at 386, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Courts appropriated
the justification for application of the exhaustion requirement in the context of private
associations, which provided an internal remedy to administrative agencies in the pub-
lic context, where an external remedy was possible in reasoning that administrative
agencies, like private associations, "possess] a specialized and specific body of expertise
in a field that particularly equips it to handle the subject matter of the dispute." Id
The court then selected a court of appeal case indicative of the expansion of the doc-
trine, Karlin v. Zalta, 154 Cal. App. 3d 953, 201 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1984), and distinguished
the applicability of the reasoning in such cases from cases involving the administrative
procedure set up by the FEHA for matters dealing with employment related discrimi-
nation. See id at 87-88, 801 P.2d at 386-87, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 143-44.
68. Id at 87, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing and quoting Karlin, 154
Cal. App. 3d at 983, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 397). In Karlin, the court of appeal found that
the "pervasive and self-contained system of administrative procedure" set up by the
McBride Act "for the monitoring both of insurance rates and the anticompetitive con-
ditions that might produce such rates" evidenced a particular competency of the
agency in dealing with highly technical and complex excessive-rate issues. Karlin, 154
Cal. App. 3d at 983, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 397. Based upon this finding, the Karlin court
determined that the administrative agency's proficiency in making the essential factual
determinations justified requiring exhaustion of the administrative process under the
McBride Act. Id. at 986-87, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
69. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 87-88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
70. Id. at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Karlin, 154 Cal. App. 3d
at 983, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (insurance rates); Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Court,
185 Cal. App. 3d 1232, 1242, 230 Cal. Rptr. 383, 387 (1986) (modification of franchises
for good cause); Morton v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 3d 248, 139 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1977) (interpretation of Horse Racing Board's rules governing ejection)).
71. Ild. at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
72. The court specifically listed four beneficial characteristics of the exhaustion
requirement: "(1) bolstering administrative autonomy; (2) permitting the agency to re-
solve factual issues, apply its expertise and exercise statutorily delegated remedies; (3)
mitigating damages; and (4) promoting judicial economy." Id. at 86, 801 P.2d at 386, 276
Cal. Rptr. at 143 (citing Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 465, 476,
551 P.2d 410, 416, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 96 (1976)).
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remedies prior to commencing a civil action of any kind.73 Rather,
the court observed that requiring exhaustion of the FEHA procedure
before allowing an employee to pursue nonstatutory claims in court
would either lead to routine issuance of right-to-sue letters, thus nullifying
the requirement, or alternatively, burden the Department and Commission
with the investigation and determination of issues beyond their jurisdiction
and special expertise, limit the resources available for the resolution of cases
within the scope of the [A]ct, raise complex issues of collateral estoppel or res
judicata, and ultimately have no beneficial impact on the judicial system, in
that the case in any event must still enter the "judicial pipeline," a result the
exhaustion doctrine was in part intended to avert.
7 4
Therefore, the court held that a victim of employment discrimination
can bypass the FEHA and go straight to court to seek damages from
an employer based upon non-FEHA claims.75 However, an employee
desiring remedies from both forums has the option of initiating the
process in each forum either concurrently7 6 or consecutively.7 7
3. Sexual Harassment May Give Rise to Tortious Discharge in
Contravention of Public Policy Claim
In addressing whether to include the common law tort action of
"wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy" in an em-
ployee's arsenal of claims against a sexually harassing employer, the
court examined78 the nature and possible boundaries of the cause of
action as set forth in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.79 and Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co.80 The court found that a cause of action for
73. See id. at 88, 801 P.2d at 387, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
74. Id. (citing Cathy McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1245,
231 Cal. Rptr. 304, 314 (1986)).
75. Id. at 88, 801 P.2d at 387-88, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144-4 (citing Alcorn v. Anbro
Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 500 n.7, 468 P.2d 216, 220 n.7, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 92 n.7 (1970)).
76. Id. at 88, 801 P.2d at 388, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (citing Brown v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 477, 481, 691 P.2d 272, 273, 208 Cal. Rptr. 724, 725 (1984)). If the plaintiff
chooses this option, she can amend her complaint to include the claims under the
FEHA as soon as she obtains a "right to sue" letter. Id.
77. Id (citing Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1271, 1277-
78, 261 Cal. Rptr. 204, 206-07 (1989); Monge v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 503, 507,
222 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65 (1986)).
78. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 88-91, 801 P.2d at 388-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
79. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). The Foley court deter-
mined that the termination of an employee for reporting an on-going criminal investi-
gation of a co-employee to his employer does not amount to wrongful discharge in
contravention of public policy, because the interests involved are not "public." Id at
670-71, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
80. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). The Tameny court
found that an employee's dismissal for refusing to commit an illegal act in the course
of employment gave rise to a claim for tortious discharge in contravention of public
policy because the claim implicated the public policy against conditioning employment
wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy must be based
upon a policy that is both "'fundamental' and 'public' in nature, i.e.,
'one which inures to the benefit of the public at large rather than to
a particular employer or employee.' "81
The court espoused the plaintiffs' argument that article I, section 8
of the California Constitution s 2 promulgates freedom from sexual
discrimination in employment as a fundamental public policy.83 The
court further maintained that the public policy against sexual harass-
ment in the workplace is based on the widespread public interest in
eliminating the negative effects that employment-related sex discrim-
ination has on society as a whole, thus satisfying the requirement
that the policy "inure to the benefit of the public."8 4 Consequently,
the court concluded that allegations of sexual harassment in employ-
ment may sustain a claim for tortious discharge in contravention of
public policy.8 5
B. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Broussard concurred separately86 only to reiterate that he
disagreed with the court's holding in Peralta Community College Dis-
trict v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,8 7 which pro-
upon the commission of criminal acts. Id at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at
846.
81. Id at 89, 801 P.2d at 388, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145 (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 669,
765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217).
82. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, section 8 provides as follows: "A person may
not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or em-
ployment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin."
83. Ro*, 52 Cal. 3d at 90, 801 P.2d at 389, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 146. The court inter-
preted the constitutional provision as applying to both public and private sector em-
ployers. Id. at 89-90, 801 P.2d at 388-89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46 (citing CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16721 (West 1987); Commodore Home Sys., -Inc. v. Superior Court, 32
Cal. 3d 211, 220, 649 P.2d 912, 917, 185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1982); Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 19, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627-28, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 344
(1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1040-44, 264 Cal. Rptr.
194, 198-200 (1989)).
84. Id at 90, 801 P.2d at 389, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 146. The court noted that the Act
itself speaks to the fundamental public interest in eliminating discrimination in em-
ployment by stating that such discrimination "'foments domestic strife and unrest, de-
prives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development and advance,
and substantially adversely affects the interest of employees, employers, and the public
in general.'" Id. (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West 1980)).
85. Id. at 91, 801 P.2d at 389-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47. In addition, the court re-
fused to confine the tort to situations where "the employer 'coerces' an employee to
commit an act that violates public policy, or 'restrains' an employee from exercising a
fundamental right, privilege, or obligation." Id, at 91, 801 P.2d at 389, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
146. Although the court indiciated that the plaintiffs' allegations could satisfy either
category, it found that neither Foley nor Tameny supported such a restriction on the
scope of the tort. Id. at 91, 801 P.2d at 389-90, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47.
86. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 91-92, 801 P.2d 373, 390, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 147
(1990) (Broussard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard joined the concurrence. Id
87. 52 Cal. 3d 40, 801 P.2d 357, 276 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1990).
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scribed compensatory damage awards as beyond the authority of the
Fair Housing and Employment Commission.88 Thus, Justice Brous-
sard merely stated that he did not subscribe to the part of the court's
opinion that referenced the Peralta holding.8 9
V. IMPACT
The California Supreme Court's three part ruling in Rojo v. Kliger
increases the number of remedies that a victim of employment dis-
crimination may pursue. Not suprisingly, the court's decision will
have a substantial impact on employers charged with discrimination
in employment, injured employees, and the future of the FEHA.
Although the court's holding with regard to the FEHA's lack of
preemption was entirely predictable, given the plain language of the
Act 90 and the numerous opinions supporting such a notion,91 the de-
cision officially opens up a host of remedies that a victim of employ-
ment discrimination may pursue. An aggrieved employee now has
the right to seek out common law remedies, statutory remedies, and
remedies under the FEHA. Should an employee choose to pursue all
three avenues of relief, the employer's liability for employment dis-
crimination will be enormous. This evidences a substantial defeat for
employers who had hoped to limit the employee's scope of recovery
to remedies provided by the Act, where compensatory and punitive
damages are unavailable and the remedies are mainly limited to cur-
ing the discriminatory behavior.92 In addition, the availability of the
common law tort action of wrongful discharge in contravention of
public policy to an employee will increase an employee's damage
award and an employer's liability.
Despite the foregoing, the crux of the court's opinion lies with the
decision that an employee need not exhaust the administrative reme-
dies under the FEHA before bringing a civil action for the non-
FEHA claims.93 While this is beneficial to an employee wanting im-
mediate relief and compensation for her injuries in the form of dam-
ages, the ruling may prove to be crippling to the utility of the FEHA.
88. Id at 56, 801 P.2d at 367, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
89. Rojo, 52 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 801 P.2d at 390, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Broussard, J.,
concurring). See supra note 26.
90. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
93. See Sexual Haraasment Plaintiffs May Bypass Adminstrative Process, Califor-
nia Court Rules, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), Dec. 27, 1990, No. 249, at A-6.
This is because an employee who has been discriminated against will
probably find the monetary relief available from the courts more de-
sirable than the FEHA remedial scheme, which focuses on curing dis-
criminatory acts in the work place. Such situations occur when the
discrimination resulted in the termination or constructive discharge
of an employee who has no desire to return to her employment, even
after the discrimination has been eliminated or otherwise resolved.
However, an employee seeking the maximum relief available
should be advised to file his or her claims under the FEHA with the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission in addition to filing a
civil suit for the common law and non-FEHA statutory claims, and
then amend that complaint to add the FEHA claims once the reme-
dies have been exhausted under the Act.94 This approach will enable
the court to award compensatory and punitive damages under all
three categories of claims, will subject the employer to the utmost li-
ability, and will force the employer to cease the discriminatory prac-
tice and mitigate the damages as much as possible. Therefore, the
FEHA's future role in eliminating discrimination in employment de-
pends primarily on how useful the aggrieved employee views the ad-
ministrative procedure in relation to the remedies immediately
available in court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Roqjo v. Kliger greatly increases an employer's liabil-
ity for sexually harassing an employee. The decision represents the
next logical step to take in light of the recent supreme court deci-
sions limiting the type of remedies available under the FEHA for vic-
tims of employment discrimination.9 5 The probability of increased
litigation did not dissuade the court from granting employees the
right to pursue remedies from all facets of California law in both ad-
ministrative and judicial tribunals. Thus, the court sent the clear
message that it will endorse nearly any method available to combat
sex discrimination in employment.
SUSAN L. SPARKS
94. See supra notes 41-42.
95. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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XI. PROPERTY LAW
Upon completion of all necessary requirements for
conversion of apartments to condominiums, a California
developer need not comply with subsequent land
planning regulations even if they have failed to convey
title to a single unit City of West Hollywood v. Beverly
Towers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California legislature has enacted extensive legislation regard-
ing the conversion of apartment buildings to condominiums. The two
primary statutory frameworks developers must follow when con-
verting these buildings are the Subdivision Map Act' and the Davis-
Sterling Common Interest Development Act.2 Additionally, the De-
partment of Real Estate must publicly file a report granting the sub-
division under the Subdivided Lands Act.3 A problem arises,
however, where local zoning ordinances, enacted subsequent to the
developer meeting all other conditions, take effect. In City of West
Hollywood v. Beverly Towers,4 the California Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a municipality can create additional conversion re-
quirements even after the developer has met state requirements.5
Nine months after the City of West Hollywood incorporated,6 the
newly elected city council adopted ordinance 114U.7 This ordinance
established local requirements for a conditional use permit for condo-
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 66410-99.58 (West 1983). The Map Act specifies certain
requirements regarding design, improvement and transfer of subdivisions or condo-
minums. See e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66418 & 66419. The Act also sets standards and
procedure for approving subdivision maps. See e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE 66474 & 66474.5.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE, §§ 1350-70 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990). The Common Interest
Development Act regulates common interest developments (condominiums) by requir-
ing developers to follow a uniform set of laws.
3. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, §§ 11000-200. Pursuant to the Subdivided Lands Act,
whenever there is a sale of five or more units, the Department of Real Estate must file
a report.
4. 52 Cal. 3d 1184, 805 P.2d 329, 278 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1991).
5. Id. at 1189-90, 805 P.2d at 332, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 378. Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli Arabian and Baxter
concurring. Justice Broussard dissented with Justice Kennard concurring in the
dissent.
6. On November 29, 1984, the citizens of the city voted to incorporate. ICE at 1187,
805 P.2d at 330, 287 Cal. Rptr. at 376. The city council then suspended regulations on
converting apartments to condominiums until they could create a permanent system.
Id.
7. WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL., ORDINANCEs, 114U (1985) (hereinafter Ordinance
114U). The ordinance altered the previous city zoning regulation "by adding compre-
minium conversions.8 Beverly Towers complied with all state and lo-
cal requirements before the council enacted Ordinance 114U but had
not sold an interest in any of the condominiums. The City claimed
that a failure to sell rendered the conversion incomplete, and, there-
fore, Ordinance 114U applied.9
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The majority held that the failure to sell was "purely technical"lO
and that the Map Act protected owners from subsequent conversion
regulations.l" The court noted that setting a definite date from
which an owner can proceed regardless of subsequent regulations
furthers the Map Act's intent.' 2 The court then determined that
Beverly Towers need not comply with the additional burdens of Or-
dinance 114U. The court observed that its decision in Youngblood v.
Board of Supervisors'3 supported this proposition.' 4
hensive regulations governing the conversion of multiple family rental units into con-
dominiums." Id.
8. Examples of the new requirements were that 1) converting the apartment
building would not decrease the supply of rental housing in the city, 2) certain per-
centages of vacant rental housing in the city must be present unless a) new rental
units would be added for each one converted, b) the developer provides "inclusionary
units or in lieu fees," or c) no major dislocation of the existing tenants occurs. Id.
9. Id at 1188, 805 P.2d at 330-31, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77. Beverly Towers ob-
tained final and tentative subdivision tract map approvals and the public report of the
Department of Real Estate necessary for sale of the condominiums. Id. at 1187, 805
P.2d at 330, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
10. Id. at 1190, 805 P.2d at 332, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The city argued that the sale
of a unit was essential because Section 1352 of the California Civil Code states that a
condominium is "created whenever a separate interest coupled with an interest in the
common area or membership in the association is, or has been, conveyed." Further-
more, a declaration, a condominium plan and a final map (if required by the Map Act)
must be recorded. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1352 (West 1982). The city asserted, therefore,
that under the statutory definition, conversion is not complete until at least one unit is
sold, even though the developer received all final governmental approvals. See County
of Los Angeles v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 809, 814, 83 Cal. Rptr.
740, 743 (1970). The court determined, however, that the sale of a unit is merely a
"definitional element of a condominium... It is not an element that must be satisfied
before an owner's right to sell is immune from conditions imposed by a city on the
exercise of that right." Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1190, 805 P.2d at 332, 278 Cal.
Rptr. at 378.
11. Id. The Map Act protects developers. California Government Code section
66474.1, for example, prevents a legislative body from denying approval of a final par-
cel map if it is substantially similar to an already approved tentative map. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 66474.1 (West 1983). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66474.2 & 65961 (West 1983).
12. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1190, 805 P.2d at 332, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The
court found that "some of the Map Act's provisions are designed to safeguard the in-
vestments and expectations of developers involved in conversion projects." Id See,
e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66474.1, 66474.2 & 65961 (West 1983).
13. 22 Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978).
14. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1191, 805 P.2d at 333, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
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In Youngblood, the court held that the tentative map approval date
was the critical date in the conversion process.a5 At that point, essen-
tially all conditions of approval should be settled.' 6 In Santa Monica
Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Board,17 the court "expressed doubt" that
Youngblood applied to condominium conversions.18 In Beverly Tow-
ers, however, the court asserted that once a developer acquires the fi-
nal map and Department of Real Estate approval, the city council
cannot retroactively enforce subsequent regulations simply because
"the only remaining act required to complete the conversion is to
convey title to a single unit."'19
The court further determined that its decision in Santa Monica
Pines "attributed an inappropriately minor role to the Map Act as it
relates to condominium conversion." 20 Santa Monica Pines is not ap-
plicable, therefore, where municipalities attempt to force further
conditions upon developers qfter they have followed the procedures
prescribed by the Map Act.21
15. Youngblood, 22 Cal. 3d at 655-56, 586 P.2d at 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248. More
specifically, the court stated, "The purpose... was to confirm that the date when the
tentative map comes before the governing body for approval is the crucial date when
that body should decide whether to permit the proposed subdivision." Id. at 655, 586
P.2d at 562, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
16. In Youngblood, the court determined that the county could not deny a sub-
stantially similar final map if they had previously approved the tentative map upon
which the final map was based. Id. Once the county approves the tentative map, the
developer may rely on that approval.
Once the tentative map is approved, the developer often must expend substan-
tial sums to comply with the conditions attached to that approval. These ex-
penditures will result in the construction of improvements consistent with the
proposed subdivision .... [I]t is only fair to the developer and to the public
interest to require the governing body to render its discretionary decision
whether and upon what conditions to approve the proposed subdivision when
it acts on the tentative map.
Id. at 655-56, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 248, 586 P.2d at 562. See also, Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d
at 1191, 805 P.2d at 332, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
17. 35 Cal. 3d 858, 679 P.2d 27, 201 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1984).
18. Id. at 866, 679 P.2d at 32, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 598. The court exempted condomini-
ums because developers seldom perform "substantial new construction" in condomin-
ium conversions. Id.
19. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1191, 805 P.2d at 333, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
20. Id. at 1192, 805 P.2d at 333, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 379. In Santa Monica Pines, the
court reasoned that the purpose of the Map Act was distinct from that of the rent con-
trol law. The Map Act was implemented to regulate subdivision layout and upgrading
while protecting the public from fraud and exploitation. Santa Monica Pines, 35 Cal.
3d at 869, 679 P.2d at 34, 201 Cal.Rptr. at 600. "[The opinion overlooks the fact that
the Map Act details the procedure by which a developer secures approval to proceed
with a conversion." Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1192, 805 P.2d at 333, 278 Cal. Rptr.
at 379.
21. Id.
The court also held that neither Griffin Development Co. v. City of
Oxnard22 nor Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Re-
gional Commission23 were controlling.24 In Griffin, unlike Beverly
Towers, the developer did not have tentative or final subdivision map
approval.25 In Avco, the developer had no vested right to continue
because he had failed to comply with certain requirements.26 In Bev-
erly Towers, on the other hand, the developer had complied with all
requirements necessary to convey title.27 Furthermore, the govern-
ment's ability to control land use planning, a concern in Avco,28 was
determined to be a non-issue in the present case.2 9
The court rejected the city's contention that Beverly Towers
needed a vesting tentative map3 o because "no further discretionary
permits were required in order for them to proceed."3 ' Lastly, the
court determined that Beverly Towers' contention that the city failed
to give it notice of Ordinance 114U was moot.3 2 Thus, because all
necessary requirements were completed, the fact that Beverly Tow-
ers had "yet to sell a unit [was] determined to be a trivial factor."33
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Broussard argued that the majority's opinion destroyed the
22. 39 Cal. 3d 259, 703 P.2d 339, 217 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985).
23. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
24. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1192, 805 P.2d at 333, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
25. Griffin dealt with whether a city could regulate conversions of apartments
into condominiums at all. In Griffin, the developer had been denied a special use per-
mit, a variance, and a tentative subdivision map. Griffin, 39 Cal. 3d at 261, 703 P.2d at
340, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
26. In Avco, the court held there was no vested right to continue because the de-
veloper had "not even applied for a [building] permit." Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 795, 553 P.2d
at 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 392. The developer, therefore, had to comply with subse-
quently enacted legislation.
27. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1192, 805 P.2d at 334, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
28. In Avco, the court feared that allowing the developer to continue upon ap-
proval of a map would exempt property lots already subdivided from government reg-
ulations for an unspecified period. Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 797-98, 553 P.2d at 554, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 394.
29. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1193, 805 P.2d at 334, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
30. Id. at 1193-94, 805 P.2d at 334-35, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81. A vesting tentative
map (pursuant to section 66498.1 of the Map Act) gives the developer a vested right to
proceed "in accordance with the local ordinances, policies and standards in effect when
the application for the vesting tentative map [is] complete." Id. at 1193 n.6, 805 P.2d at
334 n.6, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380 n.6.
31. Id. at 1194, 805 P.2d 335, 278 Cal. Rptr. 381. The city was misguided in its argu-
ment because the only reason to acquire a vesting tentative map is "to allow a devel-
oper who needs additional discretionary approvals to complete a long term
development project as approved, regardless of any intervening changes in local regu-
lations." Id. at 1194, 805 P.2d at 334-35, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81. See also, Donatas
Januta & William M. Boyd, Development Agreements and Uncertainties in the Devel-
opment Approval Process, 5 REAL PRop. L. Rpm., Apr. 1982 at 49.
32. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1194, 805 P.2d at 335, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
33. Id. at 1193-94, 805 P.2d at 334, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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government's ability to regulate condominium conversions in circum-
stances where the vested rights doctrineS4 is inapplicable for lack of
detrimental reliance.35 Moreover, "the approval of a map has never
conferred a vested right to proceed with the development."3 6 A de-
veloper must meet California's vested rights doctrine, which calls for
"substantial improvements in good faith reliance on the permit"37
before he is immune to subsequent state or city regulations.3 8 Addi-
tionally, the legislative intent of the Map Act was not to protect de-
velopers in cases such as this.39 Finally, the dissent distinguished
Youngblood stating that Santa Monica Pines controls in that a devel-
oper must show detrimental reliance to have a vested right.40
34. Id. at 1195, 805 P.2d at 336, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
The vested rights doctrine allows developers to continue the conversion process with-
out complying with subsequently enacted regulations and "is not to be applied against
the government 'except in unusual cases where necessary to avoid grave or manifest
injustice' and with due consideration for any effect on the estoppel on the achievement
of public policy goals." Id. at 1196-97, 805 P.2d at 336-37, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting Hock Investment Co. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 215 Cal. App. 3d 438, 449, 263 Cal. Rptr. 665, 671 (1989)).
35. Id. at 1200, 805 P.2d at 339, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard argued that the developer demonstrated no reliance upon the ap-
proval of the map but merely planned changes that were not implemented. Id.
36. Id. at 1197, 805 P.2d at 337, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 383. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard relied on Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 35
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1963), which held that a municipality could not be estopped from imple-
menting zoning regulations simply because a map had been filed and approved. If this
were the case, the government would lose its power to permit different uses for the
land than those specified by the map. Id. at 633-34, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
37. Beverly Towers, 52 Cal. 3d at 1197, 805 P.2d at 337, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting) (citing Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d
110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
38. Id. at 1197, 805 P.2d at 337, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 383. See supra, notes 36-37 and
accompanying text (detrimental reliance is necessary for a developer to have a vested
right to proceed).
39. Id. at 1199, 805 P.2d at 338, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
Justice Broussard agreed with the city's argument regarding the vested subdivision
map. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Invoking section 66498.9(b) of the
Map Act, the developer was not entitled to protection from subsequently enacted regu-
lations because he failed to apply for a vesting map. Id at 1199, 805 P.2d at 338-39, 278
Cal. Rptr. at 384-85 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1199-1200, 805 P.2d at 339, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (Broussard, J., dissent-
ing). According to Justice Broussard, the fairness to the developer discussed in
Youngblood should be viewed in light of "the developers' expenditures in reliance on
Map Act approval." Id. at 1200, 805 P.2d at 339, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting). Youngblood did not apply because the developer had made no
expenditures.
III. CONCLUSION
The Beverly Towers decision will boost condominium development
in California. Developers now have assurance that once all Map Act
and other requirements have been met, they can proceed with con-
version without the need to comply with subsequently enacted state
or local regulations. With this protection, the supply of condomini-
ums should increase, driving down the price of condominium owner-
ship. Although government power to control land use may be
somewhat impaired, condominium affordability will be enhanced at a




The exclusive remedy provision of the California
worker's compensation law does not bar a damage action
for injuries, either physical or menta4 arising from the
alleged wrongful termination of an employee when the
employer's conduct in question lies well outside the
"compensation bargain, "pursuant to which the
employer assumes liability for industrial personal
injury in exchange for limitations on the amount of this
liability: Shoemaker v. Myers.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shoemaker v. Myers', the California Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether an employee, who has been the victim of wrong-
ful employment termination, may sue for damages when the com-
plaint alleges that physical injuries resulted from the termination
process, notwithstanding the exclusive remedy provisions2 of the
41. Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 39 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 703 P.2d at 345, 217 Cal.
Rptr. at 7 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In Griffin, Justice Mosk was concerned with the
ability of lower income families to purchase stakes in equity due to the restraints the
majority opinion had placed on condominium development. "Tihe city has placed un-
reasonable barriers in the way of those frugal families who prefer at the end of the
year to have an enhanced equity in a piece of real property instead of 12 rent receipts."
Id. Of the Justices on the bench at the time riffin was decided, only Justices Mosk
and Broussard, and Chief Justice Lucas remain. The change of justices on the court
enabled Justice Mosk to write the majority instead of the dissent in Beverly Towers.
1. 52 Cal. 3d 1, 801 P.2d 1054, 276 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1990).
2. Former Labor Code section 3601 provided in pertinent part:
a) "Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided
in section 3706, the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee
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worker's compensation law.3 The court determined that generally,
either physical or mental disabilities which arise from termination of
employment occur within the scope of employment4 and are thus
limited by the exclusive remedy provisions.5 Employee disabilities,
however, are not subject to the exclusive remedy provisions if an ex-
press or implied statutory exception can be invoked,6 if the em-
ployee's termination results from employer conduct which can be
seen as having a "'questionable' relationship to the employment,"7 or
is not an anticipated risk of employment.8
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At common law, an employment contract of indefinite term was
generally terminable at will by either party.9 Modernly, however,
throughout the United States and in California, the employer's abso-
lute right to terminate an employee has been limited.o Recent case
law in California has explored the issue of whether employees may
maintain actions in tort against their former employers for wrongful
termination or for injuries resulting therefrom, even though the
Workers Compensation Actl provides an exclusive remedy.
against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting
within the scope of his employment..."
Stats. 1971, c. 1751, p. 3780, § 1, operative April 1, 1972.
3. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056, 276 Cal Rptr. at 305.
4. Id. at 20, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
5. Id. at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
6. An example is Government Code Section 19683 which is commonly referred to
as the "whistle-blower" statute. The statute states that an employee may bring a civil
action for damages against the employer when the employer either disciplines or dis-
charges an employee who reports violations of law to the authorities. For more discus-
sion on Government Code Section 19683, see infra notes 94-104 and accompanying
text.
7. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1063, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (quoting
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 161, 729 P.2d 743, 751, 233
Cal. Rptr. 308, 316 (1987)).
8. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 16, 801 P.2d at 1063, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
9. C7eary v. American Airlines Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 448, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
725 (1980). The common law rule is codified in Labor Code section 2922. Stats. 1971,
ch 1580, § 1, p. 3186; Stats. 1971, Ch. 1607, § 2, p. 3459.
10. Where employers terminated employees in violation of a statute or a funda-
mental public policy, the right to terminate at will has been limited. See eg., Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980);
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d
25 (1959); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973).
11. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3200 eL seq. [hereinafter "the Act"].
In Renteria v. County of Orange'2 the court faced the issue of
whether the exclusive remedy provision barred an employee's suit
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.13 The plaintiff did not
allege any physical injuries and therefore was precluded from recov-
ery under the Act. The defendant argued that Labor Code Section
455314 provided adequate recovery, but the court rejected this asser-
tion and held that an employee's suit for intentional infliction of
emotional disstress was an implied exception to the exclusive
remedy.l5
The case of Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior C.16 re-
solved the issue of whether the exclusive remedy provisions barred a
suit for fraud and conspiracy against the employer.17 The defendant
raised the argument that section 4553 provided for recovery for inten-
tional acts of the employer. Here, the court accepted the argument
and held that injuries resulting from intentional misconduct are com-
pensable under section 4553.18 In certain situations, however, em-
ployer conduct will enable an employee to bring an action at law, and
therefore the employee will be able to sue for aggravation of his inju-
ries due to the employer's fraud.19
In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection District,2 0 the court again con-
fronted whether an employee may bring a civil action for intentional
12. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
13. In Renteria, plaintiff alleged his employers discriminated against him due to
his Mexican heritage, "with the object and intent to force or cause plaintiff to suffer
humiliation, mental anguish and emotional and physical distress, and to cause plaintiff
to resign his position of employment or to be fired or dismissed therefrom." I& at 835,
147 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
14. Stats. 1972, c. 1029, p. 1907, § 1. This section states that the amount of compen-
sation will be increased by 50% if the employee is injured by an employer's serious and
willful misconduct.
15. I& at 842, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452. The court reasoned that since plaintiff's inju-
ries were noncompensable a "fifty percent increase of nothing is still nothing." I& at
841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
16. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
17. In Johns.Manville, the employer fraudulently concealed from plaintiff that he
had been exposed to and had contracted industrial disease due to asbestos poisoning.
Furthermore, plaintiff claimed that while defendant knew all along that asbestos was
hazardous, upon finding out that plaintiff had become ill, the employer concealed the
information which further aggravated the condition. ICE
18. Id. at 473, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863. The court reasoned that often
times, an employer will recognize a danger but will fail to correct it. Id. at 474, 612
P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863. Even though such conduct is intentional, if employ-
ees were allowed to sue, injuries compensable under the Act would also be sued for
outside the system. This would undermine a process which "balances the advantage to
the employer of immunity from liability at law against the detriment of relatively
swift and certain compensation payments." Id. at 474,612 P.2d at 953,165 Cal. Rptr. at
863.
19. Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. Inherent in this conclusion was
the fact that the concealment from the plaintiff was behavior which fell outside the
parameters of the balancing system.
20. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
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infliction of emotional distress, notwithstanding the exclusive rem-
edy provision.2 ' The court opined that the exclusive remedy provi-
sion preempted the plaintiff's action at law for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.22 The court reasoned that holding otherwise
would enable employees to maintain an action at law "merely by al-
leging an ulterior purpose of causing injury."2 3 Such an exception
would not promote the purpose of the compensation bargain.24 Thus,
a separate action could only be brought in special cases, where the
conduct had a "questionable relationship" to the employment.2 5 In
Shoemaker, the court clarified these somewhat conflicting interpreta-
tions of the compensation bargain, and determined whether the ex-
clusive remedy provision barred actions for injuries alleged as the
result of employment termination.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Former Labor Code § 360026 states that employers are liable for in-
juries occurring in the course of employment27 as long as specified
conditions of compensation occur.28 Former Labor Code § 360129 pro-
21. Id. at 151, 729 P.2d at 744, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 309. In Cole, a fire department su-
pervisor continually harassed the plaintiff. The plaintiff was a union representative
and management had punished him for his activities. He was the victim of constant
harassment by his supervisors, including unique personnel evaluations, disciplinary ac-
tions, demotions, and assignments to menial duties. As a result of the harassment,
plaintiff suffered a massive stroke. Id at 152-153, 729 P.2d at 744-45, 233 Cal. Rptr. at
309-310.
22. Id. at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
23. Id.
24. Id
25. Id at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The court's decision placed the
bulk of employer conduct within the parameters of the compensation bargain (the pol-
icy underlying the Act), thus the exclusive remedy provision was applicable.
26. Ch. 1303, § 5, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4262.
27. In 1978, section 3600 of the Labor Code stated in pertinent part:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division... shall, without re-
gard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his
employees arising out of and in the course of employment... in those cases
where the ... conditions of compensation occur.
Id
28. The pertinent conditions for compensation necessary under the former code
provided as follows:
(1) the employer and employee are subject to the Act,
(2) that at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing
out of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within the course
of his or her employment,
(3) the injury is proximately caused by the employment... and
(4) the injury is not caused by the employee's intoxication, the injury or death
is not intentionally self-inflicted, the injury does not arise out of an alterca-
vided that compensation available to employees under the act would
be the exclusive remedy.3 0 This exclusive remedy provision has been
challenged by employees who were terminated due to employer con-
duct not seen as a reasonable risk of employment.31
Plaintiff Shoemaker maintained an exemplary employment record
for twenty-two years in the Department of Health Services2 (herein-
after "the Department"). However, on January 11th, 1982, Shoe-
maker was terminated.3 3 In 1980, after receiving a letter from the
Attorney General stating that certain health centers were operating
illegally,34 the Department assigned Shoemaker to investigate. Shoe-
maker filed a report confirming the allegations and stating that
Beverle A. Myers, the director of the Department, and other impor-
tant officials, had approved of funding for the centers with knowl-
edge of the illegal activity.35 After the report's filing, Charles
Shuttleworth, the plaintiff's supervisor, prevented Shoemaker from
continuing his investigation.38 When Shoemaker complained, he was
harassed and was subjected to disciplinary procedures.
In May 1981, a magazine article publicized the practices which the
plaintiff had previously reported. In November of the same year,
Shoemaker was mistakenly identified as an investigator who had
harassed two patients.3 7 The plaintiff was interrogated and when he
demanded representation, he was terminated for insubordination.
The State Personnel Board reinstated Shoemaker. Subsequently,
tion in which the employee is the initial physical aggressor and the injury
does not arise out of voluntary participation in recreational activities not rea-
sonably required as part of the employment.
Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 13-14, 801 P.2d at 1060-61, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10 (citing Ch.
1303, § 5, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4262 (formerly Labor Code § 3600)).
29. Ch. 1751, § 1, 1971, Cal. Stat. 3780, (operative April 1, 1972).
30. Section 3601 provided in pertinent part:
Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such com-
pensation ... is... the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee
against the employer...
Ch. 1751, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3780 (operative April 1, 1972).
31. See, e.g., Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 148, 729 P.2d at 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 308. See supra
note 21.
32. 52 Cal. 3d at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056-57, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06. For the nine years
previous to his termination, he worked as an investigator at the Department. Id. at 7,
801 P.2d at 1056, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
33. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 8, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal Rptr. at 306.
34. The letter alleged that workers were "performing services required to be per-
formed by licensed medical professionals." Id. at 7, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at
305-306.
35. Included among the officials was Beverle A. Myers, the director of the Depart-
ment of Health Services. I at 8, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
36. Charles Shuttleworth, chief of the division, basically prevented plaintiff from
continuing in the investigation. Id
37. A psychiatrist reported that investigators had harassed two of his patients
while conducting an investigation unrelated to the health centers. The psychiatrist
wrongly named Shoemaker as one of the investigators. Id
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Shoemaker's supervisors stated that they "wanted to cause plaintiff
as much trouble as possible," even though they knew he was fired
improperly.3 8
.On December 9, 1982, plaintiff filed his first complaint. On June 8,
1983 he amended the complaint including claims for: 1) wrongful ter-
mination; 2) wrongful termination due to former Government Code
§ 1968339; 3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; 4)
breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; 5) wrongful interference with business relationship and in-
ducement of breach of contract; 6) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; 7) fraud; 8) civil rights violation; 9) injunctive relief; and 10)
attorney's fees. The defendant's demurrer to the complaint was sus-
tained with leave to amend.40
In his second amended complaint, plaintiff omitted all allegations
of physical disabilities, except in the civil rights action. Defendants
again demurred, arguing that the exclusive remedy provision applied.
The trial court sustained with leave to amend. 41 In the third
amended complaint the plaintiff claimed only mental and emotional
injury and the court sustained defendant's demurrer without leave to
amend.42
The appeals court noted that where compensable (physical) disabil-
ity was caused, case law had mandated that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers Compensation Act controlled.43 The court
stated that the physical injury allegations in plaintiff's first coin-
38. Id. at 9, 801 P.2d at 1057, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 306. Shuttleworth, along with other
senior officers, also stated that "if it had been anyone other than plaintiff, he would
not have been fired." Id.
39. Ch. 1259, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 2473 (Amended by Ch. 584, § 2, 1979 Cal. Stat.
1831). Section 19683 is the "whistle-blower" statute which protects employees who re-
port violations by their superiors. For further analysis, see infra notes 94-104 and ac-
companying text.
40. Id. at 10, 801 P.2d at 1058, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 307. The demurrer was sustained
with leave to amend as to the first, second, third, and sixth causes of action because
such actions were barred by the Act's exclusive remedy provisions. In addition, the
court sustained the demurrer as to the seventh, eighth, and eleventh causes of action.
Id.
41. Id. The court informed plaintiff that he needed to include a good explanation
for, deleting the physical injury allegations within his amended complaint. Moreover,
the court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend as to the eighth,
ninth, and tenth causes of action.
42. Id at 10, 801 P.2d at 1059, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 308. Plaintiff's failure to explain
his deletion of physical injury allegations from the complaint caused the court to rule
that the exclusive remedy provisions barred the action. Id at 10-11, 801 P.2d at 1059,
276 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
43. Id. at 11, 801 P.2d at'1059, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (citing Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
plaint were controlling and all causes of action in the third amended
complaint were therefore barred.44 Moreover, intentional miscon-
duct by the employer alone could not justify an action outside of the
exclusive remedy since disciplinary and supervisory conduct in termi-
nation is a normal risk of employment.45 The court also rejected as-
sertions that the plaintiff could maintain an action under the
"whistle-blower" statute because the Act was the more specific and,
therefore, the controlling statute.45 Finally, the appellate court held
that the civil rights cause of action had been properly pled.47
III. TREATMENT
A. Majo'ity Opinion
The California Supreme Court held that the termination of em-
ployment is a normal part of the employment relationship.48 There-
fore, either physical or mental disabilities which arise therefrom fall
under the umbrella of worker's compensation coverage and are sub-
ject to the exclusive remedy provisions.49 However, the court further
held that employees may escape from the shackles of the Act when
their injuries result from behavior that would not be considered a
reasonable risk of employment. 50
B. Considerations of Allegations of Physical Injuries
By including significant allegations of physical injuries in his origi-
nal complaint, the plaintiff could not simply omit them later in the
hopes that the appellate court would not take them into account.51
The Court stated, "[m]aterial factual allegations in a verified pleading
that are omitted in a subsequent amended pleading without adequate
explanation will be considered by the court in ruling on a demurrer
to the later pleading."52 Plaintiff relied on McGee v. McNally,53 but
Protection Dist, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987) in reaching that
decision).
44. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 11, 801 P.2d at 1059, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
45. I&
46. Id at 12, 801 P.2d at 1059-60, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09.
47. The civil rights which may have been violated were plaintiff's freedom of
speech and freedom of association.
48. Id at 20, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
49. Id at 7, 801 P.2d at 1056, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 305. Justice Arabian delivered the
opinion of the court in which the Chief Justice, Justice Broussard, Justice Panelli, Jus-
tice Eagleson and Justice Kennard joined. Justice Mosk concurred in the judgment.
50. Id
51. Plaintiff's original complaint alleged "that his injuries caused him to lose time
from work and that he believed he would suffer some permanent disability." Id at 12,
801 P.2d at 1060, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
52. Id (citation omitted).
53. 119 Cal. App. 3d 891, 174 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1981).
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because his allegations of physical injury were so substantial,54 Mc-
Gee was inapplicable and the third amended complaint could not be
analyzed without considering the first complaint's allegations.55
: Although the Court of Appeal correctly took into account these al-
legations, its subsequent reliance on Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protec-
tion 56  in banning the majority of plaintiff's claims57 was
inappropriate.58 When considering whether the exclusive remedy
provision bars a cause of action, any alleged physical injury must be
viewed in "relation to the scope and purposes of the workers' com-
pensation statutory scheme."59
C. The Statutory Exclusive Remedy Povisus
The Court noted that since plaintiff's injuries occurred in 1981, the
Act would be applied in pre-1982 Amendment form.6 0 Former Labor
Code section 360061 held employers liable for any injury to employees
as long as certain "conditions of compensation"6 2 occurred. Former
Labor Code section 360163 stated that if such conditions occurred, the
right to recover compensation was "the exclusive remedy for injuries
or death of an employee against the employer .... . 6 4 Former Labor
Code section 360265 provided that an employer's liability would not
be subject to the limitations of the Act if the conditions of compensa-
54. As previously stated, plaintiff made substantial allegations of physical injury.
See supra, note 51. In McGee, plaintiff alleged intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress against his employer and made reference to physical harm. The court stated that
the allegations of physical injury were "makeweight" and no actual claim for disability
iwas made. Id. at 895, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 255. Because the claim was essentially based on
emotional and mental injuries, the court held that compensation outside the Act would
be allowed. Id. The court relied on Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833,
147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (compensation outside the worker's compensation system may
be sought in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress) and Johns-
Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1980) (outside cause of action may be allowed for deliberate employer conduct).
55. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 12, 801 P.2d at 1060, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
56. 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987).
57. The Court of Appeals sustained defendant's demurrer without leave to amend
for most of the causes of action. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Only
the civil rights cause of action was not barred. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 12, 801 P.2d at
1060, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
58. Id. at 13, 801 P.2d at 1060, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ch. 1303, § 5, 1978 Cal. Stat. 4258, 4262.
62. Id. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
63. Ch. 1751, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3779, 3780.
64. Id. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
65. Ch. 90, § 3602, 1937 Cal. Stat. 185, 269.
tion failed to occur.66 Noting that the scope of the exclusive remedy
provisions had been a major issue over the years,67 the Court then re-
viewed its earlier decisions.
The issue had reached its peak in Cole, and in that decision, the
Court had clarified certain principles. First, the exclusive remedy
provisions hinge upon an injury arising out of and in the course of
employment.68 Second, if the employee is injured in the course of
employment, then the exclusive remedy applies regardless of how
the employer behaved.69 Employers assume limited, no fault liabil-
ity, while employees receive swift compensation without the availa-
bility of additional tort damages.70
In Cole, however, situations were indicated and described where
the exclusive remedy would not act as a bar.71 For example, the ex-
clusive remedy only applies when there is "personal physical injury
or death."72 Furthermore, when the employer has "stepped out of
[his] proper role(s)" 73 or engaged in conduct which bears a "question-
able relationship to the employment," 74 the employee is not barred
by the exclusive remedy due to exposure to a risk which did not nec-
essarily reflect the purposes of the compensation bargain.75 Having
clarified these principles, the court next turned to the alleged causes
of action.
D. Applying the Exclusive Remedy
1. Wrongful Termination Causes of Action
Shoemaker primarily argued that due to Geoia-Pacjf Corp. v.
66. The statute read, "In all cases where the conditions of compensation do not
concur, the liability of the employer is the same as if this division had not been en-
acted." Id.
67. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 15, 801 P.2d at 1062, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
68. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 750,
233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1987).
69. Id. Even though in Cole the employee's supervisor had seemingly embarked
on a campaign to destroy plaintiff's life, the court held that the actions were within
the business relationship, and that, "[Ain employee ... may not avoid the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Labor Code by characterizing the employer's decisions as
manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance
resulting in disability." Id.
70. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 158, 729 P.2d at 749, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Each party gives
up some of their rights in exchange for valuable concessions in return. For other cases
which discuss the compensation bargain, see Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Supe-
ror Ca, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474, 612 P.2d 948, 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980); Riley v.
Southwest Marine, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 1258, 250 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727 (4 Dist.
1988).
71. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
72. Id at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
73. Id. at 161, 729 P.2d at 751, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
74. Id.
75. Id
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Workers Compensation Appeals Bd,76 the Act did not apply to his al-
legations.77 Injuries that arise from the termination of employment
do not arise in the course of employment7s as required under Labor
Code § 3600.
In Georgia-Pac(fi, an employer sought review of an award of com-
pensation on the grounds that the injuries resulted from termination
of employment not a result of the employment itself.79 The appellate
court stated, in dictum, that if termination were the cause of the in-
jury, then the injury would not be compensable because it did not
arise out of the course of employment. 80
In Shoenaker, the California Supreme Court held that this conclu-
sion was inapposite to its recent decision in Cole.81 The court held
that certain employer actions,8 2 indistinguishable from "non-consen-
sual termination of an employment relationship,"83 were covered
under the Act's exclusive remedy provisions.8 4 Furthermore, the
Court's decision in Traub v. Board of Retirement8 5 supported the
proposition that injuries resulting from termination fall under the ju-
risdiction of the Act.8 6 Although the statutory language at issue in
Traub was from a different source,8 7 the Court stated that it was
76. 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1983).
77. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 17, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
78. Id at 17, 801 P.2d at 1063, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
79. 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (2 Dist. 1983). In Georgia-Pacift, the
employee suffered injuries when he was told he would either have to accept either
lower pay or termination. Id at 74, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 644. Plaintiff was awarded com-
pensation and the employer appealed, arguing that the conditions of compensation did
not exist because the injuries did not arise out of the course of employment. Id.
80. Id at 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 645.
81. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
82. The certain actions enumerated in Cole included employer conduct such as,
"demotions, promotions, criticism of work practices, and frictions in negotiations as to
grievances." Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 160, 729 P.2d at 750, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 315. Basically, the
conduct in Cole was analogized to the conduct in the present case. Since such conduct
is a risk which falls within the compensation bargain, the conduct is covered under the
Act. Shoemaker 52 Cal. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
83. Id.
84. Since such conduct is seen as a risk falling within the compensation bargain, it
is necessarily subject to the Act's jurisdiction and is the exclusive remedy. Id.
85. 34 Cal. 3d 793, 670 P.2d 335, 195 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1983).
86. Id. at 801, 670 P.2d at 340, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
87. In Traub, the statute requiring the injury to arise out of the course of employ-
ment was Government Code § 31720 which called for retirement if an employee was
disabled in the course of employment. d, at 795 n.1, 670 P.2d at 336 n.1, 195 Cal. Rptr.
at 682 n.1. The trial court held the injuries arose out of termination of employment
and therefore plaintiff was not "entitled to a service-connected disability retirement al-
lowance." IM at 797, 670 P.2d at 337, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 683. The Supreme Court later
reversed this decision. Id. at 802, 670 P.2d at 340, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
'virtually identical to Labor Code section 3600"s8 and therefore
analogous to the present case.
Moreover, the Act must be given a liberal construction.s 9 In Peter-
son v. Moran,9 0 the court held that an employee who was injured af-
ter he had been discharged was still protected under the Act.91t
Applying this rule, the language of the statute must be interpreted
broadly. Therefore, termination can be considered as part of employ-
ment.92 The determination that injuries arising from termination are
covered under the act will avoid "evidentiary nightmare(s)." 93 How-
ever, even with this determination, the issue of whether the exclu-
sive remedy would be a bar to civil actions from injuries arising out
of termination was left unresolved.
a. Government Code Section 19683
Plaintiff's second claim was based on section 19683 which bans the
use of official authority to impede a state employee from reporting
suspected criminal violations occurring on the job.94 The Court of
Appeal held that this cause of action was barred because section
19683 was in conflict with the Act, and the Act controlled, since it
was the more specific statute.95 The Court disagreed, first noting
that the "general statute, specific statute" rule might not be applica-
ble.96 However, even if the rule applied, section 19683 was the more
specific statute.9 7 The Court also looked to the policy behind the
88. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 18, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
89. Id at 19, 801 P.2d at 1064, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 313. Labor Code Section 3202 pro-
vides that the act "shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of ex-
tending [its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment." Id.
90. 111 Cal. App. 2d 766, 245 P.2d 540 (1952).
91. In Peterson, after asking his employer why he had been discharged, the em-
ployee was injured. Even though he had been technically terminated, the court held
that he was still an "employee" and thereby protected by the Act. Id at 769, 245 P.2d
at 541. See also, Mitchell v. Hizer, 73 Cal. App. 3d 499, 140 Cal. Rptr. 790 (Dist. 1, 1977)
(injured while retrieving tools); Argonaut In& Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 221 Cal.
App. 2d 140, 34 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1963) (injured picking up final paycheck).
92. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 19, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314. The court
reasoned that since post termination accidents are covered, then accidents or injuries
resulting from termination must be covered as well. Id
93. Id. at 19-20, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314. The court opined that if
termination were not found to be in the course of employment there would be the
painstaking task of having to differentiate between injuries (notably psychological
ones) caused by actions preparing for termination and those caused by the discharge
itself. Id. at 20, 801 P.2d at 1065, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 314 (citing Georgia-Pac(i Corp. v.
Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd, 144 Cal. App. 3d 72, 75, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645
(1983)).
94. CAi Gov. CODE § 19683 (West 1980).
95. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 21, 801 P.2d at 1066, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
96. Id
97. Id.
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statutes to determine which would control.98 The court determined
that the policies and goals behind the "whistle-blower" statute were
more specific than those supporting the Act,99 thus the Court deter-
mined that section 19683 was controlling.100
Defendant argued that recovery under section 19683 could not in-
clude damages which would be otherwise provided for (such as physi-
cal injuries under the Act).101 The Court rejected this contention,
holding that such an interpretation "would provide virtually no pro-
tection to the very category of employees it was designed to pro-
tect."102 In addition, the legislature "clearly intended to afford an
additional remedy to those already granted under other provisions of
the law."103 Employing this reasoning, the Court held that the spe-
cific legislative protection provided by section 19683, including a right
to sue for damages for retaliatory behavior, created a specific statu-
tory exception to the exclusive remedy provisions.' 0 4
b. Additional Causes of Action for Wrongful Termination
Plaintiff argued that his termination was in violation of public pol-
icy and hence was not subject to the exclusive remedy because such
conduct "falls outside the compensation bargain."' 0 5 Because the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 21-22, 801 P.2d at 1066-67, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16. The purpose embod-
ied by the Workers Compensation Act is to enable employees to receive efficient re-
covery for injuries on the job. The purpose behind the whistle-blower statute,
however, "is to provide redress to a certain limited class of employees (state employ-
ees), for damages suffered as a consequence of the specific use of official power to de-
ter a particular protected activity .... [Tihe goals and the subject matter governed by
the whistle-blower protection statutes are far more narrowly circumscribed, more spe-
cific, than the Act." Id.
100. Id. at 22, 801 P.2d at 1067, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
101. Id. Defendants argued that the only recovery available under 19683 would be
for that "not otherwise already provided [for] under other laws.. ." Id
102. Id This interpretation would place plaintiffs in a virtual procrustean bed.
The beneficiaries of section 19683 are civil servants. The only protection provided
under defendant's interpretation would be to public employees exempt from civil ser-
vice who suffered no injuries from the harassment. Id If compensation under the Act
was enough, the Legislature would not have added section 19683 "expressly 'relating to
the state civil service"' Id (citing Preface to Ch. 1259, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 2473).
103. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 22, 801 P.2d at 1067, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
104. Id. at 23, 801 P.2d at 1067, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 316. Such retaliatory acts are not
encompassed within the compensation bargain. Id
105. Id. Plaintiff relied extensively on Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). In Tameny, Arco terminated the plaintiff
after 15 years of employment because he refused to join in a pricing scheme which was
in violation of antitrust law. The Court extensively reviewed other jurisdictions re-
garding the issue and held that when an employee is wrongfully discharged as against
plaintiff failed to argue this beforehand, the issue was remanded to
the Court of Appeal for its determination. The Court barred the
plaintiff's claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing because the plaintiff was a
civil servant. 06 The Court reasoned that public employees hold of-
fice under statute and, therefore, have no contractual rights. 0 Fur-
thermore, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing "cannot support an award of tort damages."' 0 8
2. Other Causes of Action
a, Interference with Business Relationship and Inducement of
Breach of Contract
The claim for "interference with employment relations"'0 9 is only
applicable in certain situations" o and a business employee may not
sue for the tort. Furthermore, since his pleadings identified no "pro-
spective economic advantage," ' n plaintiff's claim was really for in-
ducement of breach of contract." 2 Under Dryden v. Tri-Valley
Growers,"i3 parties to a contract cannot sue each other for induce-
fundamental public policy (for example, his refusal to participate in a criminal act),
then a tort action against the employer will lie. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 844. In Tameny the court relied on Petterman v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), stating, "To hold that one's contin-
ued employment could be made contingent upon his commission of a felonious act at
the insistance of his employer would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part
of both the employee and employer and serve to contaminate the honest administra-
tion of public affairs.. ." Id. at 173, 610 P.2d at 1333, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (quoting
Petterman, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27. Obviously plaintiff was arguing
that by preventing him from reporting the violations of the Department officials, a
criminal act itself was being perpetrated.
106. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 23, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
107. Id. at 23-24, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The Court stated, "[I]t is
well settled in California that public employment is not held by contract but by statute
and that, insofar as the duration of such employment is concerned, no employee has a
vested contractual right to continue in employment beyond the time or contrary to the
terms and conditions fixed by law." Id. (quoting Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal.
3d 808, 813-814, 557 P.2d 970, 973, 135 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389 (1977)).
108. Id. at 24, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (citing Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988)).
109. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 24, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317. The Court
was unsure what course of action the plaintiff was trying to allege here. The court
determined that the Plaintiff was invoking California Civil Code § 49, involving inter-
ference with employment relations.
110. The tort is primarily applicable where an employer brings an action for the
loss of a domestic servant. See LJ. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson, 40 Cal. 3d 327, 708
P.2d 682, 220 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1985). In Weinrot, an employer attempted to sue for the
injuries of a lay employee caused by a third party. The court held that California Civil
Code § 49 could not be expanded to compensate business employers for losses to key
employees. Id. at 341, 708 P.2d at 691, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
111. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 24, 801 P.2d at 1068, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317.
112. Id. The Court stated that simply continuing in employment was not a good
enough case for prospective economic advantage. Id.
113. Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1977).
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ment to breach."4 Additionally, since the plaintiff's supervisors
were agents of the employer, the action was barred because agents
acting under corporate authority cannot be liable for inducing a
breach of a corporate contract.115 Therefore, since this cause of ac-
tion was essentially the same as a cause of action for breach of con-
tract, the plaintiff had no course of recovery." 6
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Court held that plaintiff's cause of action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress was governed by its decision in Cole." 7
In Cole, the Court held that employer conduct similar to the type at
hand was a normal part of the employment relationship.llS
Although the conduct may be "intentional, unfair, or outrageous it is
nevertheless covered by the workers compensation exclusivity
provisions." 1 9
c. Violation of Civil Rights and Additional Issues
Since neither plaintiff nor defendant challenged the decision of the
appellate court on the civil rights violation issue, the judgment was
affirmed and the cause of action was reinstated.120 The defendants
raised additional issues, 12 1 but because both lower courts failed to ad-
dress them due to their application of the exclusive remedy provi-
sions, these issues were remanded for consideration. 12 2
114. Id. at 998-999, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
115. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 24-25, 801 P.2d at 1068-69, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18 (cit-
ing Greenberg v. Aetna In& Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 487 (1973)).
116. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 25, 801 P.2d at 1069, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The court
basically reclassified plaintiff's claim as a breach of contract action. Since state em-
ployees have no contractual rights (see supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text),
the action was barred.
117. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 25, 801 P.2d at 1069, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
118. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist, 43 Cal. 3d at 148, 160, 729 P.2d 743, 751,
233 Cal. Rptr. at 308, 316 (1987).
119. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 25, 801 P.2d at 1069, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 318. In Cole, the
court determined that any supervisory or disciplinary action taken by employers is in-
herently intentional and therefore, allowing claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress would be contrary to prior precedent and would open the floodgates of
litigation. Cole, 43 Cal. 3d at 159, 729 P.2d at 749-50, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15.
120. Shoemaker, 52 Cal. 3d at 26, 801 P.2d at 1069, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
121. Id Included were claims that under California Government Code §§ 821.6 and
815.2, they were immune from malicious prosecution, and that because there were in-
adequacies in the original administrative claim, the cause of action was barred under
Government Code § 911.2 and 910.
122. Id. at 26, 801 P.2d at 1069, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19.
IV. IMPACT
At first glance, the Court's decision may seem harsh to employers.
The costs and frequency of stress related claims brought under the
Workers Compensation Act have skyrocketed over the recent
years. 2 3 Employers have received no help with the holding in Shoe-
maker that indemnity from workers compensation is available for
stress injuries which result solely from discharge. Employers must
still tread softly in management policies regarding discipline of em-
ployees for fear of costly workers compensation litigation.124
In 1989, Labor Code 3208.3 was established to raise the level of
proof necessary to establish a causal connection between injuries and
employment.125 Some suggest that the employee is required to estab-
lish some physical symptom of the mental injury. 2 6 Perhaps the sys-
tem would be better served by installing a more objective
standard.127 Moreover, since there is the possibility of fraud in these
cases, disciplinary procedures have to be tightened.128
Employers, however, should take some solace in the fact that their
liability is limited. Under the Court's decision in Shoemaker, the vast
majority of employer conduct will be seen as falling under the um-
brella of the "compensation bargain" and hence subject to the exclu-
sive remedy. Only truly outrageous behavior may be sued upon
separately, thus allowing employers to avoid being punished for con-
duct which would normally be actionable but for the arena in which
it occurred. Even so, the Court's decision will lead to more claims
under workers compensation with a corresponding increase in insur-
ance costs. Thus, the public at large will probably bear the costs, a
result which appears contrary to the intention of the system.129
123. The number of claims for mental stress rose from 1,178 to 9,368 between 1978
and 1988, a 700 percent increase. The Recorder, commentary section, July 9, 1991.
Moreover there has been a 60 percent increase in the costs related to stress claims with
the cost of resolving a suit ranging from $10,000 to $13,000. Id. See also Ronald Grover,
Say, Does Workers' Comp. Cover Wretched Excess?, Business Week, July 22, 1991, at
23.
124. Id.
125. Ch. 892, § 25, 1989 Cal. Stat. 2683. Amended Ch. 1550, § 20, 1990 Cal. Stat. 6183.
Section 3208.3 requires that employees must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that "actual events of employment were responsible for at least 10 percent of
the total causation from all sources contributing to the psychiatric injury." Id. Some
argue that the standard should be raised because doctors testify simply in order to
meet this standard. The Recorder, supra note 123. Moreover, Governor Wilson is pro-
posing a plan that would "make workers prove that their jobs contributed to 50% of
their mental stress." See Business Week, supra note 123.
126. See The Recorder, supra note 123.
127. For example, no recovery is allowed if, under the same facts, a reasonable
man would not suffer such mental trauma.
128. Fraud occurs on the part of employees, lawyers, and doctors alike. See The Re-
corder, supra note 123. Hidden cameras recently exposed fraudulent practices being
solicited in unemployment lines.
129. See generally, Business Week, supra note 123.
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V. CONCLUSION
California employees collected $5.3 billion in disability payments in
1989.130 Insurance rates in California are second only to Montana as
a result of our liberal workers compensation system.131 California is
one of only four states to allow claims for stress132 and under Shoe-
maker, the Court has extended this protection to stress arising from
discharge. In a system where fraud runs rampant, 33 and the market
for workers compensation claims grows steadily, 34 drastic reform is
needed. By allowing employees to invoke the protection of the
Workers Compensation Act for the vast majority of employer con-
duct, the Court has greatly increased the cost of doing business in
California during a time when corporate America needs all the help
it can get.
STUART E. FRANK
130. See Business Week, supra note 123.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. See supra note 128.
134. For instance, there has been a recent flood of attorney advertising encouraging
people to seek redress for their employers' alleged violations.

